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複数のプログラミング言語において、Microsoft Windows環境でプログラム内からコマンドを実行する場合に、コマンドに渡す引数データのエスケープ処理が不適切であると指摘されています。

株式会社バッファローが提供する複数の無線LANルーターには、複数の脆弱性が存在します。

地域におけるデジタル技術の利活用を支えるデジタル基盤の利用環境の在り方ワーキンググループ（第5回）

不適正利用対策に関するワーキンググループ（第3回）　

第309回 官民競争入札等監理委員会（開催案内）

デジタル空間における情報流通の健全性確保の在り方に関する検討会（第17回）配付資料　※ワーキンググループ（第15回）合同開催

令和5年度「消防団地域貢献表彰」の受賞団体の決定及び表彰式の開催

衛星放送ワーキンググループ（第7回）配付資料

　捜査機関による証拠ねつ造でえん罪が作られる。まさか！袴田事件第二次再審の静岡地裁決定、と差し戻し後の東京高裁決定はそれを指摘した。本書は裁判官出身の2名の弁護士と刑事訴訟法の研究者が具体的な事件をあげてえん罪の原因と再審法の改正をアピールする。必読の基本書だ。証拠開示、検察官抗告の禁止、裁判官の思い込みの解明、自白偏重の是正など。編者葛野尋之による、再審申立人への刑の執行停止（特に死刑）の提言は死刑再審の場合切実だ。本人が誰よりも知る無実のまま、命を奪われる地獄は看過できな..

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　潜水艦博物館　昨年６月29日市民や市議会に何の説明もなく広島平和記念公園とハワイ真珠湾の「パールハーバー米国立公園」の姉妹公園協定が結ばれた。平和公園の象徴「原爆ドーム」の世界遺産登録に強く反対した米国がなぜ、広島に姉妹公園協定申し入れをしてきたのか――。　私を含め５人のメンバー広島県被団協（佐久間邦事長）平和公園ガイド団有志は１月20日から24日、「パールハーバー米国立公園」を訪れた。　百聞は一見に如かず..

Facial recognition is a threat to privacy, racial justice, free expression, and information security. EFF supports strict restrictions on face recognition use by private companies, and total bans on government use of the technology. Face recognition in all of its forms, including face scanning and real-time tracking, pose threats to civil liberties and individual privacy. “False positive” error rates are significantly higher for women, children, and people of color, meaning face recognition has an unfair discriminatory impact. Coupled with the fact that cameras are over-deployed in neighborhoods with immigrants and people of color, spying technologies like face surveillance serve to amplify existing disparities in the criminal justice system.

Across the nation local communities from San Francisco to Boston have moved to ban government use of facial recognition. In New York, Electronic Frontier Alliance member Surveillance Technology Oversight Project (S.T.O.P.) is at the forefront of this movement. Recently we got the chance to speak with them about their efforts and what people can do to help advance the cause. S.T.O.P. is a New York-based civil rights and privacy organization that does research, advocacy, and litigation around issues of surveillance technology abuse.

What does “Ban The Scan” mean? 

When we say scan, we are referring to the “face scan” component of facial recognition technology. Surveillance, and more specifically facial recognition, disproportionately targets Black, Brown, Indigenous, and immigrant communities, amplifying the discrimination that has defined New York’s policing for as long as our state has had police. Facial recognition is notoriously biased and often abused by law enforcement. It is a threat to free speech, freedom of association, and other civil liberties. Ban the Scan is a campaign and coalition built around passing two packages of bills that would ban facial recognition in a variety of contexts in New York City and New York State. 

Are there any differences with the State vs City version?

The City and State packages are largely similar. The main differences are that the State package contains a bill banning law enforcement use of facial recognition, whereas the City package has a bill that bans all government use of the technology (although this bill has yet to be introduced). The State package also contains an additional bill banning facial recognition use in schools, which would codify an existing regulatory ban that currently applies to schools.

What hurdles exist to its passage? 

 For the New York State package, the coalition is newly coming together, so we are still gathering support from legislators and the public. For the City package, we are lucky to have a lot of support already, and we are waiting to have a hearing conducted on the residential ban bills and move them into the next phase of legislation. We are also working to get the bill banning government use introduced at the City level.

What can people do to help this good legislation? How to get involved? 

We recently launched a campaign website for both City and State packages (banthescan.org). If you’re a New York City or State resident, you can look up your legislators (links below!) and contact them to ask them to support these bills or thank them for their support if they are already signed on. We also have social media toolkits with graphics and guidance on how to help spread the word!  

Find your NYS Assemblymember: https://nyassembly.gov/mem/search/ 

Find your NYS Senator: https://www.nysenate.gov/find-my-senator 

Find your NYC Councilmember: https://council.nyc.gov/map-widget/  

Our faces are often exposed and, unlike passwords or pin numbers, cannot be remade. Governments and businesses, often working in partnership, are increasingly using our faces to track our whereabouts, activities, and associations. This is why EFF recently submitted comments to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, which is preparing a report on face recognition technology (FRT).   

In our submission, we reiterated our stance that there should be a ban on governmental use of FRT and strict regulations on private use because it: (1) is not reliable enough to be used in determinations affecting constitutional and statutory rights or social benefits; (2) is a menace to social justice as its errors are far more pronounced when applied to people of color, members of the LGBTQ+ community, and other marginalized groups; (3) threatens privacy rights; (4) chills and deters expression; and (5) creates information security risks.

Despite these grave concerns, FRT is being used by the government and law enforcement agencies with increasing frequency, and sometimes with devastating effects. At least one Black woman and five Black men have been wrongfully arrested due to misidentification by FRT: Porcha Woodruff, Michael Oliver, Nijeer Parks, Randal Reid, Alonzo Sawyer, and Robert Williams. And Harvey Murphy Jr., a white man, was wrongfully arrested due to FRT misidentification, and then sexually assaulted while in jail.

Even if FRT was accurate, or at least equally inaccurate across demographics, it would still severely impact our privacy and security. We cannot change our face, and we expose it to the mass surveillance networks already in place every day we go out in public. But doing that should not be license for the government or private entities to make imprints of our face and retain that data, especially when that data may be breached by hostile actors.

The government should ban its own use of FRT, and strictly limit private use, to protect us from the threats posed by FRT.