【映画の鏡】多世代交流のあり方示す『若者が地域のミライをひらく』公民館の挑戦と「ドラマ」活写=鈴木 賀津彦
JVN: NetKids iMarkにおける複数の脆弱性
Weekly Report: JPCERT/CCが「TSUBAMEレポート Overflow(2026年4-6月)」を公開
Tomorrow’s U.S. Senate Vote: Four Internet Bills, One Wrong Direction
The Senate Commerce Committee will vote this week on several censorious and privacy invasive bills: KOSA, the SCREEN Act, Youth AI Privacy Act, and CHATBOT Act. While we appreciate that the Committee is taking the time to look at these bills separately, it’s still impossible to ignore the message Congress is sending to the world: Age-gate the internet and block young people from speaking and accessing lawful speech online. Or else.
Tell Congress: don't age-gate the internet
Each of these bills claims to be trying to protect children and teenagers from dangerous situations on and offline—certainly a worthy goal. But the proposed solutions in these bills are unlikely to make children and teenagers safer at all. Rather, they would create sweeping new privacy and data security problems, and force platforms to adopt unconstitutional restrictions on the content they host, for both adults and teenagers.
There is a better way. Instead of considering these bills, the Senate Commerce Committee should be focusing on a national consumer privacy bill that would protect ALL internet users, or on banning behavioral advertising that tracks us across the web—again, for users of all ages.
But the bills being considered this week move in the other direction—more information being collected, more surveillance, and less privacy for internet users of all ages.
help eff oppose these bills
EFF sent a letter to the Committee with our concerns about these bills. We look forward to continuing to work with them to find a way forward that protects all users.
JVN: CISA ICS Advisory / ICS Medical Advisory(2026年08月04日)
Appeals Court Agrees with EFF that Building a Web Browser Doesn’t Violate the CFAA
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has endorsed a commonsense technical interpretation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), a law not usually given to such interpretation. Amazon had sued Perplexity AI to try to shut down its Comet browser, claiming the browser’s optional agentic AI “Assistant” that can browse websites like Amazon for comparison shopping purposes, violated the CFAA because Amazon did not “authorize” Perplexity to access Amazon users’ accounts. Rejecting that theory, the Ninth Circuit held that Perplexity was unlikely to be liable because users operate the tool, not Perplexity.
That’s the right conclusion, as both a legal and technical matter. As we explained to the court in our amicus brief, the CFAA requires unauthorized “access,” and Perplexity itself does not access Amazon’s servers—users of the Comet browser do. The court agreed, noting that EFF’s explanation “articulates the nature of the system most clearly.”
The court noted that agentic AI may present novel legal issues, and there is “little to no existing caselaw directly dealing with how to ascribe responsibility for AI agents like the Assistant, let alone caselaw specifically dealing with agentic AI in the CFAA context.” Ultimately, though, thorny questions of AI “intent” were irrelevant to this case, because the Assistant “is a tool, not a person for statutory purposes.” And, the court concluded, it is a tool operated by users, not Perplexity. Even where Perplexity received information from users about their Amazon accounts and used this information to instruct the Assistant, the court found that that did not constitute the sort of control needed to find access by Perplexity. As the court noted, Amazon might have other viable claims against Perplexity, but invoking the CFAA was both legally baseless and bad policy that “could expose users themselves to criminal liability.
This is a gratifying decision because all too often, big players use the CFAA to bully upstarts and innovators who offer potentially helpful user tools. When we counsel clients as part of EFF’s Coders Rights Project, CFAA risk is a frequent topic of conversation, even for developers who merely create tools that allow others to access websites in new or different ways. We’ve stood up for these creators before, and we’ll do it again, but it’s helpful to have back up from one of the most influential appellate courts in the country.
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Mobile Ad Software Encourages Location Data Sharing, EFF Report Finds
SAN FRANCISCO – Some software development kits (SDKs) provided by advertising companies to help developers monetize their apps are automatically feeding users’ location data into systems that location data brokers use to track people, an Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) report found.
EFF began investigating the location-sharing practices of various advertising SDKs to better understand the pipeline from mobile apps to location data brokers. The probe revealed how such SDKs can facilitate and encourage location data sharing – without users’ knowledge or meaningful consent – through privacy-invasive defaults, financial incentives, and unclear documentation.
“Defaults matter, not just for users, but for app developers as well. If app developers don’t pay close attention to the location-sharing settings of their advertising tools, they could inadvertently expose users’ location information,” EFF Staff Technologist Lena Cohen said. “Users can take extra steps to defend their location privacy, but they shouldn’t have to. Developers, regulators, and legislators must act to stop apps from leaking users’ location to advertising companies and data brokers.”
Cohen and EFF Senior Staff Technologist Bill Budington reviewed the public developer documentation of dozens of widely used advertising SDKs to identify how they handle and communicate with developers about location data.
In their analysis, they highlighted four advertising SDKs that collect and share a user's location by default for ad targeting whenever the user has given the app location permissions: InMobi, BidMachine, Verve’s HyBid, and Huawei’s Petal Ads. But EFF’s focus on these four does not mean that other SDKs adequately protect location data or that developers never choose to share location data when it’s not the default. In fact, advertising SDKs not discussed in this investigation have been criticized and sued for collecting location data without valid user consent.
“When developers let advertising SDKs collect location data, they’re putting users at risk of more than just creepy ads,” Budington said. “Location information sourced from the advertising industry has been used for ICE investigations, global spy tools, outing a gay priest, tracking union organizers, and tracking US military personnel. Developers have a responsibility to protect their users’ from these harms, regardless of advertising SDKs’ default settings.”
For the EFF report: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/07/developers-beware-ad-libraries-betray-your-users-location-privacy
For more on location data brokers: https://www.eff.org/issues/location-data-brokers
For more on SDKs: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/06/how-federal-government-buys-our-cell-phone-location-data
Contact: WilliamBudingtonSenior Staff Technologistbill@eff.org LenaCohenStaff Technologistlcohen@eff.org