Analyzing KOSA’s Constitutional Problems In Depth 

1 month 1 week ago
Why EFF Does Not Think Recent Changes Ameliorate KOSA’s Censorship 

The latest version of the Kids Online Safety Act (KOSA) did not change our critical view of the legislation. The changes have led some organizations to drop their opposition to the bill, but we still believe it is a dangerous and unconstitutional censorship bill that would empower state officials to target services and online content they do not like. We respect that different groups can come to their own conclusions about how KOSA will affect everyone’s ability to access lawful speech online. EFF, however, remains steadfast in our long-held view that imposing a vague duty of care on a broad swath of online services to mitigate specific harms based on the content of online speech will result in those services imposing age verification and content restrictions. At least one group has characterized EFF’s concerns as spreading “disinformation.” We are not. But to ensure that everyone understands why EFF continues to oppose KOSA, we wanted to break down our interpretation of the bill in more detail and compare our views to those of others—both advocates and critics.  

Below, we walk through some of the most common criticisms we’ve gotten—and those criticisms the bill has received—to help explain our view of its likely impacts.  

KOSA’s Effectiveness  

First, and most importantly: We have serious and important disagreements with KOSA’s advocates on whether it will prevent future harm to children online. We are deeply saddened by the stories so many supporters and parents have shared about how their children were harmed online. And we want to keep talking to those parents, supporters, and lawmakers about ways in which EFF can work with them to prevent harm to children online, just as we will continue to talk with people who advocate for the benefits of social media. We believe, and have advocated for, comprehensive privacy protections as a better way to begin to address harms done to young people (and old) who have been targeted by platforms’ predatory business practices.  

A line of U.S. Supreme Court cases involving efforts to prevent book sellers from disseminating certain speech, which resulted in broad, unconstitutional censorship, shows why KOSA is unconstitutional. 

EFF does not think KOSA is the right approach to protecting children online, however. As we’ve said before, we think that in practice, KOSA is likely to exacerbate the risks of children being harmed online because it will place barriers on their ability to access lawful speech about addiction, eating disorders, bullying, and other important topics. We also think those restrictions will stifle minors who are trying  to find their own communities online.  We do not think that language added to KOSA to address that censorship concern solves the problem. We also don’t think that focusing KOSA’s regulation on design elements of online services addresses the First Amendment problems of the bill, either. 

Our views of KOSA’s harmful consequences are grounded in EFF’s 34-year history of both making policy for the internet and seeing how legislation plays out once it’s passed. This is also not our first time seeing the vast difference between how a piece of legislation is promoted and what it does in practice. Recently we saw this same dynamic with FOSTA/SESTA, which was promoted by politicians and the parents of  child sex trafficking victims as the way to prevent future harms. Sadly, even the politicians who initially championed it now agree that this law was not only ineffective at reducing sex trafficking online, but also created additional dangers for those same victims as well as others.   

KOSA’s Duty of Care  

KOSA’s core component requires an online platform or service that is likely to be accessed by young people to “exercise reasonable care in the creation and implementation of any design feature to prevent and mitigate” various harms to minors. These enumerated harms include: 

  • mental health disorders (anxiety, depression, eating disorders, substance use disorders, and suicidal behaviors) 
  • patterns of use that indicate or encourage addiction-like behaviors  
  • physical violence, online bullying, and harassment 

Based on our understanding of the First Amendment and how all online platforms and services regulated by KOSA will navigate their legal risk, we believe that KOSA will lead to broad online censorship of lawful speech, including content designed to help children navigate and overcome the very same harms KOSA identifies.  

A line of U.S. Supreme Court cases involving efforts to prevent book sellers from disseminating certain speech, which resulted in broad, unconstitutional censorship, shows why KOSA is unconstitutional. 

In Smith v. California, the Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that made it a crime for a book seller to possess obscene material. The court ruled that even though obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment, the ordinance’s imposition of liability based on the mere presence of that material had a broader censorious effect because a book seller “will tend to restrict the books he sells to those he has inspected; and thus the State will have imposed a restriction upon the distribution of constitutionally protected, as well as obscene literature.” The court recognized that the “ordinance tends to impose a severe limitation on the public’s access to constitutionally protected material” because a distributor of others’ speech will react by limiting access to any borderline content that could get it into legal trouble.  

Online services have even less ability to read through the millions (or sometimes billions) of pieces of content on their services than a bookseller or distributor

In Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court struck down a government effort to limit the distribution of material that a state commission had deemed objectionable to minors. The commission would send notices to book distributors that identified various books and magazines they believed were objectionable and sent copies of their lists to local and state law enforcement. Book distributors reacted to these notices by stopping the circulation of the materials identified by the commission. The Supreme Court held that the commission’s efforts violated the First Amendment and once more recognized that by targeting a distributor of others’ speech, the commission’s “capacity for suppression of constitutionally protected publications” was vast.  

KOSA’s duty of care creates a more far-reaching censorship threat than those that the Supreme Court struck down in Smith and Bantam Books. KOSA makes online services that host our digital speech liable should they fail to exercise reasonable care in removing or restricting minors’ access to lawful content on the topics KOSA identifies. KOSA is worse than the ordinance in Smith because the First Amendment generally protects speech about addiction, suicide, eating disorders, and the other topics KOSA singles out.  

We think that online services will react to KOSA’s new liability in much the same way as the bookstore in Smith and the book distributer in Bantam Books: They will limit minors’ access to or simply remove any speech that might touch on the topics KOSA identifies, even when much of that speech is protected by the First Amendment. Worse, online services have even less ability to read through the millions (or sometimes billions) of pieces of content on their services than a bookseller or distributor who had to review hundreds or thousands of books.  To comply, we expect that platforms will deploy blunt tools, either by gating off entire portions of their site to prevent minors from accessing them (more on this below) or by deploying automated filters that will over-censor speech, including speech that may be beneficial to minors seeking help with addictions or other problems KOSA identifies. (Regardless of their claims, it is not possible for a service to accurately pinpoint the content KOSA describes with automated tools.) 

But as the Supreme Court ruled in Smith and Bantam Books, the First Amendment prohibits Congress from enacting a law that results in such broad censorship precisely because it limits the distribution of, and access to, lawful speech.  

Moreover, the fact that KOSA singles out certain legal content—for example, speech concerning bullying—means that the bill creates content-based restrictions that are presumptively unconstitutional. The government bears the burden of showing that KOSA’s content restrictions advance a compelling government interest, are narrowly tailored to that interest, and are the least speech-restrictive means of advancing that interest. KOSA cannot satisfy this exacting standard.  

The fact that KOSA singles out certain legal content—for example, speech concerning bullying—means that the bill creates content-based restrictions that are presumptively unconstitutional. 

EFF agrees that the government has a compelling interest in protecting children from being harmed online. But KOSA’s broad requirement that platforms and services face liability for showing speech concerning particular topics to minors is not narrowly tailored to that interest. As said above, the broad censorship that will result will effectively limit access to a wide range of lawful speech on topics such as addiction, bullying, and eating disorders. The fact that KOSA will sweep up so much speech shows that it is far from the least speech-restrictive alternative, too.  

Why the Rule of Construction Doesn’t Solve the Censorship Concern 

In response to censorship concerns about the duty of care, KOSA’s authors added a rule of construction stating that nothing in the duty of care “shall be construed to require a covered platform to prevent or preclude:”  

  • minors from deliberately or independently searching for content, or 
  • the platforms or services from providing resources that prevent or mitigate the harms KOSA identifies, “including evidence-based information and clinical resources." 

We understand that some interpret this language as a safeguard for online services that limits their liability if a minor happens across information on topics that KOSA identifies, and consequently, platforms hosting content aimed at mitigating addiction, bullying, or other identified harms can take comfort that they will not be sued under KOSA. 

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But EFF does not believe the rule of construction will limit KOSA’s censorship, in either a practical or constitutional sense. As a practical matter, it’s not clear how an online service will be able to rely on the rule of construction’s safeguards given the diverse amount of content it likely hosts.  

Take for example an online forum in which users discuss drug and alcohol abuse. It is likely to contain a range of content and views by users, some of which might describe addiction, drug use, and treatment, including negative and positive views on those points. KOSA’s rule of construction might protect the forum from a minor’s initial search for content that leads them to the forum. But once that minor starts interacting with the forum, they are likely to encounter the types of content KOSA proscribes, and the service may face liability if there is a later claim that the minor was harmed. In short, KOSA does not clarify that the initial search for the forum precludes any liability should the minor interact with the forum and experience harm later. It is also not clear how a service would prove that the minor found the forum via a search. 

The near-impossible standard required to review such a large volume of content, coupled with liability for letting any harmful content through, is precisely the scenario that the Supreme Court feared

Further, the rule of construction’s protections for the forum, should it provide only resources regarding preventing or mitigating drug and alcohol abuse based on evidence-based information and clinical resources, is unlikely to be helpful. That provision assumes that the forum has the resources to review all existing content on the forum and effectively screen all future content to only permit user-generated content concerning mitigation or prevention of substance abuse. The rule of construction also requires the forum to have the subject-matter expertise necessary to judge what content is or isn’t clinically correct and evidence-based. And even that assumes that there is broad scientific consensus about all aspects of substance abuse, including its causes (which there is not). 

Given that practical uncertainty and the potential hazard of getting anything wrong when it comes to minors’ access to that content, we think that the substance abuse forum will react much like the bookseller and distributor in the Supreme Court cases did: It will simply take steps to limit the ability for minors to access the content, a far easier and safer alternative than  making case-by-case expert decisions regarding every piece of content on the forum. 

EFF also does not believe that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Smith and Bantam Books would have been different if there had been similar KOSA-like safeguards incorporated into the regulations at issue. For example, even if the obscenity ordinance at issue in Smith had made an exception letting bookstores  sell scientific books with detailed pictures of human anatomy, the bookstore still would have to exhaustively review every book it sold and separate the obscene books from the scientific. The Supreme Court rejected such burdens as offensive to the First Amendment: “It would be altogether unreasonable to demand so near an approach to omniscience.” 

The near-impossible standard required to review such a large volume of content, coupled with liability for letting any harmful content through, is precisely the scenario that the Supreme Court feared. “The bookseller's self-censorship, compelled by the State, would be a censorship affecting the whole public, hardly less virulent for being privately administered,” the court wrote in Smith. “Through it, the distribution of all books, both obscene and not obscene, would be impeded.” 

Those same First Amendment concerns are exponentially greater for online services hosting everyone’s speech. That is why we do not believe that KOSA’s rule of construction will prevent the broader censorship that results from the bill’s duty of care. 

Finally, we do not believe the rule of construction helps the government overcome its burden on strict scrutiny to show that KOSA is narrowly tailored or restricts less speech than necessary. Instead, the rule of construction actually heightens KOSA’s violation of the First Amendment by preferencing certain viewpoints over others. The rule of construction here creates a legal preference for viewpoints that seek to mitigate the various identified harms, and punishes viewpoints that are neutral or even mildly positive of those harms. While EFF agrees that such speech may be awful, the First Amendment does not permit the government to make these viewpoint-based distinctions without satisfying strict scrutiny. It cannot meet that heavy burden with KOSA.  

KOSA's Focus on Design Features Doesn’t Change Our First Amendment Concerns 

KOSA supporters argue that because the duty of care and other provisions of KOSA concern an online service or platforms’ design features, the bill raises no First Amendment issues. We disagree.  

It’s true enough that KOSA creates liability for services that fail to “exercise reasonable care in the creation and implementation of any design feature” to prevent the bill’s enumerated harms. But the features themselves are not what KOSA's duty of care deems harmful. Rather, the provision specifically links the design features to minors’ access to the enumerated content that KOSA deems harmful. In that way, the design features serve as little more than a distraction. The duty of care provision is not concerned per se with any design choice generally, but only those design choices that fail to mitigate minors’ access to information about depression, eating disorders, and the other identified content. 

Once again, the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith shows why it’s incorrect to argue that KOSA’s regulation of design features avoids the First Amendment concerns. If the ordinance at issue in Smith regulated the way in which bookstores were designed, and imposed liability based on where booksellers placed certain offending books in their stores—for example, in the front window—we  suspect that the Supreme Court would have recognized, rightly, that the design restriction was little more than an indirect effort to unconstitutionally regulate the content. The same holds true for KOSA.  

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KOSA Doesn’t “Mandate” Age-Gating, But It Heavily Pushes Platforms to Do So and Provides Few Other Avenues to Comply 

KOSA was amended in May 2023 to include language that was meant to ease concerns about age verification; in particular, it included explicit language that age verification is not required under the “Privacy Protections” section of the bill. The bill now states that a covered platform is not required to implement an age gating or age verification functionality to comply with KOSA.  

EFF acknowledges the text of the bill and has been clear in our messaging that nothing in the proposal explicitly requires services to implement age verification. Yet it's hard to see this change as anything other than a technical dodge that will be contradicted in practice.  

KOSA creates liability for any regulated platform or service that presents certain content to minors that the bill deems harmful to them. To comply with that new liability, those platforms and services’ options are limited. As we see them, the options are either to filter content for known minors or to gate content so only adults can access it. In either scenario, the linchpin is the platform knowing every user’s age  so it can identify its minor users and either filter the content they see or  exclude them from any content that could be deemed harmful under the law.  

EFF acknowledges the text of the bill and has been clear in our messaging that nothing in the proposal explicitly requires services to implement age verification.

There’s really no way to do that without implementing age verification. Regardless of what this section of the bill says, there’s no way for platforms to block either categories of content or design features for minors without knowing the minors are minors.  

We also don’t think KOSA lets platforms  claim ignorance if they take steps to never learn the ages of their users. If a 16-year-old user misidentifies herself as an adult and the platform does not use age verification, it could still be held liable because it should have “reasonably known” her age. The platform’s ignorance thus could work against it later, perversely incentivizing the services to implement age verification at the outset. 

EFF Remains Concerned About State Attorneys General Enforcing KOSA 

Another change that KOSA’s sponsors made  this year was to remove the ability of state attorneys general to enforce KOSA’s duty of care standard. We respect that some groups believe this addresses  concerns that some states would misuse KOSA to target minors’ access to any information that state officials dislike, including LGBTQIA+ or sex education information. We disagree that this modest change prevents this harm. KOSA still lets state attorneys general  enforce other provisions, including a section requiring certain “safeguards for minors.” Among the safeguards is a requirement that platforms “limit design features” that lead to minors spending more time on a service, including the ability to scroll through content, be notified of other content or messages, or auto playing content.  

But letting an attorney general  enforce KOSA’s requirement of design safeguards could be used as a proxy for targeting services that host content certain officials dislike.  The attorney general would simply target the same content or service it disfavored, butinstead of claiming that it violated KOSA’s duty to care, the official instead would argue that the service failed to prevent harmful design features that minors in their state used, such as notifications or endless scrolling. We think the outcome will be the same: states are likely to use KOSA to target speech about sexual health, abortion, LBGTQIA+ topics, and a variety of other information. 

KOSA Applies to Broad Swaths of the Internet, Not Just the Big Social Media Platforms 

Many sites, platforms, apps, and games would have to follow KOSA’s requirements. It applies to “an online platform, online video game, messaging application, or video streaming service that connects to the internet and that is used, or is reasonably likely to be used, by a minor.”  

There are some important exceptions—it doesn’t apply to services that only provide direct or group messages only, such as Signal, or to schools, libraries, nonprofits, or to ISP’s like Comcast generally. This is good—some critics of KOSA have been concerned that it would apply to websites like Archive of Our Own (AO3), a fanfiction site that allows users to read and share their work, but AO3 is a nonprofit, so it would not be covered.  

But  a wide variety of niche online services that are for-profit  would still be regulated by KOSA. Ravelry, for example, is an online platform focused on knitters, but it is a business.   

And it is an open question whether the comment and community portions of major mainstream news and sports websites are subject to KOSA. The bill exempts news and sports websites, with the huge caveat that they are exempt only so long as they are “not otherwise an online platform.” KOSA defines “online platform” as “any public-facing website, online service, online application, or mobile application that predominantly provides a community forum for user generated content.” It’s easily arguable that the New York Times’ or ESPN’s comment and forum sections are predominantly designed as places for user-generated content. Would KOSA apply only to those interactive spaces or does the exception to the exception mean the entire sites are subject to the law? The language of the bill is unclear. 

Not All of KOSA’s Critics Are Right, Either 

Just as we don’t agree on KOSA’s likely outcomes with many of its supporters, we also don’t agree with every critic regarding KOSA’s consequences. This isn’t surprising—the law is broad, and a major complaint is that it remains unclear how its vague language would be interpreted. So let’s address some of the more common misconceptions about the bill. 

Large Social Media May Not Entirely Block Young People, But Smaller Services Might 

Some people have concerns that KOSA will result in minors not being able to use social media at all. We believe a more likely scenario is that the major platforms would offer different experiences to different age groups.  

They already do this in some ways—Meta currently places teens into the most restrictive content control setting on Instagram and Facebook. The company specifically updated these settings for many of the categories included in KOSA, including suicide, self-harm, and eating disorder content. Their update describes precisely what we worry KOSA would require by law: “While we allow people to share content discussing their own struggles with suicide, self-harm and eating disorders, our policy is not to recommend this content and we have been focused on ways to make it harder to find.” TikTok also has blocked some videos for users under 18. To be clear, this content filtering as a result of KOSA will be harmful and would violate the First Amendment.  

Though large platforms will likely react this way, many smaller platforms will not be capable of this kind of content filtering. They very well may decide blocking young people entirely is the easiest way to protect themselves from liability. We cannot know how every platform will react if KOSA is enacted, but smaller platforms that do not already use complex automated content moderation tools will likely find it financially burdensome to implement both age verification tools and content moderation tools.  

KOSA Won’t Necessarily Make Your Real Name Public by Default 

One recurring fear that critics of KOSA have shared is that they will no longer to be able to use platforms anonymously. We believe this is true, but there is some nuance to it. No one should have to hand over their driver's license—or, worse, provide biometric information—just to access lawful speech on websites. But there's nothing in KOSA that would require online platforms to publicly tie your real name to your username.  

Still, once someone shares information to verify their age, there’s no way for them to be certain that the data they’re handing over is not going to be retained and used by the website, or further shared or even sold. As we’ve said, KOSA doesn't technically require age verification but we think it’s the most likely outcome. Users still will be forced to trust that the website they visit, or its third-party verification service, won’t misuse their private data, including their name, age, or biometric information. Given the numerous  data privacy blunders we’ve seen from companies like Meta in the past, and the general concern with data privacy that Congress seems to share with the general public (and with EFF), we believe this outcome to be extremely dangerous. Simply put: Sharing your private info with a company doesn’t necessarily make it public, but it makes it far more likely to become public than if you hadn’t shared it in the first place.   

We Agree With Supporters: Government Should Study Social Media’s Effects on Minors 

We know tensions are high; this is an incredibly important topic, and an emotional one. EFF does not have all the right answers regarding how to address the ways in which young people can be harmed online. Which is why we agree with KOSA’s supporters that the government should conduct much greater research on these issues. We believe that comprehensive fact-finding is the first step to both identifying the problems and legislative solutions. A provision of KOSA does require the National Academy of Sciences to research these issues and issue reports to the public. But KOSA gets this process backwards. It creates solutions to general concerns about young people being harmed without first doing the work necessary to show that the bill’s provisions address those problems. As we have said repeatedly, we do not think KOSA will address harms to young people online. We think it will exacerbate them.  

Even if your stance on KOSA is different from ours, we hope we are all working toward the same goal: an internet that supports freedom, justice, and innovation for all people of the world. We don’t believe KOSA will get us there, but neither will ad hominem attacks. To that end,  we look forward to more detailed analyses of the bill from its supporters, and to continuing thoughtful engagement from anyone interested in working on this critical issue. 

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Aaron Mackey

San Diego City Council Breaks TRUST

1 month 1 week ago

In a stunning reversal against the popular Transparent & Responsible Use of Surveillance Technology (TRUST) ordinance, the San Diego city council voted earlier this year to cut many of the provisions that sought to ensure public transparency for law enforcement surveillance technologies. 

Similar to other Community Control Of Police Surveillance (CCOPS) ordinances, the TRUST ordinance was intended to ensure that each police surveillance technology would be subject to basic democratic oversight in the form of public disclosures and city council votes. The TRUST ordinance was fought for by a coalition of community organizations– including several members of the Electronic Frontier Alliance – responding to surprise smart streetlight surveillance that was not put under public or city council review.  

The TRUST ordinance was passed one and a half years ago, but law enforcement advocates immediately set up roadblocks to implementation. Police unions, for example, insisted that some of the provisions around accountability for misuse of surveillance needed to be halted after passage to ensure they didn’t run into conflict with union contracts. The city kept the ordinance unapplied and untested, and then in the late summer of 2023, a little over a year after passage, the mayor proposed a package of changes that would gut the ordinance. This included exemption of a long list of technologies, including ARJIS databases and record management system data storage. These changes were later approved this past January.  

But use of these databases should require, for example, auditing to protect data security for city residents. There also should be limits on how police share data with federal agencies and other law enforcement agencies, which might use that data to criminalize San Diego residents for immigration status, gender-affirming health care, or exercise of reproductive rights that are not criminalized in the city or state. The overall TRUST ordinance stands, but partly defanged with many carve-outs for technologies the San Diego police will not need to bring before democratically-elected lawmakers and the public. 

Now, opponents of the TRUST ordinance are emboldened with their recent victory, and are vowing to introduce even more amendments to further erode the gains of this ordinance so that San Diegans won’t have a chance to know how their local law enforcement surveils them, and no democratic body will be required to consent to the technologies, new or old. The members of the TRUST Coalition are not standing down, however, and will continue to fight to defend the standing portions of the TRUST ordinance, and to regain the wins for public oversight that were lost. 

As Lilly Irani, from Electronic Frontier Alliance member and TRUST Coalition member Tech Workers Coalition San Diegohas said

“City Council members and the mayor still have time to make this right. And we, the people, should hold our elected representatives accountable to make sure they maintain the oversight powers we currently enjoy — powers the mayor’s current proposal erodes.” 

If you live or work in San Diego, it’s important to make it clear to city officials that San Diegans don’t want to give police a blank check to harass and surveil them. Such dangerous technology needs basic transparency and democratic oversight to preserve our privacy, our speech, and our personal safety. 

José Martinez

5 Questions to Ask Before Backing the TikTok Ban

1 month 1 week ago

With strong bipartisan support, the U.S. House voted 352 to 65 to pass HR 7521 this week, a bill that would ban TikTok nationwide if its Chinese owner doesn’t sell the popular video app. The TikTok bill’s future in the U.S. Senate isn’t yet clear, but President Joe Biden has said he would sign it into law if it reaches his desk. 

The speed at which lawmakers have moved to advance a bill with such a significant impact on speech is alarming. It has given many of us — including, seemingly, lawmakers themselves — little time to consider the actual justifications for such a law. In isolation, parts of the argument might sound somewhat reasonable, but lawmakers still need to clear up their confused case for banning TikTok. Before throwing their support behind the TikTok bill, Americans should be able to understand it fully, something that they can start doing by considering these five questions. 

1. Is the TikTok bill about privacy or content?

Something that has made HR 7521 hard to talk about is the inconsistent way its supporters have described the bill’s goals. Is this bill supposed to address data privacy and security concerns? Or is it about the content TikTok serves to its American users? 

From what lawmakers have said, however, it seems clear that this bill is strongly motivated by content on TikTok that they don’t like. When describing the "clear threat" posed by foreign-owned apps, the House report on the bill  cites the ability of adversary countries to "collect vast amounts of data on Americans, conduct espionage campaigns, and push misinformation, disinformation, and propaganda on the American public."

This week, the bill’s Republican sponsor Rep. Mike Gallagher told PBS Newshour that the “broader” of the two concerns TikTok raises is “the potential for this platform to be used for the propaganda purposes of the Chinese Communist Party." On that same program, Representative Raja Krishnamoorthi, a Democratic co-sponsor of the bill, similarly voiced content concerns, claiming that TikTok promotes “drug paraphernalia, oversexualization of teenagers” and “constant content about suicidal ideation.”

2. If the TikTok bill is about privacy, why aren’t lawmakers passing comprehensive privacy laws? 

It is indeed alarming how much information TikTok and other social media platforms suck up from their users, information that is then collected not just by governments but also by private companies and data brokers. This is why the EFF strongly supports comprehensive data privacy legislation, a solution that directly addresses privacy concerns. This is also why it is hard to take lawmakers at their word about their privacy concerns with TikTok, given that Congress has consistently failed to enact comprehensive data privacy legislation and this bill would do little to stop the many other ways adversaries (foreign and domestic) collect, buy, and sell our data. Indeed, the TikTok bill has no specific privacy provisions in it at all.

It has been suggested that what makes TikTok different from other social media companies is how its data can be accessed by a foreign government. Here, too, TikTok is not special. China is not unique in requiring companies in the country to provide information to them upon request. In the United States, Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act, which is up for renewal, authorizes the mass collection of communication data. In 2021 alone, the FBI conducted up to 3.4 million warrantless searches through Section 702. The U.S. government can also demand user information from online providers through National Security Letters, which can both require providers to turn over user information and gag them from speaking about it. While the U.S. cannot control what other countries do, if this is a problem lawmakers are sincerely concerned about, they could start by fighting it at home.

3. If the TikTok bill is about content, how will it avoid violating the First Amendment? 

Whether TikTok is banned or sold to new owners, millions of people in the U.S. will no longer be able to get information and communicate with each other as they presently do. Indeed, one of the given reasons to force the sale is so TikTok will serve different content to users, specifically when it comes to Chinese propaganda and misinformation.

The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution rightly makes it very difficult for the government to force such a change legally. To restrict content, U.S. laws must be the least speech-restrictive way of addressing serious harms. The TikTok bill’s supporters have vaguely suggested that the platform poses national security risks. So far, however, there has been little public justification that the extreme measure of banning TikTok (rather than addressing specific harms) is properly tailored to prevent these risks. And it has been well-established law for almost 60 years that U.S. people have a First Amendment right to receive foreign propaganda. People in the U.S. deserve an explicit explanation of the immediate risks posed by TikTok — something the government will have to do in court if this bill becomes law and is challenged.

4. Is the TikTok bill a ban or something else? 

Some have argued that the TikTok bill is not a ban because it would only ban TikTok if owner ByteDance does not sell the company. However, as we noted in the coalition letter we signed with the American Civil Liberties Union, the government generally cannot “accomplish indirectly what it is barred from doing directly, and a forced sale is the kind of speech punishment that receives exacting scrutiny from the courts.” 

Furthermore, a forced sale based on objections to content acts as a backdoor attempt to control speech. Indeed, one of the very reasons Congress wants a new owner is because it doesn’t like China’s editorial control. And any new ownership will likely bring changes to TikTok. In the case of Twitter, it has been very clear how a change of ownership can affect the editorial policies of a social media company. Private businesses are free to decide what information users see and how they communicate on their platforms, but when the U.S. government wants to do so, it must contend with the First Amendment. 

5. Does the U.S. support the free flow of information as a fundamental democratic principle? 

Until now, the United States has championed the free flow of information around the world as a fundamental democratic principle and called out other nations when they have shut down internet access or banned social media apps and other online communications tools. In doing so, the U.S. has deemed restrictions on the free flow of information to be undemocratic.

In 2021, the U.S. State Department formally condemned a ban on Twitter by the government of Nigeria. “Unduly restricting the ability of Nigerians to report, gather, and disseminate opinions and information has no place in a democracy,” a department spokesperson wrote. “Freedom of expression and access to information both online and offline are foundational to prosperous and secure democratic societies.”

Whether it’s in Nigeria, China, or the United States, we couldn’t agree more. Unfortunately, if the TikTok bill becomes law, the U.S. will lose much of its moral authority on this vital principle.

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Hudson Hongo

Location Data Tracks Abortion Clinic Visits. Here’s What to Know

1 month 1 week ago

Our concerns about the selling and misuse of location data for those seeking reproductive and gender healthcare are escalating amid a recent wave of cases and incidents demonstrating that the digital trail we leave is being used by anti-abortion activists.

The good news is some states and tech companies are taking steps to better protect location data privacy, including information that endangers people needing or seeking information about reproductive and gender-affirming healthcare. But we know more must be done—by pharmacies, our email providers, and lawmakers—to plug gaping holes in location data protection.

Location data is highly sensitive, as it paints a picture of our daily lives—where we go, who we visit, when we seek medical care, or what clinics we visit. That’s what makes it so attractive to data brokers and law enforcement in states outlawing abortion and gender-affirming healthcare and those seeking to exploit such data for ideological or commercial purposes.

What we’re seeing is deeply troubling. Sen. Ron Wyden recenty disclosed that vendor Near Intelligence allegedly gathered location data of people’s visits to nearly 600 Planned Parenthood locations across 48 states, without consent. It sold that data to an anti-abortion group, which used it in a massive anti-abortion ad campaign.The Wisconsin-based group used the geofenced data to send mobile ads to people who visited the clinics.

It’s hardly a leap to imagine that law enforcement and bounty hunters in anti-abortion states would gladly buy the same data to find out who is visiting Planned Parenthood clinics and try to charge and imprison women, their families, doctors, and caregivers. That’s the real danger of an unregulated data broker industry; anyone can buy what’s gathered from warrantless surveillance, for whatever nefarious purpose they choose.

For example, police in Idaho, where abortion is illegal, used cell phone data in an investigation against an Idaho woman and her son charged with kidnapping. The data showed that they had taken the son’s minor girlfriend to Oregon, where abortion is legal, to obtain an abortion.

The exploitation of location data is not the only problem. Information about prescription medicines we take is not protected against law enforcement requests. The nation’s eight largest pharmacy chains, including CVS, Walgreens, and Rite Aid, have routinely turned over prescription records of thousands of Americans to law enforcement agencies or other government entities secretly without a warrant, according to a congressional inquiry.

Many people may not know that their prescription records can be obtained by law enforcement without too much trouble. There’s not much standing between someone’s self-managed abortion medication and a law enforcement records demand. In April the U.S. Health and Human Services Department proposed a rule that would prevent healthcare providers and insurers from giving information to state officials trying to prosecute some seeking or providing a legal abortion. A final rule has not yet been published.

Exploitation of location and healthcare data to target communities could easily expand to other groups working to protect bodily autonomy, especially those most likely to suffer targeted harassment and bigotry. With states passing and proposing bills restricting gender-affirming care and state law enforcement officials pursuing medical records of transgender youth across state lines, it’s not hard to imagine them buying or using location data to find people to prosecute.

To better protect people against police access to sensitive health information, lawmakers in a few states have taken action. In 2022, California enacted two laws protecting abortion data privacy and preventing California companies from sharing abortion data with out-of-state entities.

Then, last September the state enacted a shield law prohibiting California-based companies, including social media and tech companies, from disclosing patients’ private communications regarding healthcare that is legally protected in the state.

Massachusetts lawmakers have proposed the Location Shield Act, which would prohibit the sale of cellphone location information to data brokers. The act would make it harder to trace the path of those traveling to Massachusetts for abortion services.

Of course, tech companies have a huge role to play in location data privacy. EFF was glad when Google said in 2022 it would delete users’ location history for visits to medical facilities, including abortion clinics and counseling and fertility centers. Google pledged that when the location history setting on a device was turned on, it would delete entries for particularly personal places like reproductive health clinics soon after such a visit.

But a study by AccountableTech testing Google’s pledge said the company wasn’t living up to its promises and continued to collect and retain location data from individuals visiting abortion clinics. Accountable Tech reran the study in late 2023 and the results were again troubling—Google still retained location search query data for some visits to Planned Parenthood clinics. It appears users will have to manually delete location search history to remove information about the routes they take to visiting sensitive locations. It doesn’t happen automatically.

Late last year, Google announced plans to move saved Timeline entries in Google Maps to users’ devices. Users who want to keep the entries could choose to back up the data to the cloud, where it would be automatically encrypted and out of reach even to Google.

These changes would appear to make it much more difficult—if not impossible—for Google to provide mass location data in response to a geofence warrant, a change we’ve been asking Google to implement for years. But when these features are coming is uncertain—though Google said in December they’re “coming soon.”

Google should implement the changes sooner as opposed to later. In the meantime, those seeking reproductive and gender information and healthcare can find tips on how to protect themselves in our Surveillance Self Defense guide. 

Karen Gullo

How to Figure Out What Your Car Knows About You (and Opt Out of Sharing When You Can)

1 month 1 week ago

Cars collect a lot of our personal data, and car companies disclose a lot of that data to third parties. It’s often unclear what’s being collected, and what's being shared and with whom. A recent New York Times article highlighted how data is shared by G.M. with insurance companies, sometimes without clear knowledge from the driver. If you're curious about what your car knows about you, you might be able to find out. In some cases, you may even be able to opt out of some of that sharing of data.

Why Your Car Collects and Shares Data

A car (and its app, if you installed one on your phone) can collect all sorts of data in the background with and without you realizing it. This in turn may be shared for a wide variety of purposes, including advertising and risk-assessment for insurance companies. The list of data collected is long and dependent on the car’s make, model, and trim.  But if you look through any car maker’s privacy policy, you'll see some trends:

  • Diagnostics data, sometimes referred to as “vehicle health data,” may be used internally for quality assurance, research, recall tracking, service issues, and similar unsurprising car-related purposes. This type of data may also be shared with dealers or repair companies for service.
  • Location information may be collected for emergency services, mapping, and to catalog other environmental information about where a car is operated. Some cars may give you access to the vehicle’s location in the app.
  • Some usage data may be shared or used internally for advertising. Your daily driving or car maintenance habits, alongside location data, is a valuable asset to the targeted advertising ecosystem. 
  • All of this data could be shared with law enforcement.
  • Information about your driving habits, sometimes referred to as “Driving data” or “Driver behavior information,” may be shared with insurance companies and used to alter your premiums.  This can range from odometer readings to braking and acceleration statistics and even data about what time of day you drive.. 

Surprise insurance sharing is the thrust of The New York Times article, and certainly not the only problem with car data. We've written previously about how insurance companies offer discounts for customers who opt into a usage-based insurance program. Every state except California currently allows the use of telematics data for insurance rating, but privacy protections for this data vary widely across states.

When you sign up directly through an insurer, these opt-in insurance programs have a pretty clear tradeoff and sign up processes, and they'll likely send you a physical device that you plug into your car's OBD port that then collects and transmits data back to the insurer.

But some cars have their own internal systems for sharing information with insurance companies that can piggy back off an app you may have installed, or the car’s own internet connection. Many of these programs operate behind dense legalese. You may have accidentally “agreed” to such sharing without realizing it, while buying a new car—likely in a state of exhaustion and excitement after finally completing a gauntlet of finance and legal forms.

This gets more confusing: car-makers use different terms for their insurance sharing programs. Some, like Toyota's “Insure Connect,” are pretty obviously named. But others, like Honda, tuck information about sharing with a data broker (that then shares with insurance companies) inside a privacy policy after you enable its “Driver Feedback” feature. Others might include the insurance sharing opt-in alongside broader services you might associate more with safety or theft, like G.M.’s OnStar, Subaru’s Starlink, and Volkswagen’s Car-Net.

The amount of data shared differs by company, too. Some car makers might share only small amounts of data, like an odometer reading, while others might share specific details about driving habits.

That's just the insurance data sharing. There's little doubt that many cars sell other data for behavioral advertising, and like the rest of that industry, it's nearly impossible to track exactly where your data goes and how it's used.

See What Data Your Car Has (and Stop the Sharing)

This is a general guide to see what your car collects and who it shares it with. It does not include information about specific scenarios—like intimate partner violence— that may raise distinctive driver privacy issues.

See How Your Car Handles (Data)
Start by seeing what your car is equipped to collect using Privacy4Cars’ Vehicle Privacy Report. Once you enter your car’s VIN, the site provides a rough idea of what sorts of data your car collects. It's also worth reading about your car manufacturer’s more general practices on Mozilla's Privacy Not Included site.

Check the Privacy Options In Your Car’s Apps and Infotainment System
If you use an app for your car, head into the app’s settings, and look for any sort of data sharing options. Look for settings like “Data Privacy” or “Data Usage.” When possible, opt out of sharing any data with third-parties, or for behavioral advertising. As annoying as it may be, it’s important to read carefully here so you don’t accidentally disable something you want, like a car’s SOS feature. Be mindful that, at least according to Mozilla’s report on Tesla, opting out of certain data sharing might someday make the car undriveable. Now’s also a good time to disable ad tracking on your phone.

When it comes to sharing with insurance companies, you’re looking for an option that may be something obvious, like Toyota’s “Insure Connect,” or less obvious, like Kia’s “Driving Score.” If your car’s app has any sort of driver scoring or feedback option—some other names include GM’s ”Smart Driver,” Honda’s “Driver Feedback,” or Mitsubishi’s “Driving Score”—there’s a chance it’s sharing that data with an insurance company. Check for these options in both the app and the car’s infotainment system.

If you did accidentally sign up for sharing data with insurance companies, you may want to call your insurance company to see how doing so may affect your premiums. Depending on your driving habits, your premiums might go up or down, and in either case you don’t want a surprise bill.

File a Privacy Request with the Car Maker
Next, file a privacy request with the car manufacturer so you can see exactly what data the company has collected about you. Some car makers will provide this to anyone who asks. Others might only respond to requests from residents of states with a consumer data privacy law that requires their response. The International Association of Privacy Professionals has published this list of states with such laws.

In these states, you have a “right to know” or “right to access” your data, which requires the company to send you a copy of what personal information it collected about you. Some of these states also guarantee “data portability,” meaning the right to access your data in a machine-readable format. File one of these requests, and you should receive a copy of your data. In some states, you can also file a request for the car maker to not sell or share your information, or to delete it. While the car maker might not be legally required to respond to your request if you're not from a state with these privacy rights, it doesn’t hurt to ask anyway.

Every company tends to word these requests a little differently, but you’re looking for options to get a copy of your data, and ask them to stop sharing it. This typically requires filling out a separate request form for each type of request.

Here are the privacy request pages for the major car brands:

Sometimes, you will need to confirm the request in an email, so be sure to keep an eye on your inbox.

Check for Data On Popular Data Brokers Known to Share with Insurers
Finally, request your data from data brokers known to hand car data to insurers. For example, do so with the two companies mentioned in The New York Times’ article: 

Now, you wait. In most states, within 45 to 90 days you should receive an email from the car maker, and another from the data brokers, which will often include a link to your data. You will typically get a CSV file, though it may also be a PDF, XLS, or even a folder with a whole webpage and an HTML file. If you don't have any sort of spreadsheet software on your computer, you might struggle to open it up, but most of the files you get can be opened in free programs, like Google Sheets or LibreOffice.

Without a national law that puts privacy first, there is little that most people can do to stop this sort of data sharing. Moreover, the steps above clearly require far too much effort for most people to take. That’s why we need much more than these consumer rights to know, to delete, and to opt-out of disclosure: we also need laws that automatically require corporations to minimize the data they process about us, and to get our opt-in consent before processing our data. As to car insurers, we've outlined exactly what sort of guardrails we'd like to see here

As The New York Times' reporting revealed, many people were surprised to learn how their data is collected, disclosed, and used, even if there was an opt-in consent screen. This is a clear indication that car makers need to do better. 

Thorin Klosowski

【寄稿】映画『かづゑ的』を撮る中で 85年間 療養所で生きる カメラとマイク伴走8年 「本当の〝らい患者〟の感情を残したい」=熊谷博子さん<br />」

1 month 1 week ago
DSC_3779のコピー2 (1).webp 「できるんよ、やろうと思えば」、瀬戸内海のハンセン病療養所で暮らす宮﨑かづゑさんの言葉だ。かづゑさんに出会ってから8年間にわたって撮影したドキュメンタリー映画「かずゑ的」が3月2日からポレポレ東中野などで全国公開に。監督の熊谷博子さんに映画に込めた思い..
JCJ

[B] 「交渉は降伏ではない(ローマ教皇)」【西サハラ最新情報】  平田伊都子

1 month 1 week ago
「白旗を掲げて交渉しろ」と、キリスト教カトリック教会のトップ、ローマ教皇フランシスコが、ウクライナを諭しました。 が、ウクライナ戦争大統領は耳を貸しません。 ゼレンスキー閣下はイスラエルのネタニヤフ首相と共演するユダヤ教徒です。 お二人とも「負けられません、勝つまでは」です。
日刊ベリタ

Making the Law Accessible in Europe and the USA

1 month 1 week ago

Special thanks to EFF legal intern Alissa Johnson, who was the lead author of this post.

Earlier this month, the European Union Court of Justice ruled that harmonized standards are a part of EU law, and thus must be accessible to EU citizens and residents free of charge.

While it might seem like common sense that the laws that govern us should be freely accessible, this question has been in dispute in the EU for the past five years, and in the U.S. for over a decade. At the center of this debate are technical standards, developed by private organizations and later incorporated into law. Before they were challenged in court, standards-development organizations were able to limit access to these incorporated standards through assertions of copyright. Regulated parties or concerned citizens checking compliance with technical or safety standards had to do so by purchasing these standards, often at significant expense, from private organizations. While free alternatives, like proprietary online “reading rooms,” were sometimes available, these options had their own significant downsides, including limited functionality and privacy concerns.

In 2018, two nonprofits, Public.Resource.Org and Right to Know, made a request to the European Commission for access to four harmonized standards—that is, standards that apply across the European Union—pertaining to the safety of toys. The Commission refused to grant them access on the grounds that the standards were copyrighted.   

The nonprofits then brought an action before the General Court of the European Union seeking annulment of the Commission’s decision. They made two main arguments. First, that copyright couldn’t be applicable to the harmonized standards, and that open access to the standards would not harm the commercial interests of the European Committee for Standardization or other standard setting bodies. Second, they argued that the public interest in open access to the law should override whatever copyright interests might exist. The General Court rejected both arguments, finding that the threshold for originality that makes a work eligible for copyright protection had been met, the sale of standards was a vital part of standards bodies’ business model, and the public’s interest in ensuring the proper functioning of the European standardization system outweighed their interest in free access to harmonized standards.

Last week, the EU Court of Justice overturned the General Court decision, holding that EU citizens and residents have an overriding interest in free access to the laws that govern them. Article 15(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU and Article 42 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU guarantee a right of access to documents of Union institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies. These bodies can refuse access to a document where its disclosure would undermine the protection of commercial interests, including intellectual property, unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.

Under the ECJ’s ruling, standards written by private companies, but incorporated into legislation, now form part of EU law. People need access to these standards to determine their own compliance. While compliance with harmonized standards is not generally mandatory, it is in the case of the toy safety standards in question here. Even when compliance is not mandatory, products that meet technical standards benefit from a “presumption of conformity,” and failure to conform can impose significant administrative difficulties and additional costs.

Given that harmonized standards are a part of EU law, citizens and residents of member states have an interest in free access that overrides potential copyright concerns. Free access is necessary for economic actors “to ascertain unequivocally what their rights and obligations are,” and to allow concerned citizens to examine compliance. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in in 2020, “[e]very citizen is presumed to know the law, and it needs no argument to show that all should have free access” to it.

The Court of Justice’s decision has far-reaching effects beyond the four toy safety standards under dispute. Its reasoning classifying these standards as EU law applies more broadly to standards incorporated into law. We’re pleased that under this precedent, EU standards-development organizations will be required to disclose standards on request without locking these important parts of the law behind a paywall.

Mitch Stoltz