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EFF and ARTICLE 19 Submission to the European Commission on the DSA Trusted Flagger Guidelines
EFF and ARTICLE 19 have submitted joint comments to the European Commission on draft guidelines for the Digital Services Act’s trusted flagger mechanism. Having long advocated for a DSA that protects freedom of expression while preserving intermediary liability protections and the prohibition on general monitoring, we welcome the Commission's effort to provide practical guidance on how the trusted flagger system should operate.
The DSA’s trusted flagger system can help platforms identify illegal content more efficiently. But if implemented poorly, it could also encourage over-removal of lawful speech, weaken due process, and give government authorities disproportionate influence over online expression.
We support the Commission's focus on good practices and illustrative examples, rather than legal interpretations that could inadvertently steer platforms toward particular enforcement outcomes—and argue that the guidelines should include stronger safeguards to protect freedom of expression, due process, and the impartiality of the trusted flagger system.
We also support the Commission's clarification that the DSA itself does not define "illegal content"; that determination must come from applicable national or EU law. Trusted flaggers submit prioritized notice, but platforms remain responsible for determining whether content is actually illegal. Platforms must therefore conduct careful, informed assessments and should not assume that a trusted flagger notice necessarily warrants restricting content.
Our submission highlights several areas where the guidelines could be strengthened:
- Cross-border assessments require caution. Platforms should not rely on a trusted flagger notice to assess legality across Member States, where national legal frameworks may differ.
- Systemic risks extend beyond content moderation. The DSA's systemic risk framework should not rely too heavily on individual moderation decisions, but should also consider broader platform design choices, including recommender systems.
- Law enforcement authorities should generally not be granted trusted flagger status. They already have statutory powers under Article 9 of the DSA, and combining those powers with trusted flagger status creates a risk that platforms may treat trusted flagger notices as de facto removal orders, undermining due process and the rule of law.
- Civil society organizations play an essential role. Civil society organizations help identify illegal content and report human rights abuses, but the guidelines should also recognize that these organizations may face retaliation for their work and should be protected from abusive campaigns that threaten their independence.
- Trusted flaggers should complement—not replace—existing partnerships. The new mechanism should not sideline existing trusted partnership programs, including collaborations with civil society organizations that do not or cannot hold trusted flagger status, especially those outside of the EU with valuable regional expertise.
Read the full submission here:
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California Steps Back From Dangerous Expansion of its Age-Gating Law
The California legislature has stepped back from a plan that would have expanded its age-gating law, removing language that could have compounded serious threats to users’ speech, privacy and security just to browse the internet. A.B. 1856, authored by Assemblymember Buffy Wicks, will now move forward through the legislature without its most problematic pieces.
EFF still believes the underlying law that A.B. 1856 amends, A.B. 1043, is unconstitutional. Signed into law in 2025 (and effective January of 2027), A.B. 1043 requires all operating systems and app stores to collect users’ ages, place them in various age brackets and then block young people from lawful speech and services depending on their age. We also believe that even though A.B. 1043 does not require age verification, the liability it creates for operating systems and app stores—including fining operating systems up to $7,500 per affected child for violating the law—will push those services to verify users’ ages. In practice, that could lead to more ID checks, more biometric scanning, more invasive data collection and risk of breach, and more barriers to adults’ and young people’s lawful speech.
However, we appreciate that the Legislature has abandoned its plan to expand this problematic age-gating framework to browsers and websites. This would have significantly expanded this dangerous law before it even took effect. We thank the author and committee staff for recognizing these harms and not moving forward with this language.
On top of that, EFF is pleased that an earlier amendment to A.B 1856 reduced the threat to the open-source community by exempting open-source operating systems. Given these changes, EFF has removed its opposition to A.B. 1856. We appreciate the author for listening to concerns from advocates, developers and others about the effect it would have on open-source development and also around expanding this problematic framework.
To be clear, we still believe the law passed last year threatens online anonymity, privacy, and security. A.B. 1043 is one of a troubling wave of proposals that encourage—or, in some cases, outright require—age verification. Our position on this is clear: no one should have to provide or verify their age to access the internet. Once users’ personal data is collected, it can easily be leaked, hacked, or misused. No matter the method, every age verification system demands that people hand over their sensitive and immutable personal information to link their offline identity to their online activity. That’s a bad deal for us all.
Age-gating mandates are reshaping the internet in ways that are invasive, dangerous, and deeply unnecessary. But users are not powerless! We can challenge these laws, protect our digital rights, and build a safer digital world for all internet users, no matter their ages. This resource hub can help—so explore, share, and join us in the fight for a better internet.