A List of ICE Subpoenas to Tech Companies

EFF update
1 day 18 hours ago

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has conducted unlawful investigations into dozens of individuals who have documented ICE activities in their communities, social media users who criticized the government, and international students who attended a protest.

A favored tool in these speech chilling investigations are administrative subpoenas sent to technology companies, requesting basic subscriber data about their users. For example, from 2018 to 2020, ICE sent nearly 500 administrative subpoenas to Meta, Google, and Twitter (now X), according to documents obtained by Just Futures Law. In just the second half of 2025, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sent 21 administrative subpoenas to Reddit, according to its Transparency Report.

While some subpoenas are routine, ICE has been forced to withdraw others after users challenged them in court or companies pushed back. These challenged subpoenas exceeded the agency's statutory authority and violated users' First Amendment rights.

Below is a non-comprehensive list of DHS subpoenas that we gathered going back to 2025, looking at public reporting and court cases. This is likely an undercount. The full scope is hard to pin down because these subpoenas typically only come to light when a user is given notice and challenges them in court, or when a company documents them in a transparency report (so far, only Reddit appears to break out specific numbers on DHS subpoenas). In addition, DHS has been slow to respond to our Freedom of Information Act requests and lawsuits seeking records that would show how many administrative subpoenas ICE has sent to social media companies since 2025.

If you know of other subpoenas that are not on this list, please reach out to info@eff.org. While the government has abused the subpoena process in other areas, particularly to hospitals, this list focuses on DHS and ICE subpoenas to technology companies for user data. 

DATE ISSUED

(and link to subpoena)

TARGETED COMPANY INDIVIDUAL USER TARGETED  OUTCOME  3/17/25 Facebook  Momodou Taal, international student who attended pro-Palestinian protest Withdrawn 3/23/25 Google  Momodou Taal, international student who attended pro-Palestinian protest Withdrawn 4/1/25 Google  Amandla Thomas-Johnson, international student who attended pro-Palestinian protest Google disclosed data to ICE on 5/8/25 9/4/25 Meta  6 accounts in Southern California that documented immigration activity, including LB_Protest, Long Beach Rapid Response Network, and Stopice.net Withdrawn after court challenge on 11/24/25 9/11/25* Meta (Instagram) Pennsylvania account called "MontCo Community Watch" that documented immigration activity Withdrawn after court challenge on 1/16/26 9/11/25* Meta (Facebook) Pennsylvania account called "MontCo Community Watch" that documented immigration activity Withdrawn after court challenge on 1/16/26 10/30/25 Google  Retired Philadelphia user who emailed criticism to U.S. prosecutor   Withdrawn after court challenge on 2/5/26 2/4/26* Google Social media user who regularly posts criticism of the President Subpoena challenged in Court 2/19/26* Reddit "Tired_Thumb," user who posted about ICE officer Withdraw after court challenge on 3/27/26; replaced with grand jury subpoena 2/27/26* X "podslurp,” who posted publicly available address information about ICE officer Withdrawn May 2026; replaced with grand jury subpoena 3/7/26 PayPal/Venmo "Voices of Racial Justice," a racial justice organization in Minnesota  PayPal/Venmo disclosed data 3/20/26 4/3/26* Google (YouTube) @TheDonLemonShow, GeorgiaFort, @DemocracyNow, and seven other accounts that reported on protest at Minnesota church Google Objected 4/7/26 4/12/26* T-Mobile Minnesota journalist Georgia Fort and others T-Mobile disclosed data on 4/12/26 First half of 2025 Reddit  Reddit account Subpoena withdrawn after questions from Reddit Second half of 2025 Reddit  11 Reddit accounts that posted content "critical of ICE actions" 3 subpoenas withdrawn after Reddit objected

* = denotes summonses issued under 19 U.S.C. 1509, an authority that has been abused in the past, according to DHS's inspector general.

Mario Trujillo

EFF's Policy Position on ALPR Surveillance: Eliminate It and Reduce Its Harms

EFF update
1 day 22 hours ago

Automated license plate readers (ALPRs) build a searchable map of everywhere a driver goes, fed into databases that police, ICE, and private vendors can query after the fact. Networked across a city, ALPRs are purpose-built to track everyone regardless of suspicion. ALPRs are not a surveillance tool that can be made safe with the right policy or feature update—they are irredeemably harmful.

EFF's position is that ALPR mass surveillance—the indiscriminate, continuous collection and retention of location data on every driver, regardless of suspicion—should not exist. Because it nonetheless does, EFF also urges courts and state legislatures to impose strict, enforceable restrictions, such as warrant requirements and deletion deadlines.

EFF's position is that ALPR mass surveillance—the indiscriminate, continuous collection and retention of location data on every driver, regardless of suspicion—should not exist. Because it nonetheless does, EFF also urges courts and state legislatures to impose strict, enforceable restrictions, such as warrant requirements and deletion deadlines. EFF applies every tool available to eliminate ALPR surveillance and the harm it enacts.

The Case Against ALPRs

A note about scope: This post addresses ALPR mass surveillance. It does not address the wider universe of automated traffic enforcement (ATE) such as conventional red light and speed cameras that solely ticket a specific violation, without retaining or networking data on uninvolved drivers. But lawmakers and purchasers should guard against efforts by vendors to piggyback on ATE contracts to market ALPR mass surveillance systems.

ALPRs are frequently marketed as a narrow tool for specific purposes, such as recovering stolen vehicles. But in practice, these sensors sweep up data on every driver who passes a camera, and store it in searchable databases. That indiscriminate collection and retention is precisely why ALPR-fed surveillance systems can be easily weaponized against immigrants, political dissidents, and other targeted communities as ICE and other federal agencies escalate their assault on civil liberties. There is no configuration of an ALPR network that eliminates this risk, because the risk is the mass surveillance itself, not a misuse of it.

Of course, ALPRs cause other predictable harms. Innocent drivers are recurringly arrested and menaced by police because of ALPR errors. Officers regularly abuse ALPR systems to stalk past and potential romantic partners. Creating any database of personal information—including ALPR surveillance databases—inherently creates risk of data theft and subsequent harm to data subjects. And ALPR surveillance of protests and targeting of activists chill participation in First Amendment-protected dissent. But even if these downstream harms could all be prevented (and they likely can’t), ALPRs would remain an intolerable form of mass surveillance.

Fighting on Every Front to Eliminate ALPR Surveillance

At the city level, EFF works with community members and decision makers to outright refuse ALPR purchasing. ALPRs are not inevitable. The same decision mechanisms used to facilitate runaway surveillance purchasing in U.S. localities can be turned against these systems to dismantle them.

EFF also pushes state legislatures to establish strict state-level limits on ALPR surveillance, such as data-deletion rules and use restrictions. Building such constraints into statute can mitigate the harms of existing ALPR systems.

In courts across the country, EFF files amicus briefs arguing that warrantless police searches of ALPR databases violate the Fourth Amendment. In California state court, EFF and the ACLU of Northern California are suing on behalf of two community groups, SIREN and CAIR-CA, arguing that the San Jose Police Department's practice of letting officers search stored plate data—to the tune of over 100,000 times a year—without a warrant violates the California Constitution. We’ve also sued to block California law enforcement from sharing ALPR data with federal and out-of-state agencies, in violation of a California statute.

A big part of EFF’s work is exposing the harms of ALPR surveillance. Our investigative team tirelessly collects information about how law enforcement uses ALPRs with public records requests, sues to enforce such requests, and publishes reports about them. We’ve also successfully lobbied for a State Auditor investigation of law enforcement’s use of ALPRs.

Coordinated Action Against Mass Surveillance

EFF practices integrated advocacy because all of these tools work best together. City refusals, statehouse restrictions, impact litigation, and investigative activism are different levers EFF pulls toward the same end: eliminating ALPR surveillance, and building the durable public power needed to keep it off our streets. A council vote against a Flock contract and a warrant argument in Santa Clara County Superior Court are both, at their core, the same fight: rejecting mass surveillance infrastructure outright, and using every venue available to eliminate its harmful presence and consequences.

Sarah Hamid

EFF Statement on Meta Settlement

EFF update
1 day 23 hours ago

Under this settlement, young users will now have less access to Meta products, and a lesser ability to exercise their rights to speak, access information and art and culture, associate and form communities, and play. The settlement also embeds age assurance into every product, mandating the collection of even more personal information from users of all ages; this enshrines Meta's harmful surveillance into law, and it will compromise users' privacy and anonymity while increasing their exposure to data breaches and government data requests. And the data minimization and security measures don’t keep states from using data collected under the agreement for other law enforcement purposes – which could include things like criminal investigations of abortions or gender-affirming care. 

David Greene

【お知らせ】ICC（国際刑事裁判所）赤根 智子所長がハーグからオンラインで話す　９月６日（日）午後５時から７時

日本ジャーナリストクラブ（JCJ）
2 days ago
　　　　　　　　　　　日時：2026年9月6日(日) 17:00〜19:00（※各講演45分＋質疑応答15分を予定）煽られた感情による分断や一方的な力の行使が世界を覆いつつあるように思えるこの社会で、法や司法が果たし得る役割とは。40年弱もの間、一つひとつの裁判を通じて法と人間に向き合っていた太田元判事と、戦争犯罪などを裁く国際刑事裁判所の所長として法の支配の擁護に尽力する赤根智子さんを迎え、私たちと法をつなぐものを考えます。「一つひとつの裁判、法、人間」　元東京高裁判事／弁..
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French Top Court Gets It Right, Strikes Down Social Media Ban For Youths

EFF update
2 days 1 hour ago

Earlier this month, France’s top court struck down the country’s legislation that banned social media use for people under 15 years old, which had been scheduled to take effect in January 2027. This is a welcome win for free expression, as we face a wave of countries and U.S. states seeking to pass similar laws banning young people from social media. 

In particular, the Constitutional Council’s decision focused on two components:

Infringement on Free Expression

The Council ruled that the legislation banning under-15s from social media infringed on freedom of expression and communication in a manner that is not appropriate, necessary, or proportionate, which is required by Article 34 of the French Constitution. In particular, it stressed that the ban did not distinguish between different types of online services, and ignored the circumstances of individual users, such as their exact age, level of maturity, and family situation.

The evidence is clear: these are reckless and harmful laws that negatively impact all people, not just those under 15. These measures chill all users’ exercise of the right to free speech and expression online by imposing obstacles on sites or by wrongfully blocking people’s access outright.

By forcing young people into digital isolation, these bans curtail vital access to news and resources for health and development; especially for LGBTQ+ and marginalized youth as social media can often be the only place to find community, explore their identity, or access life-saving resources. They also completely ignore the calls of young people themselves who favor digital literacy and education over surveillance and government control. 

These bans also destroy the right to online anonymity—a cornerstone of our right to free expression that in particular protects whistleblowers, journalists, activists, and immigrants.

Infringement on the Right to Private Life 

The Council’s second objection noted that the law requiring every person, even adults, to prove their age before accessing social media platforms impedes the right to private life, and thus infringes on Article 2 of the Déclaration de 1789.

The French Council gets a lot right in this decision: it highlights that bans like this impact not just young people, but everyone online. They force people of all ages to hand over government IDs, face scans, and other sensitive information into a growing surveillance ecosystem. Further, when parental consent is required, companies must collect even more verification data on the parents.

We know that when people are forced to hand over this information, age verification systems frequently misidentify or lock out people of color, people with disabilities, and trans or gender-nonconforming individuals whose IDs may not match their appearance; adding to the privacy concerns around these bans.

Next Steps 

As all bills in France are subject to scrutiny by the Constitutional Council to ensure compliance with the French Constitution, French President Emmanuel Macron has tasked Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu to re-work the legislation with a goal to adopt a ‘legally robust’ version of the social media ban. 

Public policy must be effective, proportionate, and respectful of fundamental rights; and the ruling by the Constitutional Council has ramifications beyond France. It sends a message of caution to Brussels, where the EU Commission is working on an EU-wide bill on access restrictions. These legal restrictions would likely require problematic age verification of users. The prominent EU digital identity wallet and the “mini” age verification app, presented as privacy-robust options, instead raise serious privacy and security concerns.

Young people deserve better than a policy built on panic, and all internet users deserve a safe and free internet that includes measures to empower all people with the knowledge they need to navigate online spaces safely. A social media ban generates headlines, but it will not solve the problem. 

Paige Collings