ＫＤＤＩ株式会社が提供するAndroidアプリ「あんしんフィルター for au」には、重要情報の平文送信の脆弱性が存在します。

Bytelloが提供するBytello Share（Windows版）のEXE形式インストーラにはDLL読み込みに関する脆弱性が存在します。

Intelから各製品向けのアドバイザリが公表されました。

Siemensから各製品向けのアドバイザリが公表されました。

2026年05月12日（現地時間）、米国CISAがCISA ICS Advisory / ICS Medical Advisoryを公表しました。

Apache Camelには、複数の脆弱性があります。これらの脆弱性のうち一部の脆弱性について概念実証コードが公開されていることを確認しています。この問題は、当該製品を修正済みのバージョンに更新することで解決します。詳細は、開発者が提供する情報を参照してください。

Last week, Instagram ended its opt-in, and therefore rarely used, end-to-end encryption feature. Years after publicly promising to provide the privacy protections of end-to-end encryption across its platforms by default, it instead gave up on that technical challenge. Now, we've all lost an option for safer conversations on one of the biggest social media platforms in the world.

In an announcement in 2023, Meta bragged about how it had successfully encrypted Messenger, and teased that Instagram was in progress. Even before then, they’d talked about how important encryption was in Messenger and Instagram in a white paper published in 2022, stating: 

We want people to have a trusted private space that’s safe and secure, which is why we’re taking our time to thoughtfully build and implement e2ee by default across Messenger and Instagram DMs.

So where did the reversal come from? In a statement, Meta claimed that, “Very few people were opting in to end-to-end encrypted messaging in DMs.” This isn’t all that surprising, as turning it on was an optional four-step process that few people knew about. Defaults matter, and Meta’s choice to blame people for failing to opt into this feature is proof of how much. In that same statement, the company pointed people to WhatsApp for access to encrypted messaging. Yet if Meta truly wanted people to have a trusted private space to communicate, it would meet them everywhere they are: on WhatsApp, on Messenger, and on Instagram.

But at least Meta was straightforward about the fact that it will not continue to support or work on this feature. That's rare. Most tech company promises aren’t broken explicitly, they just remain undelivered long enough to be forgotten. 

This is particularly disappointing as other companies take even bigger swings, like Google and Apple working together to implement end-to-end encryption over Rich Communication Services (RCS), and Signal’s continued work to make its app simpler and easier to use for everyone.

Meta abandoning this principle is disheartening, especially as we are still waiting for other promised features from the company, like end-to-end encryption in Facebook Messenger group messages. Instead of blaming users for not using these sorts of features and then abandoning the promise of delivery, Meta—and other tech companies—should start by enabling strong privacy protective features by default.

情報通信審議会　情報通信技術分科会　陸上無線通信委員会（第100回）

情報通信行政・郵政行政審議会　電気通信事業部会　市場検証委員会（第9回）配布資料・議事録

未来社会を見据えた人とデジタルの関係の在り方に関する研究会（第3回）開催案内

電波資源拡大のための研究開発等の成果発表会の開催

情報通信審議会 情報通信政策部会（第69回）開催案内

災害時における応急仮設住宅の提供等に関する調査　＜結果に基づく通知＞

情報通信審議会　情報通信技術分科会　IPネットワーク設備委員会 電気通信事業におけるパブリッククラウドシステム利用に関する検討作業班（第4回）

第46回政策評価審議会（第45回政策評価制度部会と合同）（令和8年3月24日開催）資料・議事要旨・議事録

　「時は来た。憲法改正の発議について、めどが立ったと言える状態で来年の党大会を迎えたい」。高市首相が師と仰ぐ安倍元首相にならい「来年の党大会」と改憲の国会発議の期限を表明した12日の自民党大会で、陸上自衛隊中央音楽隊に所属の陸曹が制服（音楽隊の演奏服）で登壇し、国歌を斉唱した。自衛官は登壇に際して「陸上自衛隊が誇るソプラノ歌手」と司会者から会場に紹介されたという。自民党、防衛省は「国歌の斉唱は政治行為にあたらない」とするが、問題は国会でも取り上げられ、「自衛隊の中立性に疑念を..

This week, Apple released iOS 26.5, an update that supports end-to-end encryption for Rich Communication Services (RCS), meaning conversations between Android and iPhone will soon be encrypted in the default chat apps. This has been a long time coming, and is a welcome delivery on a promise both Google and Apple made.

With this update, conversations that take place between Apple’s Messages app and Google Messages on Android will be end-to-end encrypted by default, as long as the carrier supports both RCS and encrypted messages (you can find a list of carriers here). RCS messages are a replacement for SMS, and in 2024 Apple started supporting it, making for a marked improvement in the quality of images and other media shared between Android and iPhones. 

Now, those conversations can also benefit from the increased privacy and security that end-to-end encryption offers, making it so neither Google, Apple, nor the cellular carriers have access to the contents of messages. This feature comes courtesy of both Apple and Google supporting the GSMA RCS Universal Profile 3.0, which implements the Messaging Layer Security protocol for encryption. Metadata will likely still be collected and stored for these conversations, making alternatives like Signal still a better option for many conversations. Likewise, if you back up those conversations to the cloud, they may be stored unencrypted unless you enable Advanced Data Protection on iOS (Google Messages end-to-end encrypts the text of messages in backups, but not the media, so we’d like to see a similar offering as ADP on Android). Still, this is a significant step forward for the privacy of millions of conversations worldwide.

End-to-end encrypted RCS messaging is still marked as beta on Apple devices, likely because the rollout is dependent on carriers as well as the Android phone running the most recent version of Google Messages. 

It might take some time before you get this feature in your chats and until you do, remember that the conversations are not protected with end-to-end encryption. But once everyone in the conversation is on the right software version and the carrier support is implemented, you will see a lock icon and the text, “Encrypted” at the top of the conversation for any chats you have over RCS, as seen here:

We applaud Apple and Google for getting this across the finish line and Encrypting It Already! More companies should take these sorts of difficult but necessary steps to protect the privacy of our conversations and our data.

Osama Khalid was just twelve years old when he began contributing to Wikipedia Arabic. In the height of the blogging era, he became a prolific blogger, publishing writings on his home country of Saudi Arabia, meetups he attended, and his opinions and observations about open source technology and freedom of expression. He advocated for internet freedom, contributed time and translations to various projects—including EFF’s HTTPS Everywhere—and was a thoughtful presence at the conferences he attended around the world…all while training to become a pediatrician.

In July of 2020, he was detained amid a wave of arbitrary arrests carried out by the Saudi authorities during the Covid-19 lockdown and initially given a five-year prison sentence. That sentence was later increased on appeal to 32 years, then reduced in 2023 to 25 years, and again to 14 years this past September. In a joint letter that we signed on to in April, the Saudi human rights organization ALQST, which has been leading the campaign for Osama’s release, wrote: “The huge discrepancy between sentences handed down at different stages in the case underscores the arbitrary manner in which sentencing is carried out in the Saudi judicial system.”

So, what was his “crime”? Sharing information online that conflicted with official narratives. Osama’s Wikipedia contributions included pages on critical human rights issues in Saudi Arabia, including the treatment of women’s rights activist Loujain al-Hathloul (herself an EFF client) and Saudi Arabia’s infamous al-Ha’ir prison. His blog, which has since been taken offline, included articles such as one criticizing government plans for the surveillance of encrypted platforms.

Over the years, we’ve campaigned for the release of a number of individuals imprisoned for their speech. Our contributions to the campaigns of Ola Bini, the Swedish software developer who has been targeted by the government of Ecuador for the past seven years, and Alaa Abd El Fattah, have had real impact. These cases are reminders that attacks on free expression are rarely confined to borders: governments around the world continue to use vague cybercrime laws, national security claims, and politically motivated prosecutions to silence critics, technologists, journalists, and activists.

Supporting these two—and others we’ve highlighted in our Offline project—has never been about defending only individuals. It has also been about defending the principle that writing code, sharing ideas, criticizing governments, and organizing online should not be treated as crimes. Public pressure, international solidarity, legal advocacy, and sustained campaigning can shift the political cost of repression—and, in some cases, help secure meaningful protections for those targeted.

That’s why we’re highlighting Osama’s case and will continue to work with partners including ALQST to advocate for his release. Osama Khalid, like so many human rights defenders, journalists, and internet users detained by the Saudi government, deserves to be free.