EFF to Arizona Federal Court: Protect Public School Students from Surveillance and Punishment for Off-Campus Speech

5 days 11 hours ago

Legal Intern Alexandra Rhodes contributed to this blog post. 

EFF filed an amicus brief urging the Arizona District Court to protect public school students’ freedom of speech and privacy by holding that the use of a school-issued laptop or email account does not categorically mean a student is “on campus.” We argued that students need private digital spaces beyond their school’s reach to speak freely, without the specter of constant school surveillance and punishment.  

Surveillance Software Exposed a Bad Joke Made in the Privacy of a Student’s Home 

The case, Merrill v. Marana Unified School District, involves a Marana High School student who, while at home one morning before school started, asked his mother for advice about a bad grade he received on an English assignment. His mother said he should talk to his English teacher, so he opened his school-issued Google Chromebook and started drafting an email. The student then wrote a series of jokes in the draft email that he deleted each time. The last joke stated: “GANG GANG GIMME A BETTER GRADE OR I SHOOT UP DA SKOOL HOMIE,” which he narrated out loud to his mother in a silly voice before deleting the draft and closing his computer.  

Within the hour, the student’s mother received a phone call from the school principal, who said that Gaggle surveillance software had flagged a threat from her son and had sent along the screenshot of the draft email. The student’s mother attempted to explain the situation and reassure the principal that there was no threat. Nevertheless, despite her reassurances and the student’s lack of disciplinary record or history of violence, the student was ultimately suspended over the draft email—even though he was physically off campus at the time, before school hours, and had never sent the email.  

After the student’s suspension was unsuccessfully challenged, the family sued the school district alleging infringement of the student’s right to free speech under the First Amendment and violation of the student’s right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Public School Students Have Greater First Amendment Protection for Off-Campus Speech 

The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the First Amendment rights of public school students in a handful of cases

Most notably, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (1969), the Court held that students may not be punished for their on-campus speech unless the speech “materially and substantially” disrupted the school day or invaded the rights of others. 

Decades later, in Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L. by and through Levy (2021), in which EFF filed a brief, the Court further held that schools have less leeway to regulate student speech when that speech occurs off campus. Importantly, the Court stated that schools should have a limited ability to punish off-campus speech because “from the student speaker’s perspective, regulations of off-campus speech, when coupled with regulations of on-campus speech, include all the speech a student utters during the full 24-hour day.” 

The Ninth Circuit has further held that off-campus speech is only punishable if it bears a “sufficient nexus” to the school and poses a credible threat of violence. 

In this case, therefore, the extent of the school district’s authority to regulate student speech is tied to whether the high schooler was on or off campus at the time of the speech. The student here was at home and thus physically off campus when he wrote the joke in question; he wrote the draft before school hours; and the joke was not emailed to anyone on campus or anyone associated with the campus.  

Yet the school district is arguing that his use of a school-issued Google Chromebook and Google Workspace for Education account (including the email account) made his speech—and makes all student speech—automatically “on campus” for purposes of justifying punishment under the First Amendment.  

Schools Provide Students with Valuable Digital Tools—But Also Subject Them to Surveillance 

EFF supports the plaintiffs’ argument that the student’s speech was “off campus,” did not bear a sufficient nexus to the school, and was not a credible threat. In our amicus brief, we urged the trial court at minimum to reject a rule that the use of a school-issued device or cloud account always makes a student’s speech “on campus.”   

Our amicus brief supports the plaintiffs’ First Amendment arguments through the lens of surveillance, emphasizing that digital speech and digital privacy are inextricably linked.  

As we explained, Marana Unified School District, like many schools and districts across the country, offers students free Google Chromebooks and requires them to have an online Google Account to access the various cloud apps in Google Workspace for Education, including the Gmail app.  

Marana Unified School District also uses three surveillance technologies that are integrated into Chromebooks and Google Workspace for Education: Gaggle, GoGuardian, and Securly. These surveillance technologies collectively can monitor virtually everything students do on their laptops and online, from the emails and documents they write (or even just draft) to the websites they visit.  

School Digital Surveillance Chills Student Speech and Further Harms Students 

In our amicus brief, we made four main arguments against a blanket rule that categorizes any use of a school-issued device or cloud account as “on campus,” even if the student is geographically off campus or outside of school hours.  

First, we pointed out that such a rule will result in students having no reprieve from school authority, which runs counter to the Supreme Court’s admonition in Mahanoy not to regulate “all the speech a student utters during the full 24-hour day.” There must be some place that is “off campus” for public school students even when using digital tools provided by schools, otherwise schools will reach too far into students’ lives.  

Second, we urged the court to reject such an “on campus” rule to mitigate the chilling effect of digital surveillance on students’ freedom of speech—that is, the risk that students will self-censor and choose not to express themselves in certain ways or access certain information that may be disfavored by school officials. If students know that no matter where they are or what they are doing with their Chromebooks and Google Accounts, the school is watching and the school has greater legal authority to punish them because they are always “on campus,” students will undoubtedly curb their speech. 

Third, we argued that such an “on campus” rule will exacerbate existing inequities in public schools among students of different socio-economic backgrounds. It would distinctly disadvantage lower-income students who are more likely to rely on school-issued devices because their families cannot afford a personal laptop or tablet. This creates a “pay for privacy” scheme: lower-income students are subject to greater school-directed surveillance and related discipline for digital speech, while wealthier students can limit surveillance by using personal laptops and email accounts, enabling them to have more robust free speech protections. 

Fourth, such an “on campus” rule will incentivize public schools to continue eroding student privacy by subjecting them to near constant digital surveillance. The student surveillance technologies schools use are notoriously privacy invasive and inaccurate, causing various harms to students—including unnecessary investigations and discipline, disclosure of sensitive information, and frustrated learning. 

We urge the Arizona District Court to protect public school students’ freedom of speech and privacy by rejecting this approach to school-managed technology. As we said in our brief, students, especially high schoolers, need some sphere of digital autonomy, free of surveillance, judgment, and punishment, as much as anyone else—to express themselves, to develop their identities, to learn and explore, to be silly or crude, and even to make mistakes.  

Sophia Cope

✋ Get A Warrant | EFFector 37.17

5 days 16 hours ago

Even with the holidays coming up, the digital rights news doesn't stop. Thankfully, EFF is here to keep you up-to-date with our EFFector newsletter!

In our latest issue, we’re explaining why politicians latest attempts to ban VPNs is a terrible idea; asking supporters to file public comments opposing new rules that would make bad patents untouchable; and sharing a privacy victory—Sacramento is forced to end its dragnet surveillance program of power meter data.

Prefer to listen in? Check out our audio companion, where EFF Surveillance Litigation Director Andrew Crocker explains our new lawsuit challenging the warrantless mass surveillance of drivers in San Jose. Catch the conversation on YouTube or the Internet Archive.

LISTEN TO EFFECTOR

EFFECTOR 37.17 - ✋ GET A WARRANT

Since 1990 EFF has published EFFector to help keep readers on the bleeding edge of their digital rights. We know that the intersection of technology, civil liberties, human rights, and the law can be complicated, so EFFector is a great way to stay on top of things. The newsletter is chock full of links to updates, announcements, blog posts, and other stories to help keep readers—and listeners—up to date on the movement to protect online privacy and free expression. 

Thank you to the supporters around the world who make our work possible! If you're not a member yet, join EFF today to help us fight for a brighter digital future.

Christian Romero

【25年JCJ賞受賞者スピーチ】=南京と沖縄つなげる 〝新しい戦前〟にはしない 中村 万里子さん(琉球新報社)

5 days 17 hours ago
 「〝新しい戦前〟にしない」キャンペーンは昨年3月22日、沖縄戦を指揮した第32軍の創設の日に始めました。連載「戦世ぬ沖縄」では日本のアジア侵略と植民地支配の最終局面にあった沖縄戦までを体験者の証言で伝えました。沖縄は加害者にも被害者にもさせられたという内省を踏まえた取り組みです。 沖縄戦は1945年3月下旬から3か月にわたる激しい地上戦でしたが、日中戦争が沖縄戦にどうつながったのかは、これまで取り上げられなかったテーマです。 沖縄では「南京・沖縄を結ぶ会」が、中国と市民交流..
JCJ

Rights Organizations Demand Halt to Mobile Fortify, ICE's Handheld Face Recognition Program

5 days 19 hours ago

Mobile Fortify, the new app used by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to use face recognition technology (FRT) to identify people during street encounters, is an affront to the rights and dignity of migrants and U.S. citizens alike. That's why a coalition of privacy, civil liberties and civil rights organizations are demanding the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) shut down the use of Mobile Fortify, release the agency's privacy analyses of the app, and clarify the agency's policy on face recognition. 

As the organizations, including EFF, Asian Americans Advancing Justice and the Project on Government Oversight, write in a letter sent by EPIC

ICE’s reckless field practices compound the harm done by its use of facial recognition. ICE does not allow people to opt-out of being scanned, and ICE agents apparently have the discretion to use a facial recognition match as a definitive determination of a person’s immigration status even in the face of contrary evidence.  Using face identification as a definitive determination of immigration status is immensely disturbing, and ICE’s cavalier use of facial recognition will undoubtedly lead to wrongful detentions, deportations, or worse.  Indeed, there is already at least one reported incident of ICE mistakenly determining a U.S. citizen “could be deported based on biometric confirmation of his identity.”

As if this dangerous use of nonconsensual face recognition isn't bad enough, Mobile Fortify also queries a wide variety of government databases. Already there have been reports that federal officers may be using this FRT to target protesters engaging in First Amendment-protected activities. Yet ICE concluded it did not need to conduct a new Privacy Impact Assessment, which is standard practice for proposed government technologies that collect people's data. 

While Mobile Fortify is the latest iteration of ICE’s mobile FRT, EFF has been tracking this type of technology for more than a decade. In 2013, we identified how a San Diego agency had distributed face recognition-equipped phones to law enforcement agencies across the region, including federal immigration officers. In 2019, EFF helped pass a law temporarily banning collecting biometric data with mobile devices, resulting in the program's cessation

We fought against handheld FRT then, and we will fight it again today. 

Dave Maass

Privacy is For the Children (Too)

6 days 2 hours ago

In the past few years, governments across the world have rolled out different digital identification options, and now there are efforts encouraging online companies to implement identity and age verification requirements with digital ID in mind. This blog is the third in a short series that explains digital ID and the pending use case of age verification. Here, we cover alternative frameworks on age controls, updates on parental controls, and the importance of digital privacy in an increasingly hostile climate politically. You can read the first two posts here, and here.

Observable harms of age verification legislation in the UK, US, and elsewhere:

As we witness the effects of the Online Safety Act in the UK and over 25 state age verification laws in the U.S, it has become even more apparent that mandatory age verification is more of a detriment than a benefit to the public. Here’s what we’re seeing:

It’s obvious: age verification will not keep children safe online. Rather, it is a large proverbial hammer that nails everyone—adults and young people alike—into restrictive parameters of what the government deems appropriate content. That reality is more obvious and tangible now that we’ve seen age-restrictive regulations roll out in various states and countries. But that doesn’t have to be the future if we turn away from age-gating the web.

Keeping kids safe online (or anywhere IRL, let’s not forget) is a complex social issue that cannot be resolved with technology alone.

The legislators responsible for online age verification bills must confront that they are currently addressing complex social issues with a problematic array of technology. Most of policymakers’ concerns about minors' engagement with the internet can be sorted into one of three categories:

  • Content risks: The negative implications from exposure to online content that might be age-inappropriate, such as violent or sexually explicit content, or content that incites dangerous behavior like self-harm. 
  • Conduct risks: Behavior by children or teenagers that might be harmful to themselves or others, like cyberbullying, sharing intimate or personal information or problematic overuse of a service.
  • Contact risks: The potential harms stemming from contact with people that might pose a risk to minors, including grooming or being forced to exchange sexually explicit material.
Parental controls—which already exist!—can help.

These three categories of possible risks will not be eliminated by mandatory age verification—or any form of techno-solutionism, for that matter. Mandatory age checks will instead block access to vital online communities and resources for those people—including young people—who need them the most. It’s an ineffective and disproportionate tool to holistically address young people’s online safety. 

However, these can be partially addressed with better-utilized and better-designed parental controls and family accounts. Existing parental controls are woefully underutilized, according to one survey that collected answers from 1,000 parents. Adoption of parental controls varied widely, from 51% on tablets to 35% on video game consoles. Making parental controls more flexible and accessible, so parents better understand the tools and how to use them, could increase adoption and address content risk more effectively than a broad government censorship mandate.  

Recently, Android made its parental controls easier to set up. It rolled out features that directly address content risk by assisting parents who wish to block specific apps and filter out mature content from Google Chrome and Google Search. Apple also updated its parental controls settings this past summer by instituting new ways for parents to manage child accounts and giving app developers access to a Declared Age Range API. Where parents can declare age range and apps can respond to declared ranges established in child accounts, without giving over a birthdate. With this, parents are given some flexibility like age-range information beyond just 13+. A diverse range of tools and flexible settings provide the best options for families and empower parents and guardians to decide and tailor what online safety means for their own children—at any age, maturity level, or type of individual risk.

Privacy laws can also help minors online.

Parental controls are useful in the hands of responsible guardians. But what about children who are neglected or abused by those in charge of them? Age verification laws cannot solve this problem; these laws simply share possible abuse of power with the state. To address social issues, we need more efforts directed at the family and community structures around young people, and initiatives that can mitigate the risk factors of abuse instead of resorting to government control over speech.

While age verification is not the answer, those seeking legislative solutions can instead focus their attention on privacy laws—which are more than capable of assisting minors online, no matter the state of their at-home care. Comprehensive data privacy, which EFF has long advocated for, is perhaps the most obvious way to keep the data of young people safe online. Data brokers gather a vast amount of data and assemble new profiles of information as a young person uses the internet. These data sets also contribute to surveillance and teach minors that it is normal to be tracked as they use the web. Banning behavioral ads would remove a major incentive for companies to collect as much data as they do and be able to sell it to whomever will buy it from them. For example, many age-checking tools use data brokers to establish “age estimation” on emails used to sign up for an online service, further incentivizing a vicious cycle of data collection and retention. Ultimately, privacy-encroaching companies are rewarded for the years of mishandling our data with lucrative government contracts.

These systems create much more risk online and offline for young people in terms of their privacy over time from online surveillance and in authoritarian political climates. Age verification proponents often acknowledge that there are privacy risks, and dismiss the consequences by claiming the trade off will “protect children.” These systems don’t foster safer online practices for young people; they encourage increasingly invasive ways for governments to define who is and isn’t free to roam online. If we don’t re-establish ways to maintain online anonymity today, our children’s internet could become unrecognizable and unusable for not only them, but many adults as well. 

Actions you can take today to protect young people online:
  • Use existing parental controls to decide for yourself what your kid should and shouldn’t see, who they should engage with, etc.
  • Discuss the importance of online privacy and safety with your kids and community.
  • Provide spaces and resources for young people to flexibly communicate with their schools, guardians, and community.
  • Support comprehensive privacy legislation for all.
  • Support legislators’ efforts to regulate the out-of-control data broker industry by banning behavioral ads.

Join EFF in opposing mandatory age verification and age gating laws—help us keep your kids safe and protect the future of the internet, privacy, and anonymity.

Alexis Hancock