Annual Report 2022 and Activities for 2023

The following is an English translation of the portion of the FY2022 situation analysis and FY2023 activity goals from the agenda submitted to JCA-NET's FY2023 General Assembly. This document is based on machine translation and may contain inaccuracies. Click here for the original Japanese text.

Index
1. The situation regarding the right to information and communication, with particular reference to the year 2022
1.1. War in Ukraine and National Security Strategy
1.2. Cyber Police Bureau and Cyber Special Investigation Unit
1.3. Expansion of Exceptions in the Name of My Number and Covid-19 Response
1.4. The Scandal Surrounding Twitter and SNS
1.5. Rapid Spread of ChatGPT (Generated AI) and Lag in Regulatory Discussions
2. For activities in 2023
2.1. "Against Cyber War" in the Anti-War Peace Movement
2.2 Efforts to oppose a surveillance society centered on the Internet
Addendum: List of Seminars (April 2022 to March 2023)

1. The situation regarding the right to information and communication, with particular reference to the year 2022

1.1. War in Ukraine and National Security Strategy

In December 2022, the Japanese government approved three documents, the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Defense Force Development Plan (the "Three Security and Defense Documents "[1], at a Cabinet meeting. These documents have been the subject of much criticism. In particular, the documents have been criticized for their content, which deviates further from the previous government's view by clearly stating the capability to attack enemy bases (counterattack capability); The previous government view was that the existence of the Self-Defense Forces was constitutional and that its role was limited to the exclusive defense of Japan.

On the other hand, the reference in the three documents to the cyber space (Internet and related communication structures), which is JCA-NET's main area of activity, was not discussed much, including the responses of the opposition parties in the Diet. (Only a few criticisms are contained in an opinion piece by the Japan Federation of Bar Associations[2] and an editorial by the Asahi Shimbun.[3] The following is a brief discussion of the issues, focusing on this point.

The reason why "cyber" has received less attention than other military activities is that its domain does not directly involve the use of force to take human life, so it is difficult to understand its relationship with the use of force, threat of force, and other issues that are the subject of constitutional disputes. In the past, issues in the area of computer communication have tended to be avoided by the mass movements because they have been feeling difficulty to understand based on traditional media common sense centering on print media. At the same time, due to the weakness of our movement, a basic understanding of cyber warfare in the anti-war peace movement has not yet been established. However, the National Security Strategy states the following

"The borderline between emergency situation and peacetime is becoming increasingly blurred, as gray zone situations over territory, cross-border cyber attacks on civilian critical infrastructure, and information warfare through the proliferation of false information, etc. are constantly occurring. Furthermore, the scope of national security has expanded to include economic, technological, and other areas that were previously considered non-military, blurring the boundary between military and non-military areas." [4]

We should be very wary of the government's attempt to use the cyber space as a cue to incorporate Japanese society as a whole into the war system.

The vague concept of "gray zone situations," as described above, blurs the boundaries of the conventional military domain and brings to the fore the perspective of encompassing all areas of society within the realm of national military security. The expression "information warfare through the proliferation of disinformation, etc., is constantly occurring" positions our communication environment as the battlefield of "information warfare." The truth or falsity of the content of information is constantly called into question. At the same time, we are half forced to accept as "true information" the propaganda that the government deploys as part of its national policy to carry out the war. The government's suppression and intentional proliferation of information on social networking sites is at risk of involving the information and communications industry.

In fact, several media outlets reported that the Self-Defense Forces(SDF) had begun research on SNS to manipulate and guide public opinion by the end of 2022.[5] Kyodo News reported the following:

"The Ministry of Defense has begun research on artificial intelligence (AI). it was learned through interviews with several government officials that the Ministry of Defense had begun research on manipulating and guiding domestic public opinion on social networking sites (SNS) by using artificial intelligence (AI) technology. The goal is to create a trend in the Internet space where dominant "influencers" on the Internet are encouraged to subconsciously transmit information favorable to the ministry in order to broaden support for defense policy, foster hostility toward a specific country in an emergency, and dispel the anti-war and war-weariness momentum of the public."

The methods used here can be seen as a diversion from those used by private companies in advertising. Overseas, they are also used in election campaigns, and it has been revealed that the U.S. Department of Defense has been using Twitter accounts to manipulate public opinion in the Middle East for many years. [6]

The risk in government use of such methods is that, unlike overt propaganda or government public relations efforts to inflame public opinion, it is impossible to determine whether or not this is intentional inducement, making it very difficult to obtain reliable resources to try to determine the truth of the matter in the first place.

Although the government denies this research on public opinion manipulation by the SDF, a document titled "Efforts on AI in the Ministry of Defense "[7] published by the Ministry of Defense in April 2022 states that "the construction of a digital twin as the basis for utilization by AI" will be "based on behavioral and neural system data and neuroscientific findings, a human digital ." The document clearly states that the issue is to manipulate public opinion in the context of "information warfare".

Another issue to be watched closely in relation to the war in Ukraine and the cyber space is that the SDF's cyber units are actively collaborating with NATO cyber units and participating in large-scale training exercises. Not only the Self-Defense Forces but also relevant government ministries and agencies (Cabinet Office, National Police Agency, etc.), as well as private IT companies and companies involved in electric power infrastructure are all participating in NATO's cyber warfare training. (NTT[8], Tohoku Electric Power Group TOINX[9] ) In the cyber space, the boundary between military and nonmilitary is already being literally removed. Compared to the seriousness of the situation, the domestic anti-war movement has not shown much interest.

In the midst of the war in Ukraine, while the Internet is being used for war, there is a worldwide trend to shut down the Internet or ban its services in order to suppress anti-government movements, and JCA-NET has participated several times in international joint statements protesting such Internet shutdowns. (See the section of "Signatures of support as an organization, etc.") Thus, the Internet itself is already involved in "information warfare," and year 2022 is the year in which we have witnessed such a situation firsthand.

The Internet, which is JCA-NET's main field of activity, is itself both military and non-military, but at present, the guarantee of freedom of speech and basic human rights on the Internet has been based on peacetime. However, this premise is crumbling, and rather than being based on wartime (contingency), a legal system that subordinates our communication rights to national security is becoming dominant. We need to have a deep sense of urgency in this regard. The government's security strategy document positions the Internet as a battlefield for "information warfare," and there is a danger that surveillance and control of Internet speech on the assumption of contingency will become normalized and justified.

1.2. Cyber Police Bureau and Cyber Special Investigation Unit

The Cyber Police Bureau and the Cyber Special Investigation Unit, which were newly established in April 2022, were criticized and warned at the time of their inauguration as a move toward a new surveillance police state.

In April 2022, the Cyber Strategy and Priority Measures in Police (which stipulate measures to be taken based on the strategy) were revised, and the Cyber Strategy in Police was published, setting forth police initiatives for the next three years.[10]

The Cyber Police Bureau will play a central role in the promotion of cyber policy in cooperation with the various departments of the National Police Agency and various domestic and foreign entities, the Cyber Special Investigation Unit will actively participate in international joint investigations with foreign investigative agencies, and the Information Technology Analysis Division will conduct information technology analysis, etc. In common with the Self-Defense Forces, it also stipulates that the Cyber Special Investigation Unit shall "promote the sophistication and efficiency of analysis and analysis using artificial intelligence and other advanced technologies, since the collection of information on the Internet and analysis of malware programs are indispensable for the elucidation of the actual situation. It also mentions that "it is essential to respond in cooperation with the private sector, etc." and "review service design and ensure traceability after the fact" as promotion of industry-government-academia collaboration and promotion of crime infrastructure measures in cooperation with private businesses, etc. Due to the abstract nature of the wording, it is unclear what regulations are intended for our communication rights, and how specifically the request for cooperation from private operators is being considered.

The Cyber Police Bureau's activities over the past year since the establishment of the Special Investigation Unit have not been fully disclosed due to a lack of media coverage, but in the first half of FY2022, the Cyber Special Investigation Unit was responsible for more than a dozen "major cyber incidents," including international joint investigations. Most of the cases were reportedly caused by "ransomware," a ransomware program that is believed to have originated overseas.[11]

As part of its response to the so-called cyber attacks, in October 2022, the Japanese government (Financial Services Agency, National Police Agency, and Cabinet Cyber Security Center) issued a statement alerting "Lazarus" as the perpetrator of the server attacks, naming an organization under the authorities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.[12] This is an effort called "public attribution" to deter cyber attacks by publicizing and blaming the attackers.[13] It is said to be extremely rare for the Japanese government to conduct public attribution. On the other hand, Junpei Kawahara, Director General of the Cyber Police Bureau, stated in an interview with the Asahi Shimbun newspaper that the attribution was "the result of clarifying the actual situation by taking into account information obtained through investigations by the Life Safety Division and information held by the Security Division. Public attribution is not universally conducted for state-sponsored cyberattacks; one public attribution was conducted in 2021, but this time it was against China. (In both cases, the public is not given clear evidence, but only a high probability that the perpetrator is guilty, which has been criticized as a political rather than a criminal justice approach.This approach has been criticized in the past. [14] It should be noted that these methods are used in the context of the Japanese government's tendency to take a one-sided position on the war in Ukraine and regional tensions in East Asia, and to influence public opinion.

In addition, international investigative cooperation is likely to be strengthened in the future, and we need to create an international anti-surveillance movement in response to this trend.

1.3. Expansion of Exceptions in the Name of My Number and Covid-19 Response

There have been a number of problems with the My Number Card[conmprehensive digital ID card system], including erroneous registration and linkage. JCA-NET is concerned that My Number cards will become an important infrastructure for the surveillance society, and has discussed this issue in several seminars, with the cooperation of the members of the "No More Common Numbers (My Number)" Network.

Here, we would like to focus on one issue in relation to our concern about the infrastructure of the future surveillance society.

Nikkei XTECH reported on March 10, 2021[15] that

"The government will apply an exception to the My Number Law for the first time and use My Number in the Vaccination Record System (VRS) for local governments. This is so that different municipalities can quickly grasp the vaccination history of their residents. This is expected to have an impact on the future of the My Number system.

In February 2021, the Cabinet Secretariat's Information and Communications Technology (IT) Strategy Office (hereinafter referred to as "IT Office") signed a voluntary contract with medical startup Mirabo to develop VRS. It will be provided to local governments from April 2021 using cloud services. A second dose of the new Covid-19 vaccine is recommended three weeks after the first dose, and it is necessary to keep track of vaccination history between municipalities even when residents move to other municipalities.

The My Number Law has a limited list of administrative procedures in which administrative agencies and municipalities can "use" or "provide" personal data (specified personal data) that includes My Number. There are provisions in the My Number Law for municipalities to use My Number for immunization records; the exception is first applied when specified personal data stored in the VRS is "provided" to other municipalities. "

The VRS has recently been exposed as a series of input errors in the linking of My Number, and in fact, a few percent of the total number of errors in the VRS have been reported since its inception.[16] The VRS differs significantly from the conventional My Number system in that "in the vaccination program for the new COVID-19, the national government has established a centralized system and leased the system to local governments, which is a model for a new My Number utilization system in cooperation between the national government and local governments. "[17]

However, in November 2022, the Digital Agency changed its interpretation of the law, and the provision of specified personal data (My Number) under Article 19, Item 16 became the exception to the restriction on the provision of personal data (My Number); "when it is necessary for the protection of a person's life, body, or property" and "when it is difficult to obtain the consent of the person" can be applied to vaccination as well.

The issues surrounding this VRS were criticized by the No Number Needed Network(The Iranai Net) at the time of 2021 as follows. The vaccination record system is unprecedented because it does not use an information provision network system, but instead links personal data, including My Number, between local governments." The Iranai Net further criticized the system, saying, "If the government uses the pretext of necessity and urgency, personal data protection measures that can be interpreted as broadly as it wishes, the safety and security of the My Number system cannot be ensured. "[18]

In the course of COvid-19 response, it became clear that government digital systems such as My Number, which have the ability to comprehensively link and grasp our personal data, can be operated arbitrarily under the pretext of crisis management, etc., rather than strictly regulated by law. Local governments have also expressed concern about the introduction of a system to centrally manage specific personal data in the cloud for security reasons. However, the national government has effectively made a top-down decision.[19]
Furthermore, on March 1, 2022, this system will implement a function that allows municipal employees to inquire about vaccination records in other municipalities at once by entering residents' My Number.

It is particularly noteworthy that, while My Number is originally a system based on the management of residents by local governments, the national government has rather established a centralized system in the VRS, and local governments are effectively forced to use this system. In other words, we note that the design of the system makes such basic system changes technically feasible. The system design itself does not incorporate any mechanism to protect privacy, making it clear that it is easy to arbitrarily operate and divert the technology. Currently, COVID-19 has been downgraded to a Category 5 status, but the VRS remains in place. Human rights groups have long feared that a system that was introduced as an exception to a crisis would remain in place even after the situation was resolved or dissolved, and as a result, a social system of heightened surveillance would take root. The VRS and My Number are typical examples of this.

1.4. The Scandal Surrounding Twitter and SNS

In October 2022, Elon Musk, CEO of the U.S. car company Tesla and space developer SpaceX, will acquire Twitter. Advocating freedom of expression, a massive reinstatement[20] of accounts that had been suspended due to discriminatory posts, including those of Donald Trump, was decided at the stroke of a crane by Musk, while the accounts of journalists critical of Musk, including those of The New York Times, The Washington Post, and CNN, were frozen.[21] At the same time, Musk also went on a rampage, firing about half of Twitter's employees.[22]

According to an ITmedia article[23], Mastodon has taken hostile measures against Twitter, such as preventing users from tweeting with URLs related to Mastodon, displaying previously posted links as harmful links, and preventing users from saving drafts. The company has taken what can be called hostile exclusionary measures, such as The official mastodon Twitter account was also frozen.

This situation showed that the social networking service, which has become almost a necessity in people's lives, is a service that can act in an abusive and censorship-like manner at the discretion of its management. It also called into question the idea that people use these services because they are free, convenient, and everyone else is using them. People became concerned about the fact that services such as Twitter, Facebook, and Line in Japan are free services provided by specific for-profit companies, are heavily influenced by their management policies, and have the problem of obtaining users' personal data, which is essential for their management through advertising revenue. And also, people became interested in various issues, such as the fact that these services have a system that does not allow free communication between different SNS services, creating customer enclosure by these companies, and the large risk of exposure to unwanted slander and hate speech.

In response, Mastodon and other "federated" or "decentralized" social networking services attracted attention, and from 2022 to 2023, the number of users rapidly increased. Mastodon is not the exclusive service of a particular company, and its program is open source, meaning that anyone can set up a server, and it can be used in conjunction with different services. Masotodon and others were introduced at several JCA-NET seminars.

Other major social networking services have not been able to overcome the problems they have faced in the past, such as Facebook, where a whistleblower provided a huge amount of internal data to the Wall Street Journal in 2021, a matter that will be discussed in both the U.S. and British Parliaments. The reality that algorithms built for profit encourage hateful posts has been exposed.

The biggest challenge for us is that despite the many problems, individuals and organizations working on human rights and social issues have not been able to break away from existing for-profit social networking services. The social influence of social networking services is so great and irresistible. The overwhelming majority of organizations have taken a contradictory approach: in order to promote human rights and social justice, they are forced to turn a blind eye to powerful platform providers with business models that may conflict with human rights principles. The pressing question is how social movements and NGOs can build a system for disseminating information that does not diminish their social influence while breaking away from for-profit social networking sites that exploit personal data.

1.5. Rapid Spread of ChatGPT (Generated AI) and Lag in Regulatory Discussions

ChatGPT, which was announced in December 2022, became a rage and is still booming because it enables interactive communication that closely resembles human conversation. The scope of this technology is rapidly expanding from text-based dialogue to the generation of images, videos, and other forms of communication.

There is a growing movement to introduce such generative AI mechanisms not only in the private sector, but also in government. On May 8, 2023, the Executive Committee of the Council for the Promotion of Digital Society, which is led by the Digital Agency, formulated the "Agreement on Business Use of ChatGPT and Other Generative AI," which states that "in principle, approval will not be given when handling confidential information. According to an article[24] in TechTrends, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF) has already introduced the system since April, and the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT) has started to discuss the establishment of guidelines at its council and other meetings since May. Local governments seem to be responding more quickly. The Tokyo Metropolitan Government, Yokosuka City, and other municipalities have begun to work on the premise of introducing the system. As for the private sector, it is needless to say.

Even in the Diet, questions using ChatGPT have appeared, such as one asked by Kazuma Nakatani, a member of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, to Prime Minister Kishida at the House of Representatives Cabinet Committee on March 29, 2023.[25] It is reported that Minister Nishimura of Economy, Trade and Industry is considering using ChatGPT to answer questions in the Diet once concerns over the handling of confidential information have been resolved.[26] The use of ChatGPT in government is certain to increase.

Many problems have been pointed out with ChatGPT. Among them, as long as it is based on a large-scale language learning model, there are concerns that it will reflect and amplify discrimination and prejudice in society, that it will be used to spread so-called "disinformation," and that it will conflict with copyrights, all of which are important issues. However, despite these problems, the government and companies are still making the judgment that the advantages outweigh the disadvantages of the use of AI, and are only agitating a sense of crisis over the delay in international competitiveness in the development of AI technology and its implementation in social infrastructure, making it difficult to say that a sober judgment is being made.

JCA-NET has discussed the problems of ChatGPT in several seminars, and it is necessary to be fully aware of the fact that the intervention of AI in the area of human "dialogue" is a problem that could overturn the basic framework of democracy, which was established on the premise of dialogue. We need to be fully aware of the danger. The emergence of AIs in the traditional face-to-face arenas of parliamentary deliberation and debate, court proceedings, collective bargaining by labor unions, and negotiations between residents and government agencies and businesses could effectively render the basic framework of negotiation and deliberation itself unworkable.

On the other hand, although the Japanese government has been promoting the "Principle of a Human-Centered AI Society "[27] as part of Society 5.0, the actual government policy has rather prioritized AI-centered development, and the document has taken on an ideological character that glues and hides this government attitude.

The use of generated AI, such as ChatGPT, will be linked to various aspects of society, from the utilization of personal data through the My Number system and the use of surveillance technology by law enforcement agencies, as described in another section, to the development and introduction of technology by private companies that can comprehensively grasp and manage all aspects of life, from the workplace to the consumer. The year 2022 was a year of unprecedented social conditions in the post-Corona+Ukraine war era, and it was a year that exposed the trend toward a surveillance society.

2. For activities in 2023

2.1. "Against Cyber War/warfare" in the Anti-War Peace Movement

In December 2022, the Cabinet decided on "active cyber defense" in the three documents on security and defense. In January 23, the Cabinet Secretariat established the Office for Preparation of Cyber Security System (headed by Cabinet Councillor Seiji Koyanagi), which consists of 45 people seconded from the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and other ministries.[28] The Cabinet also decided to establish an expert committee for the development of legislation.[29]

The so-called "cyber warfare," including active cyber defense, covers a wide range of warfare areas from what can be called enemy base attacks in the cyber space to what is collectively called "information warfare," including disinformation. As a result, many of them encompass our daily communication environment itself, such as the Internet. In "cyber warfare," our communication rights may be restricted for reasons of national security or emergencies such as war. Furthermore, our right to privacy and the secrecy of our communications may suffer serious violations.

The hurdle for participation in warfare in the cyber space is extremely low, as seen in the case of young people from Japan joining the IT Army in Ukraine[30] and in other situations, including the situation described in the FY 2022 Situation Report in this report, where the Ministry of Defense has reportedly begun research on using AI to manioulate public opinion via social networking services. as a "weapon" in the information war. There is a danger that government propaganda will become a forum for pushing people to war in ways that were not previously envisioned. JCA-NET is committed to encouraging the anti-war peace movement to become more involved in the cyber space and to work together with them in this effort. JCA-NET would like to strengthen its efforts to get anti-war peace movement groups more interested in the cyber space and to build a system to fight together.
2.2 Efforts to oppose a surveillance society centered on the Internet

JCA-NET has not proactively addressed the issue of My Number/card, which has become a focal point of the surveillance society in Japan. The government's policy of integrating health care cards with the My Number Card has been shaken up by the discovery of a series of serious system failures, including the linkage and registration of My Number Cards. On the other hand, however, the government has not made any drastic changes to the entire My Number system. Rather, the government is moving toward a society in which the My Number Card will become indispensable, such as by installing it in smartphones and opening it up to the private sector. The so-called "surveillance society" problem is not limited to the Internet, but the negative impact of the Internet on the surveillance society is growing every year.

On the other hand, there is unfortunately no organization in Japan that focuses on the issue of Internet surveillance and privacy. With this in mind, JCA-NET will focus mainly on network-related issues, and will build partnerships with related organizations in the anti-surveillance movement. In particular, we would like to emphasize that encryption and anonymization have become important conditions for our communication and the spread of open source/free software as activities related to these issues.

Regarding encryption, we have been conducting educational activities on the significance of encryption while participating in the Global Encryption Day event held every fall, and will continue to do so this year. In the international context, the government's policy of legalizing only encryption that can be deciphered by law enforcement agencies and creating backdoors should be stopped. In 2021, JCA-NET issued a statement " Japanse Government should withdraw from the International Statement Regarding End-to-End Encryption and Public Safety".[31]We will continue our movement to oppose regulation of encryption.

Finally, we would like to discuss anonymity. In Japan, the identification of individuals is strictly required when signing up for Internet access or cell phone contracts. Therefore, in order to exercise the right to anonymity, the widespread use of the Internet is not enough; anonymity and encryption are indispensable tools for those who are vulnerable in terms of human rights, such as victims of domestic violence, corporate whistleblowers, refugees being tracked by their own governments, etc., to be able to communicate freely. On the other hand, there are those who oppose the right to anonymity and believe that anonymity should not be necessary if there is nothing to hide. JCA-NET will work with related human rights organizations to promote the importance of the right to anonymity and to build a culture on the Internet that encourages the use of privacy tools, through seminars, workshops, web-based campaigns, and movements against government restrictions.

Addendum: List of Seminars (April 2022 to March 2023)

The seminar uses the Jitsi-meet instance of JCA-NET. Each session has about 20 to 20 participants. The seminars also provide an opportunity for users to experience alternative online meetings by daring not to use ZOOM.

April 2022
https://www.jca.apc.org/jca-net/ja/node/184

Saturday, April 23, 3:00 p.m. Internet and Gender
Tuesday, April 26, 7:00 p.m. APC (Association for Progressive Communication) and Internet Activism in the Global South (Global Internet Activism: Part 1)
Saturday, April 30, 3:00 p.m. To not be complicit in "cyberwar" (War and the Internet: Part 2)

May 2022
https://www.jca.apc.org/jca-net/ja/node/190

May 22 (Sun.) 3:00 p.m. The Long War Against Surveillance and Censorship - What is the Electronic Frontier Foundation?
Thursday, May 26, 7:00 p.m. Using Machine Translation - To be in direct contact with the real voices of world that is changing dramatically
Tuesday, May 31, 7:00 p.m. Russia's Anti-War Movement and the Internet: Citizens' Struggle to Connect the Net to Real Space

June 2022
https://www.jca.apc.org/jca-net/ja/node/197

Wednesday, June 22, 7:00 p.m. Using Encryption Services: Focus on Proton
Saturday, June 25, 3:00 p.m. Security and Usage Consultation: for mutual support
Tuesday, June 28, 19:00 Fighting for the rights of users at risk: Access Now (Net Activism in the World: Part 3)

July 2022
https://www.jca.apc.org/jca-net/ja/node/201

Monday, July 25, 19:00 How to preserve documentation of your movement - Internet Archive
Thursday, July 28, 7pm Fighting Data Exploitation. An Introduction to Privacy International (Net Activism Around the World: Part 4)
Sunday, July 31, 3 pm Women's Rights Program (APC), Hacking Hate. Guest commentator will be Ms. Noriko Motoyama (Asian Women's Resource Center).

August 2022
https://www.jca.apc.org/jca-net/ja/node/222

Tuesday, August 23, 7:00 p.m. De-Google made easy with surveys, signature gathering, and collaboration!
Saturday, August 27, 3:00 p.m. Everything from security and privacy to know-how on how to use the Internet.
Tuesday, August 30, 7:00 p.m. The current situation of Myanmar's military regime and what we can do (tentative)

September 2022
https://www.jca.apc.org/jca-net/ja/node/224

Sunday, September 18 Collecting information on the government and parliament
Wednesday, September 21 Linux User Information Exchange (welcome those who want to start)
Thursday, September 29 Follow-up (Cryptpad and Internet Archive usage, etc.)

October 2022
https://www.jca.apc.org/jca-net/ja/node/229

Saturday, October 22, 3:00 p.m. Global Crypto Day Participation Project--Crypto as a Lifestyle
October 26 (Wed.) 7:00 p.m. JCA-NET Seminar "Autumn Reading Special
Monday, October 31, 7:00 p.m. Follow-up--Questions and information exchange related to the topics covered in the seminar

November 2022
https://www.jca.apc.org/jca-net/ja/node/237

Tuesday, November 22, 7:00 p.m. Using Password Management Software
Saturday, November 26, 3:00 p.m. Thinking about the issue of My Number from the perspective of global surveillance capitalism--the risks of digital identity facing people around the world.
Tuesday, November 29, 7:00 p.m. Follow-up--Questions and information exchange related to topics covered in the seminar

December 2022
https://www.jca.apc.org/jca-net/ja/node/246

Wednesday, December 21, 19:00 What is distributed SNS: transition from twitter, introduction to SNS for beginners
Dec. 24 (Sat) 15:00 Digital Colonialism
Tuesday, December 27, 19:00 Follow-up--Questions and information exchange related to the topics covered in the seminar

January 2023
https://www.jca.apc.org/jca-net/ja/node/254

Tuesday, January 24, 7:00 p.m. Challenges of transitioning from twitter to federated SNS
Saturday, January 28, 3:00 p.m. Reading the three defense documents from the perspective of cyber and digital surveillance society
Tuesday, January 31, 19:00 Follow-up

February 2023
https://www.jca.apc.org/jca-net/ja/node/254

Thursday, February 23, 7:00 p.m. What online and open source research can any citizen do - with Bellingcat as a clue
Sunday, February 26, 3:00 p.m. Three Security and Defense Documents--Demilitarization of the Cyber Domain and People's Cyber Security
Tuesday, February 28, 7:00 p.m. Follow-up--Questions and information exchange related to the topics covered in the seminar

March 2023
https://www.jca.apc.org/jca-net/ja/node/256

Sunday, March 19, 3 pm ChatGPT and the Future of Democracy
Thursday, March 23, 7:00 p.m. Overcoming Japanese-English Domination: Uses and Challenges of Machine Translation
Thursday, March 30, 7:00 p.m. Follow-up

Footnotes: 1
1

https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou.html
2

https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/library/pdf/document/opinion/2022/221216…
3

https://www.asahi.com/articles/DA3S15540935.html
4

https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/nss-j.pdf
5

Joint https://www.47news.jp/8673315.html
6

(Intercept) Twitter Found to Have Supported Secret Pentagon Online Propaganda Campaign" https://www.alt-movements.org/no_more_capitalism/hankanshi-info/knowled…- base/intercept-twitter-dod-us-military-accounts_jp/
7

https://www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/ai/senryaku/9kai/siryo7.pdf
8

https://group.ntt/jp/newsrelease/2023/04/19/230419a.html
9

https://service.toinx.co.jp/tsq/news_003#heading-1
10

https://www.npa.go.jp/bureau/cyber/pdf/202204_senryaku.pdf
11

Jiji Press, October 1, 2022, https://www.jiji.com/jc/article?k=2022093000672&g=soc
12

NHK, "Japanese Government Names North Korean Hacker 'Lazarus' Who Is He?" https://www.nisc.go.jp/pdf/press/20221014NISC_press.pdf
13

Police White Paper, https://www.npa.go.jp/hakusyo/r04/honbun/html/y3321000.html
14

The Problem With Ill-Substantiated Public Cyber Attribution: A Legal Perspective.https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/03/28/problem-with-ill- substantiated-public-cyber-attribution-legal-perspective-pub-86695
15

https://xtech.nikkei.com/atcl/nxt/column/18/00001/05289/
16

https://xtech.nikkei.com/atcl/nxt/column/18/00001/06052/
17

https://xtech.nikkei.com/atcl/nxt/column/18/00138/052901295/
18

Collapsed by corona vaccination! Protecting My Number's personal data (2) http://www.jca.apc.org/activist/?m=202103
19

https://xtech.nikkei.com/atcl/nxt/column/18/01614/040700004/
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NHK https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20221125/k10013903221000.html
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NHK https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20221216/k10013925251000.html
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https://mainichi.jp/articles/20221109/k00/00m/020/155000c
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https://www.itmedia.co.jp/news/articles/2212/16/news161.html
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https://techtrends.jp/trends/utilize-chat-gpt/
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Nikkei https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOUA28BY00Y3A320C2000000/
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NHK April 11, https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20230411/k10014035011000.html
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