Aggregator

経済産業省は、工場を建設する目的で平成27年（1月～12月期）に1,000平方メートル以上の用地を取得した製造業、ガス業、熱供給業、電気業の事業者を対象に「工場立地動向調査」を実施し、結果を取りまとめました。

4月5日から9日まで、韓国のソウルにおいて、日中韓自由貿易協定(FTA)交渉の第10回交渉会合(局長/局次長会合)が開催されます。

経済産業省は、昨年10月に「活力あふれる『ビンテージ・ソサエティ』の実現に向けた取組に係る研究会」を立ち上げ、検討を重ね、今般報告書をとりまとめました。

交通事故の削減や渋滞緩和、環境負荷低減等の課題解決が期待される協調ITS（※）の実現普及に必要とされる地図データベースの整備や維持・更新のコスト削減に役立つ日本発の国際規格が制定されました。

平成28年3月4日に、東京電力からありました改正電気事業法に基づく会社分割に係る申請について、このたび申請のとおり認可しました。

With no serious debate, including on proposed amendments, Canada is blazing full speed ahead with Bill C-22, which would threaten encryption and increase surveillance. Also known as the Lawful Access Bill, Bill C-22 is currently moving forward quickly to a vote despite the many, many criticisms civil liberty groups and the tech industry have hurled at it.

As we’ve discussed before, Bill C-22 is dangerous on multiple levels. It pushes for requirements for metadata retention, expands information sharing with foreign governments, and establishes a mechanism that allows Canada’s Ministry of Public Safety to demand that companies create backdoors, effectively breaking encryption. That mechanism was a key facet of Part 2 in Bill C-22, and the government prevented it from being independently debated.

In a deep analysis of the bill, Citizen Lab and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association detail every one of flaws of this proposal, concluding that most elements are unsalvageable. 

A wide range of tech companies agree. Signal, Apple, Google, and several VPN providers oppose the bill, and some have said they’d likely be forced to either cut Canadians off from certain features or shut down services in Canada altogether.

The Canadian government wants this dangerous, complicated, overreaching bill passed before June 19. Bill C-22 is riddled with privacy problems that affect millions of people. It should be debated and studied fully, not jammed through on an arbitrary deadline. 

OpenMedia is offering a tool for Canadians to contact their elected representatives about the bill. Actions taken on OpenMedia's website are governed by OpenMedia's privacy policy, not EFF's.

EFF is grateful for SerpApi’s generous support, helping us fight for your rights to speak and access information online. SerpApi has been giving to EFF every year since 2018, and alongside our 32,000 individual donors, their gift is critical to keeping up the fight.

Whether in the courts, halls of power, or broader policy debates, we appreciate the work this support has made possible over the years. Some examples:

• We sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and Department of State to stop an unconstitutional social media surveillance program to identify and punish individuals who express viewpoints the government disagrees with.
• We helped develop the Santa Clara Principles, a framework to reign in overbroad content moderation so that all users are treated fairly and offered consistent tools for recourse if their speech is censored by tech companies.
• In the whitepaper Unfiltered: How YouTube’s Content ID Discourages Fair Use and Dictates What We See Online, we pushed back on YouTube for silencing individual creators in the interest of protecting a small number of giant copyright holders.
• We stood with whistleblowers and dissidents persecuted for their online speech.
• We continued the fight to protect Section 230.

We live in an era when lawful speech and the right to access information are being targeted by Big Tech and governments around the world that are hostile to dissent. Free speech online is core to EFF’s mission, and SerpApi’s support will help us continue the fight to protect everyone’s right to free expression.

2020年基準 消費者物価指数 全国 2026年(令和8年)5月分

令和8年度バイオマス産業都市募集開始のプレスリリースについて

第230回統計委員会

林総務大臣閣議後記者会見の概要

This Pride season, join EFF and the Queer Arts Collective in building a creative space at the intersection of digital justice and artistic expression. 

We’re looking for fresh, untold, historically censored takes on digital liberation. 

Whether it’s pointing the lens towards an issue you feel is underrepresented in digital justice efforts; sharing personal accounts of joy, pleasure, or sorrow under surveillance; painting your widest imagination for our communities using technology for good instead of carcerality and doom—we want to see it and we want it to expand our own understanding of what’s important and beautiful. 

We’re going to be curating between five and nine art pieces across writing (fiction, nonfiction, poetry) and visual arts (photography, drawing, painting). We welcome fluidity in medium and genre, and cross-genre works of all kinds, such as graphic storytelling and collaborations. 

We are looking for works that convey the importance of digital liberation and ways of achieving it, particularly from under-represented perspectives. Pieces will be selected based on interpretation of the theme, emotional resonance (does it surprise, move, frighten, delight?), and overall curatorial cohesion for each issue. 

Submissions that adhere to the following length guidelines are preferred: 

(NON)FICTION - max 1500 words
POETRY - max 2 poems 
VISUAL ARTS - max 1 artwork, which can be a serialized collection. 

Please submit to paige+pride@eff.org by June 30, 2026, including your piece as an attachment and a short bio in the body of the email, alongside anything else we should know about your submission. You can expect to hear back from us around July 31, and we aim to have the first issue published in September. If we select your submission for publication on both EFF and Queer Arts Collective websites, we will compensate you between $25 - $50, depending on the number of pieces published. 

There is no fee for entry. Please only submit one piece or a contained series for this call, and wait for us to get back to you before submitting again. If you plan to submit both individually and as part of a collective, one submission in each of these categories applies. 

Your submission must be your original work and you must have the legal right to authorize us to publish it, but it need not be created specifically for this project; you may submit a work you have published previously. Please disclose any use of AI in a note in your application—this will not disqualify your entry, though we value transparency of labor exchange. 

As attempting to witness art is a highly subjective endeavor, please don't consider not being selected as anything other than circumstantial. We are looking to foster a community of artists working for digital justice, and would love to see more from you in the future. 

You will retain all legal rights to your work, but agree to provide EFF and Queer Arts Collective with a non-exclusive and non-time-limited license to publish your work on their websites and other promotional materials, such as in zines. 

Meet the Judges

Kit Walsh is an EFF attorney who works to protect the rights of activists, journalists, researchers, and dissenters in order to build a better world. She is also a Nebula-award-winning author and is best known for her tabletop roleplaying game Thirsty Sword Lesbians.

Paige Collings is an EFF activist working to dismantle systems of oppression and advance collective liberation. Her work focuses on highlighting how state surveillance and corporate restrictions stifle marginalized communities and perpetuate historic injustices and harm. She works with activists across the globe to facilitate systemic change by speaking truth to power and creating spaces for alternative imaginations.

The Queer Arts Collective is an NYC-based collective run by queer and racialized artist-activists, looking to make space for art that is deliberately disruptive of structural hierarchies that power the status quo.

Last week, Senators Ted Cruz and Ron Wyden introduced the Justice Against Weaponized Bureaucratic Overreach to Networked Expression, or JAWBONE Act. The bipartisan legislation creates a federal cause of action against government officials who coerce or attempt to coerce broadcasters, interactive computer services, or AI providers into taking actions against lawful, First-Amendment-protected speech, and establishes a transparency system for government communications with those intermediaries about user expression.

We thank the Senators for their leadership on this important issue. Jawboning occurs when the government pressures private companies to censor speech protected by the First Amendment, and it’s not always obvious to the public or to the victims what has actually happened. Deleting posts or cancelling accounts because a government official or agency demanded it or even made threats in making those demands—just like spying on people’s communications on behalf of the government—raises serious free speech concerns. Among other things, this bill would provide a new legal right to bring claims against the government in federal court, in addition to what the First Amendment provides.

At EFF, we’re continuing to fight back on behalf of those censored by government coercion. One recent example: we represent the creator of ICEBlock, an app that allows the public to report immigration enforcement activity in their communities. In June 2025, high-ranking federal officials began threatening to investigate and prosecute the creator of ICEBlock, Joshua Aaron. In October 2025, the U.S. Attorney General demanded Apple remove ICEBlock from the App Store, and the company complied. The government’s coercion violated Aaron’s First Amendment rights.

We’ve also filed a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit against the same government agencies that threatened Aaron and other services that provided forums to report ICE activity. The lawsuit seeks the disclosure of the government’s communications with Apple, Google, and Meta that forced the services to remove lawful speech.

When federal officials pressure private companies into censoring protected speech, it can violate the First Amendment. But, not every communication from a government agency to a platform is unconstitutionally coercive. Treating legitimate communication and information-sharing between the government and private actors as though it were always unconstitutional would chill the valuable, good-faith engagement that supports a healthier and safer internet and nation for all Americans. This is a complex issue, and one that is important for Congress and the courts to get right. 

Finally, contrary to what many in Congress have been saying, social media platforms and other internet intermediaries have their own First Amendment rights to decide how they moderate users’ speech. They are not “state actors” and do not have an obligation under the First Amendment to allow all user speech on their platforms. EFF filed an amicus brief setting out our position in 2018, and we’ve said it in many cases since. The Supreme Court recognized again in the Netchoice cases that these services have a right to curate and edit their users’ speech, whether or not it aligns with the government’s position. And, it’s important to defend that First Amendment right so that governments cannot dictate how to edit a company’s site according to the government’s wishes and desires. To prevent jawboning by default, companies must be free to curate their platforms as they wish.

EFF applauds Senators Cruz and Wyden for taking this critical issue seriously, and we look forward to working with Congress on this bipartisan bill as it moves through the process. We hope it lands on the right balance to provide additional protections for everyday users around freedom of expression. 

Court records belong to the public. Yet anyone seeking access to federal court filings through PACER, a government software system that stands for Public Access to Court Electronic Records, is usually required to pay hefty fees to search for and view documents. PACER’s fees have long acted as a barrier that makes it hard, especially for low income people, to see and understand the work produced by our own public servants. 

That's why EFF joined a broad group of organizations supporting the Open Courts Act of 2026, legislation that would modernize the federal courts' electronic filing systems and eliminate PACER fees. 

The bill would replace the aging PACER and CM/ECF systems with a modern, unified platform designed to improve public access, strengthen cybersecurity, and reduce long-term costs. Supporters note that PACER currently collects more than $150 million annually in fees from the public, despite court records being public documents.

The Open Courts Act would also make court records easier to find, access, and understand. The legislation builds on a similar proposal, also supported by EFF, that previously won bipartisan support in the Senate Judiciary Committee but did not become law before the end of the congressional session.

This is not a new issue for EFF. More than a decade ago, we criticized PACER's paywalls and the removal of some court records from online access, arguing that the public should not have to pay to read the law and the judicial decisions that shape it. The Open Courts Act would move U.S. courts a big step closer to that goal. 

In addition to EFF, the bill is supported by Fix the Court, the group pushing this bill forward, as well as civil society groups, open government watchdogs, and media groups. 

Public access to the courts is a cornerstone of democratic accountability. Let’s eliminate unnecessary barriers to court records, and bring the federal judiciary’s tech into the modern era. 

• Read the full letter supporting the Open Courts Act of 2026

Late last year, as part of our annual “Year in Review” series, we summarized our efforts providing digital privacy and security advice to at-risk communities. OPSEC trainings (short for operational security, a catch-all term we use to describe any kind of workshop, advising session, assessment, or presentation about operational security for individuals and organization) are something we've long provided, but until recently, something we’ve never broadcasted.

This has become a critical aspect of our work over the years, keeping us grounded and in touch with the realities of tech-enabled violence as well as evolving resistance strategies used by movement workers. Hoping other security trainers and organizers copy our homework, here’s a more thorough breakdown.

NOT TRADITIONAL PENTESTING

To be clear, we're not a 'pentesting' company, which refers to the methodological process of testing a person or organization's security and privacy posture, nor an information security (infosec) firm that offers anything within scopes of traditional security assessments.  Infosec companies almost always adhere to a cycle of: discovery/reconnaissance; > vulnerability scanning and testing; > exploitation of vulnerabilities found; > and a reportback of recommended mitigation strategies. Such full-spectrum audits can run the gamut of testing network security, physical security, organization posture against phishing or ransomware attacks, web app security, and more. For many organizations, the value of such engagements is immeasurable.

Such companies—although equipped with the technical sophistication to do full-spectrum digital security auditing and testing—often lack the critical points of view of human rights defenders and activists. Many human rights defenders and liberation movement workers are critically under-resourced and unable to meet the high costs of engagement with such infosec companies.  But that’s not what we offer. Our trainings center the needs of people on the ground, and offer this work pro bono. 

The cycle of engagement our work tends to take is similar to the lifecycle of pentesting outlined above, but with some key differences better suited to people-powered movements. 

We begin with a period of discovery about the organization we’re engaging with, learning about their work, the issue space they’re working in, and the types of threats their peers have faced in the past. Relying on our knowledge of known threat actors (state-operated threats, non-state actors, surveillance mechanisms, and more), we conduct a thorough threat modeling and risk assessment exercise, surfacing critical pieces of information about what we ought to prioritize protecting and from what. Sometimes that’s enough for a group to get started on improving their security plans, and we send them on their way.

After receiving consent from the group to do so, we may perform some OSINT (open source intelligence) investigation and map out a sketch of their digital footprint. This often looks like some combination of discoverability through public records, data broker ecosystems, and breach databases, as well as risks they may incur through the services they rely on for their web presence. That latter part can be done with typical pentesting reconnaissance tools, as well as our own project Privacy Badger for mapping the trackers on their website, which pose them and their users some amount of risk. Working from this sketch of their digital footprint, opportunities to lessen the reach of their data exposure, or at least the more sensitive areas they ought to be aware of, become apparent.

For a more in-depth engagement, we take the information gathered from the guided threat modeling exercises, as well as the digital footprint we’ve developed for them, and we move on to training the participants on what they need to address their threats. Sometimes that looks like a deep dive on encryption and how it can be used to protect data backups and secure communications. Other times it looks like getting very knowledgeable and practiced on the various ways to stay safe from surveillance threats encountered at a protest. Often though, our engagement with those asking for advice on how to strengthen their OPSEC is as simple as presenting materials covered in our Surveillance Self-Defense (SSD) project, but with EFF staff to help apply those lessons to their context.

MOVEMENTS AND COMMUNITIES ADVISED

Requests for such training mostly arise organically, either via referral, from our participation in external media, or driven by an interest in SSD. Naturally, the demand for accessible OPSEC advice escalates along with the general sophistication and reach of surveillance technology. And as authoritarianism creeps and continues to threaten the movement workers fighting against it, there's a marked urgency for that demand.

The types of communities and liberation movement workers that reach out run a wide array of experiences, but some commonalities stick out. Since the fall of Roe v. Wade, we've seen a huge uptick in abortion access activists like clinic escorts and information distribution networks reaching out. So too are providers of criminalized healthcare services, both abortion services and gender affirming care alike. The list goes on: advocates for transgender rights such as art collectives and archivists, sex worker rights activists, survivors of intimate partner violence, climate justice activists, legal defense groups focusing on immigrant justice and Black liberation. And many, many others, often stemming from experiences of distinct marginalization and state-powered violence.

We’re dressing the wounds the violence of surveillance inflicts.

TAXONOMY OF THREATS

When there's a cast of common threat actors that so often emerge during risk assessment (ideologically motivated harassers, lawmakers, cops, negligent leadership at large tech platforms, etc) there is a level of predictability about their capabilities. We use that information to make knowledgeable risk assessments for those we’re working with, determining the means that threat actors have to cause them harm, as well as the likelihood.

For community organizers and grassroots activists we most often see concerns around doxxing (and harassment driven by OSINT), social media monitoring, content suppression on tech platforms, and insider threats such as infiltration within trusted communication channels. Often this comes with a tension between publicity and privacy—needing to spread their message and further their cause, while recognizing that digital privacy has a profound impact on their personal safety. Some activists may instead hope to organize other more covert forms of direct action. They're more likely to be concerned about the types of street level surveillance that they may encounter.

Small organizations nonprofit and otherwise may share the concerns around doxxing, as well as traditional digital security concerns around their web presence. Website defacement and data exfiltration are particular concerns for organizations that don't have the resources to commit to IT security staff. And for those that do have meager budgets for such things, organizational compliance and ease-of-use regarding privacy and security technologies are a whole other concern. The question then becomes how to manage a system of distributed devices that are uncontrolled by the organization, but operationally necessary for each member of their community. 

Generally speaking, the threats most commonly encountered in these spaces have to do with the opacity and unchecked reach of surveillance systems. With every single individual or group that we encounter in this type of work, threat modeling comes number one in terms of priority. There is no way to protect against every theoretical threat. Instead, we walk others through the process of identifying and then prioritizing known and perceived threats, based on their specific context and the type of work that they do, before moving on to recommended mitigation and resistance strategies. 

STRATEGIES OF RESISTANCE

Developing a threat model without a course of action often does more to stoke privacy nihilism than remedy the risks communities face. The more we engage with at-risk communities and offer reasonable, accessible OPSEC advice, the greater our instinct develops for recognizing such strategies. At the core of these recommendations lie the backbones of privacy and security fundamentals, such as encryption, access controls, sophisticated backup plans, OSINT skills, and resistance to online tracking.

Over the years, we've found it easiest to begin with non-technical recommendations first. These strategies often mesh well with the community's extant organizing procedures, such as designating team roles and thought out contingency plans for specific risks. This may look like identifying those extant plans and tacking on responsibilities like data backups, code words for community vetting, and developing workarounds or contingency plans for if they lose access to specific technologies. 

Eventually, though, the strategies must become more technical, like switching to more private and secure technology alternatives, developing a sophisticated and encrypted data backup plan, and having technical contingency plans in place for if/when they are deplatformed or their services interrupted. Developing patience and compassion when walking groups through unfamiliar technologies is an essential tool of this work. So too is the habit of checking ourselves, as privacy and security nerds, to know the difference between the most secure technologies and those which will actually be used by at-risk community members. Any step towards more thoughtful OPSEC is better than one too difficult to use. The last thing we want is a recommendation that results in people frustratedly giving up on doing anything at all. After all, the whole point of this is to empower movement workers, not inhibit them.

HOLISTIC MITIGATIONS

It is painfully obvious how many identified threats could be protected against if there were comprehensive data privacy legislation protecting all people. The lack of such is an existential threat to everyone. Bills that undermine peoples' right to privacy are never clear about what they're doing, and often come wrapped in some paternalistic guise of addressing some other harm elsewhere. They often use confusing, oblique language that preys on the public's interest to correct the course of other social harms. The reality is that when it’s clearly explained, every person online wants better privacy. And as we know, every individual's personal security and wellbeing are entwined with their access to privacy. The capacity with which a person can decide what to share online, rather than have sensitive information non-consensually taken from them by creepy surveillance technologies, is a matter of self-determination. And it's in all our best interests to fight for the right to self-determination.

WHAT WE GET BACK

An unexpected outcome of identifying so many common threat actors across such varied issue spaces is revealing potential avenues of collaboration and camaraderie. Some movements are already keen on this allyship, such as those focusing on various aspects of bodily autonomy and self-determination. Abortion access activists and trans liberation activists are often in concerted allyship. Other less obvious connections are legal defense groups that offer "know-your-rights" style educational materials and other issue-specific activists who have questions about the legal threats they're facing while fighting for their cause. 

Recognizing the common threat actors across different issue spaces begins to highlight opportunities for collective action against those threats. As a digital rights organization, this is very much our wheelhouse, and precisely why our technologist team is self-described as one working toward the public interest. It’s also from this point of view that we continue to win. And why it’s critical for lawmakers to pay attention when we say particular pieces of bad legislation are harmful to public safety. And finally, why it is necessary for public interest technologists and digital rights activists to connect with other communities to learn about the specific technology risks they’re worried about. As Mariame Kaba says, “Nothing that we do that is worthwhile is done alone.” This very blog post is in an effort to provoke thought for digital security trainers, so that we as a community don’t work atomized and alone, reproducing the same work, exhausting ourselves and creating unnecessary redundancy.

We do what we can to keep up. And thankfully, we participate within an ecosystem of digital security providers that have a keen mind towards fighting for digital rights. We share resources, referrals, and expertise. Our Surveillance Self-Defense project is stress-tested by the experiences shared by the liberation movement workers we engage with and provide this work to. If you’re interested in becoming a digital security resource for your community, start with the SSD. If you’re a human rights defender with questions about how to stay safe, reach out. And if you’re not sure what else to do, you can always help us keep it going.

The Trump administration’s approach to AI safety, particularly the generative AI models that regularly grab headlines, has been haphazard at best. At worst, it’s unconstitutional. As EFF and our allies explained in an amicus brief, the Pentagon’s actions against one company, Anthropic, violate the First Amendment because they were motivated by the administration’s desire to punish an uncooperative company, not legitimate concerns about national security.

By and large, the Trump administration’s AI strategy has minimized regulation in the name of “winning” the global “race” to develop leading frontier models. It has pared back regulations intended to address even the most serious AI threats—like AI-enabled cyberattacks on government systems—to protect AI innovation.

Yet it has repeatedly singled out one AI company for arbitrary, heavy-handed rules and sanctions. For years, the federal government relied on Anthropic’s models for use in its classified systems. But after Anthropic resisted the government’s demands to use Anthropic’s models to autonomously kill people or spy on Americans, the government declared war on the “woke” company. It designated the company a “supply chain risk,” effectively banning agencies and government contractors from doing business with the company.

A court issued a preliminary injunction preventing these sanctions from taking effect, as EFF and other civil liberties organizations urged it to do in an amicus brief filed earlier this year. But absent judicial action, these sanctions would’ve cost the company hundreds of millions of dollars. Either way, it sent a clear signal that companies must adhere to the government’s wishes or face similar consequences.

As we explained in our brief filed today, these sanctions were clear retaliation for the company’s public refusal to allow the Pentagon to use its models to develop fully autonomous weapons and spy on Americans. This kind of retaliation is unconstitutional.

In a recent executive order, the Trump administration took its war on Anthropic even further, by imposing “export controls” that ban any foreign nationals from using Anthropic’s new Mythos and Fable models. To comply with this order, Anthropic shut down the models altogether.

These extreme measures were purportedly justified by security concerns. The administration said it feared that Anthropic’s Mythos-class models could be used to find and exploit existing vulnerabilities in software code—hardly a new feat for an LLM. Anthropic itself has contributed to public anxieties about its Mythos-class models, initially claiming that Mythos was too dangerous for public release and restricting access to a handful of partners. The company’s CEO called for a pause on AI development, citing fears that the technology was becoming too powerful.

But regulators should be cutting through the hype, not feeding it. Even if Mythos’s capabilities were a modest improvement over existing technology, others are already closing the gap. In other words, nothing about Mythos is so uniquely dangerous that it warrants exceptional export controls to protect the public. Yet other LLMs with similar offensive cybersecurity capabilities are not subject to export controls. Instead, the government has embraced a voluntary system in which companies are encouraged to submit models to the government for cybersecurity testing 30 days before releasing them to the public.

AI policy should be reasonably responsive to real-world risk, grounded in the realities of the technology, and no more burdensome than necessary to protect the public. But the government’s haphazard decision to impose export controls on Mythos-class models, while subjecting other AI models to nothing more than a voluntary, light-touch framework, meets none of these criteria. As leading cybersecurity experts and executives recently explained in an open letter, these sanctions prevent developers and security teams from using the best models to find and fix vulnerabilities before adversaries, armed with nearly as capable AI, can exploit them.

Decades Later, Code Is Still Speech

More importantly, export controls on important software tools like LLMs can undermine the free flow of digital communications and technologies that activists, innovators, and ordinary users desperately need. Freedom of expression requires access to these tools. Depriving the public of the best AI threatens our rights without making us any safer.

EFF has long opposed government efforts to restrict the publication of non-classified software to the general public. In the 1990s, EFF challenged export controls on encryption software, helping establish the principle that “code is speech,” protected by the First Amendment. Courts recognized that software is not just a functional tool—it’s a means of ideas, knowledge, and technical know-how. And they recognized that the government was overreaching in trying to restrict private developers from sharing their improvements in computer security with the public.

While AI models raise new questions, efforts to restrict access to them implicate the same constitutional and speech concerns as older efforts to restrict encryption. Export controls are uniquely susceptible to abuse. And they are especially suspect when they are unilaterally imposed without clear and fair standards.

Whether these export controls were another attempt to punish Anthropic or simply a misguided security measure, the public loses. The real cybersecurity risks of advanced AI may ultimately justify limited regulations to protect the public from legitimate threats. But whether the government ultimately chooses to heavily regulate the technology or hold off to promote innovation, its rules must be rational and evenhanded. 

• Read EFF's Amicus Brief in Anthropic v. Department of War

◆フリーランス法違反で是正勧告　　公正取引委員会は、KADOKAWAのフリーランス法違反を認定し、再発防止を求める勧告を出した。業務を委託したライターらフリーランスに取引条件を明示しなかったことなどが、フリーランス法に抵触した。　公取委によると、KADOKAWAは2024年12月1日から25年8月31日にかけ、雑誌と本の原稿などの業務を依頼したライターやイラストレーターなど113人に対し、報酬支払期日などの取引条件を文書やメールなどで明示していなかった。電話や口頭で説明してい..