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情報通信行政・郵政行政審議会　郵政行政分科会（第105回）配布資料・議事概要・議事録

Bans Like California’s Don’t Fix What’s Wrong With Social Media Companies

SAN FRANCISCO - Technology and the laws that regulate it should support and empower young people. California’s AB 1709 - signed into law today by Gov. Gavin Newsom - falls far short of this goal, say the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and its allies.   

Using technology is how we learn and build community in today’s world. Laws such as AB 1709, a functional ban on social media use for people under the age of 16, instead cut young people off from essential information and experiences. That particularly harms those already facing increased challenges, who often find safety in supportive online communities that they can’t always access in the physical world.  

"California should be passing laws to ensure that technology really works for people of all ages, not enacting social media bans that cut young people off from digital lifelines, communities, and speech," said EFF Associate Director of State Affairs Rindala Alajaji. "Denying minors access to digital forums - or stripping out basic tools needed to navigate them - is not going to help make young people safer or healthier in the AI age."  

Research shows social media bans are ineffectual, while also denying young people opportunities to develop their own voices and perspectives—to share their art, practice religion or engage in politics.   

Age-gating requirements also force everyone to give up more personal information. To verify who can pass through their online gates, companies will collect even more data, and this further concentrates power in the hands of companies, rather than protecting people.  

AB 1709 is also inconsistent with rights to free expression and California will be spending resources to defend a law tied up in court. Instead, we should redouble our efforts to get technology laws right—and support the passage of new robust privacy laws that target surveillance business models. That’s how we protect everyone in the AI age.   

Young people should be able to use technology in safe and healthy ways. The Golden State should model the gold standard laws that ensure technology works for everyone, rather than shut down access to digital forums in ways that do more harm than good. 

"Social media bans like AB1709 make kids less safe, while undermining privacy and freedom of expression for everyone,” said Evan Greer, Director of Fight for the Future. “Young people have been on the forefront of every social movement throughout history that has led to positive social change. We need policies that empower young people rather than silencing them. These kid-focused bans are a gift to Big Tech giants, allowing them to continue operating their harmful business model while incentivizing them to collect even more data. California lawmakers should be ashamed. They didn't do anything to protect the kids, they just used kids as pawns to make good headlines."  

“In a world of increasing stigma and marginalization for LGBTQ+ families, AB 1709 continues that trend by stripping people with LGBTQ+ parents of the ability to meet and build community with one another on the internet” said Jordan Wilson, Executive Director of COLAGE. “Beyond obstructing the right of youth with LGBTQ+ parents to access information, this bill places an undue burden on all Californians by forcing age verification at a time when digital privacy rights are being eroded globally. We cannot ‘protect children’ by stripping them of their primary avenue for connection.” 

Contact:  RindalaAlajajiAssociate Director of State Affairsrin@eff.org

　８月９日に荻窪駅前の会議室で６月に再選された岸本聡子杉並区長の第２期スタートイベント「みんなでいこう杉並ＮＥＸＴ！～杉並区長選挙でのつながりを、未来に」が開かれた。　会場では１５０人余りの参加者がテーマごとに防災や住まいなど１０のテーブルに分かれて地域の課題について話し合った。区民の声を反映させる「対話の区政」と市民自治をめざすもので、グループには岸本区長も参加しながら耳を傾け発言した。　　　　　　　ＪＣＪ月刊機関紙「ジャーナリスト」２０２６年８月２５日号　

株式会社コンテックが提供するPC-HELPERシリーズには、複数の脆弱性が存在します。

株式会社コンテックが提供するCONPROSYSシリーズには、複数の脆弱性が存在します。

株式会社コンテックが提供する無線LAN FLEXLANシリーズには、複数の脆弱性が存在します。

株式会社コンテックが提供するSolarView Compactには、複数の脆弱性が存在します。

SHIRASAGI Projectが提供するSHIRASAGIには、複数の脆弱性が存在します。

This special edition of Global Information Society Watch (GISWatch) considers the importance of WSIS as an inclusive policy and governance mechanism, and what, from a civil society perspective, needs…

This special edition of Global Information Society Watch offers powerful arguments for the decolonisation of free/libre and open source software (FLOSS).

Law enforcement agencies across the country are increasingly relying on spying technologies—automated license plate readers (ALPR), cell-site simulators, and facial recognition, to name a few--causing an outcry in many communities where people are rightly concerned about the threat to civil rights and civil liberties these tools present.

Some authorities are responding to these concerns by trying to hide what they’re doing. Police departments are telling officers not to mention ALPRs when stopping vehicles and concealing their use of ALPRs to avoid citizens’ public records requests. Concealing the use of unpopular spying tools isn’t anything particularly new for law enforcement—cops have been doing it for years—but it’s just as wrong now as it was 20 years ago.

These practices prevent the public from knowing about and questioning how agencies are spending taxpayer dollars on spying technologies and holding them accountable. This is especially troubling when many towns are signing contracts with Flock and other ALPR vendors with little to no public oversight. The practice also violates disclosure obligations, allows cops and prosecutors to hide their tactics from judges, and cheats defendants from being able to challenge the use of evidence gathered by spy tech from being used against them.

404 Media recently revealed that in its usage policy for Flock ALPR cameras, one county in Iowa tells police to keep them a secret when detaining people: “DO NOT MENTION ALPR USAGE TO THE OCCUPANTS OF THE VEHICLE,” the policy document reads. “DO NOT MENTION ALPR USAGE IN YOUR REPORT OR COMPLAINT UNLESS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY.” If writing a report about an incident, police are told to say they used “county resources” in making a stop instead of acknowledging use of ALPRs.

In Houston, police officers are likewise instructed to “be as vague as permissible” about why they are using Flock because the searches they run on Flock’s surveillance system could be obtained via public records requests.

There is growing public alarm about the threat to civil liberties posed by ALPR cameras and reports of police abusing the tech by using it to spy on their exes. Some cities have the cameras covered up, and others are cancelling their use of ALPR networks. Two states have recently stepped back from ALPRs. This trend is certainly not lost on law enforcement agencies. Hiding the fact that they’re using ALPRs from Flock and other vendors is one way of avoiding scrutiny and bad PR.

But law enforcement and their spy tech vendors keeping people in the dark about the surveillance technologies trained on them predates the Flock backlash by decades. For example, AT&T built a powerful phone surveillance tool for police, called Hemisphere, in the mid 2000s, and the company required agencies not to use evidence gathered by Hemisphere in court unless there was no other admissible evidence. If evidence obtained through Hemisphere was used, police were required to recreate it through a traditional subpoena, a process they called “parallel construction.” We called it “evidence laundering.”

Likewise, police and prosecutors have taken far-reaching steps to hide from the public and courts their use of cell site simulators, also known as stingrays. Police have used these devices, which trick cell phones into connecting to them instead of phone towers to try locating suspects, to obtain people’s location data without a warrant by deceptively obtaining basic pen register orders from courts. Pen register orders are for obtaining call log data and police don’t need to prove they have probable cause to get one.

In Baltimore, for example, a judge concluded that law enforcement had used a standard pen register order to intentionally hide its use of a Stingray from the court in violation of its legal disclosure obligations, leading to a landmark 2015 privacy ruling that cops need a warrant to use the device.

That didn’t stop police from continuing to try to pull the wool over the eyes of courts and defense attorneys when they used stingrays, however. Prosecutors have accepted plea deals to hide their use of cell-site simulators and have even dropped cases rather than reveal information about their use of the technology. U.S. Marshalls have driven files hundreds of miles to thwart public records requests.

Fortunately, our commitment to shining a light on the use of surveillance tech is just as strong, if not stronger, than law enforcement’s quest to hide it. We’re working with privacy advocates and community groups to bring awareness about existing and emerging spy tools that threaten civil liberties and we’re encouraging policymakers and lawmakers to do more to restrain warrantless mass surveillance and stop it before it ever takes hold.  

If you're curious about whether your local police have contracts for ALPRS or other surveillance technologies, you can search EFF's Atlas of Surveillance.

 

税務システム等標準化検討会（第17回）

情報通信審議会　情報通信技術分科会　新世代モバイル通信システム委員会　ローカル5G検討作業班（第25回）開催案内

「安全性・信頼性を確保したデジタルインフラの海外展開支援事業」令和8年度「ローカル・スタートアップ枠」二次公募の採択結果

The term “digital sovereignty” has become ubiquitous. European officials invoke it in debates about cloud infrastructure, AI, semiconductors, and platform regulation. Governments throughout the global majority use it to argue for greater control over data and communications infrastructure and boost their economies. Companies market “sovereign cloud” products designed to reassure their customers that their information stays under local jurisdiction. But digital sovereignty could be something more: an opportunity for users around the world to build more resilient, open  systems and the skills and infrastructure to maintain them.

There is no singular definition of digital sovereignty, nor is there a single coherent position in the digital rights space. Despite its growing popularity, the term remains frustratingly vague. Policymakers, regulators, civil society groups, and others can mean very different things when they use the term. But to start simply with a broad definition, we can say that it means having the capacity to control one’s digital destiny—though the implications of that will obviously differ considerably whether you’re talking about an individual or a country.

We can start by developing  a shared understanding of what digital sovereignty actually means. We’ve also included a glossary of terms at the bottom of this post. 

In Europe and other places where digital sovereignty has become a topic of policy, discussions focus on reducing dependency: on foreign (and particularly American) cloud infrastructure, chips, platforms, and at times, foreign political priorities. The concern is both economic and geopolitical. If essential infrastructure is controlled by companies elsewhere—and thus subject to the laws of another jurisdiction—then what control does a country actually have over its own digital future?

In global majority countries in particular, wars, sanctions, and the growing fragmentation of the internet have demonstrated for many that the physical infrastructure that underlies digital life is neither neutral nor invulnerable. 

Amidst this increasing geopolitical instability governments and civil society should consider whether digital sovereignty can help shore up that infrastructure. 

What are we talking about when we talk about digital sovereignty? 

A recent Franco-German joint paper on digital sovereignty defines it as the “capability and capacity to develop, provide, use, adapt and control digital technologies including hardware in an independent, self-determined and secure manner” and puts forward a framework to operationalize Europe’s capacity to act in the digital domain. 

Some governments, such as Germany’s, have started to put funding behind sovereignty efforts through initiatives like the Sovereign Tech Agency, which “invest[s] globally in the open software components that underpin Germany's and Europe's competitiveness and ability to innovate.” 

Positions on digital sovereignty among EFF’s allies across Europe vary. Open Rights Group have defined digital sovereignty as “the ability of a country to have control over its digital infrastructure, data, and technology” and states it to be “critical for the UK’s economic and national security.” 

Similarly, the European Partnership for Democracy has expressed concern that “a few Big Tech corporations decide our collective destiny,” and argue that the EU should explore “alternative ownership models for tech companies and clearly [define] their purpose and mission.” And our friends at EDRi (of which EFF is a member) have stated clearly that “Europe’s digital sovereignty starts with open source.” Some initiatives, such as DI.DAY, consider digital sovereignty an opportunity to free users from Big Tech dependencies.

Elsewhere in the world, conversations about digital sovereignty often take a different shape. Indigenous discussions of the topic have been ongoing for more than a decade and focus on the inherent right of Native nations to govern their own digital ecosystems. In Southeast Asia, the desire for digital sovereignty has created growth in the sovereign cloud industry, but the conversation isn’t purely economic: Concerns about jurisdiction for where data is held are driving much of the conversation. 

In Latin America, digital public infrastructure is often a key aspect of debates. Across Africa, leaders speak of a desire to shift the continent from being consumers of technology to becoming architects of their own digital infrastructure and data ecosystems. And in the Middle East and North Africa, concerns about reliance on U.S. technology companies—which have engaged in conflict and disproportionate censorship (particularly of Palestinian voices) in the region—are often paramount.

Reem Almasri, a senior researcher based in Jordan, recently spoke to EFF about digital sovereignty, which she sees as “the ability of people and communities to choose, control, and use technology that serves their needs and values,” particularly in light of the role that U.S. companies have played in regional conflicts.

In a January article, Almasri pointed to growing concerns about granting greater sovereignty and influence to governments over citizens’ data, communications, and websites, writing: “This is particularly worrisome in countries that impose high levels of internet and media censorship and run unaccountable surveillance programs on their citizens’ data.”

Indeed, while pushing for greater sovereignty from Big Tech has benefits, there is an inherent risk that some states will pursue digital sovereignty as a means of cutting off or splintering access—as we’ve already seen in Iran, Russia, and elsewhere.

For that reason, it’s no surprise that some, such as Iranian professor Azadeh Akbari, believe that “the current wave pushing digital sovereignty as the key to ending dependency on American and Chinese technology is negligent of its Eurocentric bias.” 

What does EFF believe?

In a world where people have digital sovereignty, civil society should be able to communicate freely, privately, and anonymously if they wish. People should be able to easily understand where their data lives and who has access to it. That data should be easily portable between platforms and services.

At EFF, we view digital sovereignty not as a walled garden, but as an opportunity for resilience and development of industries and skills. We believe that governments can and should take a role in crafting digital sovereignty that centers the autonomy of users rather than just re-creating a state of digital dependency with a new set of companies. Governments should support and use free and open source tools and projects built using principles of interoperability and data portability. This support should include employing full-time developers, UX designers, and community managers. Government policy and legislation should grant users control of their own data and a clear understanding of who can lawfully access it. Digital sovereignty should foster users’ ability to choose how they use digital products and services, free from unfair lock-ins, coercive terms and manipulative defaults. It should also foster the broader public interest internet, the part of the web that provides public goods and useful services without requiring the scale or the business practices of the tech giants.

Encryption backdoors are fundamentally incompatible with a vision of data sovereignty that centers user control. Governments should support the development and normalization of reputable end-to-end encrypted communications as well as strong encryption for data at rest. This support should include employing cryptographers and contributing to strong, peer-reviewed encryption standards strengthened by data minimization as a fundamental design principle, as well as refraining from legislating mandates for “lawful access” or any other reason.  

As technologists, we don’t have to wait for governments to act in order to create the digital sovereignty we want. We get the internet that we build. We can contribute to open source, decentralized, and end-to-end encrypted projects. We can build standards that make interoperability and data portability a feature from the very beginning. We can resist the call of proprietary solutions, user lock-in, and encryption backdoors.

And finally, while digital sovereignty is often framed as a response to the dominance of Big Tech, that does not mean that there is no role for private companies to play. There is no point in replacing the influence of a few mostly US-based tech companies with a handful of giants based elsewhere. Companies can and should build platforms and services on top of open source, decentralized protocols and contribute to the ecosystem. Companies should also minimize processing a person’s data except as strictly necessary to provide them what they asked for, and only with opt-in consent that makes it clear to users what data they are gathering, where it is stored, and who has access to it. And companies should build their tools and platforms in a way that allows interoperability and that makes it easy for users to leave with their data. Some of these practices are already required by law in some jurisdictions, but companies don’t have to merely do the bare minimum the law demands: they should respect their users and support data sovereignty right now.

A glossary of terms

The following terms are useful for understanding this blog post as well as the broader conversation about Digital Sovereignty:

Intermediary liability: the legal responsibility of online service providers (ISPs, websites, social media platforms) for unlawful activities by their users, such as defamation, copyright infringement, or illegal hate speech.

The stack: a secure, open-source technology framework, often focusing on European alternatives, designed to break dependencies on (mostly) US-based technology providers. It comprises interoperable, vendor-neutral, and transparent digital infrastructures designed to regain control over data, infrastructure, and technology.

Digital sovereignty: the ability of people, as nations, organizations, and individuals, to control their own digital destiny by retaining authority over their own data, technology, and infrastructure.

Data sovereignty: the principle that digital information is subject to the laws and governance frameworks of the country or region where it is physically collected, stored, or processed. It dictates that data remains bound by the specific privacy protections and regulations of its originating jurisdiction, regardless of where the collecting organization is located.

Digital commons: a shared, online resource, such as knowledge, software, and data, that is collectively produced, governed, and maintained by a community, intended for public access. Examples include Wikipedia, open source operating systems such as Linux, and Creative Commons licensed content.

Data portability/interoperability: the ability to easily transfer personal data from one service provider to another, or to a personal system, in a structured, machine-readable format. It empowers users to move away from "walled gardens," reducing vendor lock-in and enhancing user autonomy.

Digital dependency: the opposite of digital sovereignty. The inability of people as nations, organizations, and individuals to control their own digital destiny through control over their own data, technology, and infrastructure. 

Decentralization: a shift away from relying on centralized, often US-based, corporate platforms toward a distributed, user-centric internet where individuals, communities, and nations maintain control over their data, digital identity, and infrastructure.

End-to-end encryption (e2ee): a secure communication process where only the sender and intended recipient can access, read, or decrypt messages or data.

Fairness (à la the Digital Fairness Act): the absence of deceptive, manipulative, or addictive design practices that distort consumer choice and exploit vulnerabilities. 

User sovereignty: the concept that individuals possess absolute control over their personal data, digital identity, and online privacy, rejecting the centralization of power by large technology platforms. It emphasizes user consent, decentralization, and the ability to manage personal data using secure and independent tools.