日中韓自由貿易協定(FTA)交渉の第10 回交渉会合(局長/局次長会合)が開催されます
「活力あふれる『ビンテージ・ソサエティ』の実現に向けて」(研究会報告書)をとりまとめました
自動走行との連携が期待される、地図情報に関する国際規格が発行されました
東京電力株式会社の会社分割について、電気事業法に基づき認可しました
Traffic Violation! License Plate Reader Mission Creep Is Already Here
A new report from 404 Media sheds light on how automated license plate readers (ALPRs) could be used beyond the press releases and glossy marketing materials put out by law enforcement agencies and ALPR vendors. In December 2025, Georgia State Patrol ticketed a motorcyclist for holding a cell phone in his hand. According to the report, the ticket read, “CAPTURED ON FLOCK CAMERA 31 MM 1 HOLDING PHONE IN LEFT HAND.”
If you’re thinking that this sounds outside of the scope of what ALPRs are supposed to do, you’re right. In November 2025, Flock Safety, the maker of the ALPR in question, wrote a post about how they definitely are in compliance with the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In this post, which highlighted what ALPRs are and what they are not, the company writes: “What it is not: Flock ALPR does not perform facial recognition, does not store biometrics, cannot be queried to find people, and is not used to enforce traffic violations.” (emphasis added)
Well, apparently their customers never got the memo and apparently the technology’s design does not explicitly prevent behavior the company officially and publicly disavows.
Or at least this used to be the case: Flock now lists six different companies providing traffic enforcement technology on its “Partner program” site. Public records also show that speed enforcement cameras have been connected to Flock's ALPR network.
EFF and other privacy advocates have long warned about mission creep when it comes to surveillance infrastructure. Police often swear that a piece of technology will only be used in a particular set of circumstances or to fight only the most serious crimes only to utilize it to fight petty crimes or watch protests.
We continue to urge cities, states, and even companies to end their relationship with Flock Safety because of the incompatibility between the mass surveillance it enables and its inability to protect civil liberties—including preventing mission creep.
【馬毛島基地建設】着工3年 費用青天井 完成遠く 米軍訓練滑走路・施設を先行 視察団、防衛省が阻む=丹原 美穂(沖西ネット事務局・JCJ東海)
Supreme Court Agrees With EFF: ISPs Don't Have To Be Copyright Enforcers
If your ISP can be liable for huge amounts of money for not terminating your access to the internet because of accusations that you—or someone in your household or college network—has committed copyright infringement, that is dangerous. We live in a world where high speed internet access is a necessity for participation in everyday life. That’s why liability for ISPs for their customers’ actions should not be expanded.
Last fall, EFF filed an amicus brief urging the U.S. Supreme Court to reject an expansive theory of secondary copyright liability that threatened to impose massive damages on internet service providers and other technology companies simply for offering widely used services. Yesterday, the Court agreed.
In Cox v. Sony, the Court reversed a Fourth Circuit decision that had upheld a billion-dollar verdict against internet provider Cox Communications. Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas explained that contributory liability is limited to two situations: when a defendant actively induces infringement, or when it provides a product or service that it knows is tailored for infringement.
This framework closely tracks the approach EFF urged in our amicus brief. As we explained, courts should look to patent law for guidance in defining the boundaries of secondary copyright liability. Patent law recognizes liability where a defendant actively induces infringement, or distributes a product knowing that it lacks substantial non-infringing uses. The Court’s opinion adopts that same basic structure.
EFF also emphasized the broader public interest at stake in preserving these limits. Expansive theories of secondary liability do not just affect large internet providers. They can chill innovation, threaten smaller technology companies, and undermine the development of general-purpose tools that millions of people rely on for lawful speech, creativity, education, and access to information. When liability turns on generalized knowledge that some users may infringe, service providers face pressure to over-police user activity or withdraw useful services altogether.
The Court also made clear that mere knowledge that some customers use a service to infringe is not enough. Copyright holders must show that the provider intended its service to be used for infringement. That intent can be established only through active inducement or by showing that the service is specifically designed for unlawful uses—not simply because the service provider failed to take affirmative steps to prevent infringement.
Applying this standard, the Court held that Cox could not be liable. There was no evidence that Cox encouraged or promoted infringement. The record instead showed that Cox implemented warning systems, suspended service, and in some cases terminated accounts in an effort to discourage unlawful activity.
Nor was Cox’s internet access service tailored to infringement. The Court emphasized that general-purpose internet connectivity is capable of substantial lawful uses. Treating the provision of such services as contributory infringement would improperly expand secondary liability beyond the limits recognized in prior Supreme Court decisions.
The Court also rejected the Fourth Circuit’s broader rule that supplying a service with knowledge it may be used to infringe is itself sufficient for liability. That theory conflicts with decades of precedent warning against imposing copyright liability based solely on knowledge or a failure to take additional preventive steps.
EFF is pleased with yesterday’s opinion. We will continue to advocate for the public’s ability to build, use, and innovate with new technologies.
Link to our amicus brief:
https://www.eff.org/document/us-s-ct-cox-v-sony-eff-et-al-amicus-brief
Link to the opinion:
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-171_bq7d.pdf