EFF to NJ Supreme Court: Prosecutors Must Disclose Details Regarding FRT Used to Identify Defendant

EFF update
1 week 4 days ago

This post was written by EFF legal intern Alexa Chavara.

Black box technology has no place in the criminal legal system. That’s why we’ve once again filed an amicus brief arguing that the both the defendant and the public have a right to information regarding face recognition technology (FRT) that was used during an investigation to identify a criminal defendant.

Back in June 2023, we filed an amicus brief along with Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) in State of New Jersey v. Arteaga. We argued that information regarding the face recognition technology used to identify the defendant should be disclosed due to the fraught process of a face recognition search and the many ways that inaccuracies manifest in the use of the technology. The New Jersey appellate court agreed, holding that state prosecutors must turn over detailed information to the defendant about the FRT used, including how it works, its source code, and its error rate. The court held that this ensures the defendant’s due process rights with the ability to examine the information, scrutinize its reliability, and build a defense.

Last month, partnering with the same organizations, we filed another amicus brief in favor of transparency regarding FRT in the criminal system, this time in the New Jersey Supreme Court in State of New Jersey v. Miles.

In Miles, New Jersey law enforcement used FRT to identify Mr. Miles as a suspect in a criminal investigation. The defendant, represented by the same public defender in Arteaga, moved for discovery on information about the FRT used, relying on Arteaga. The trial court granted this request for discovery, and the appellate court affirmed. The State then appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court, where the issue is before the Court for the first time.

As explained in our amicus brief, disclosure is necessary to ensure criminal prosecutions are based on accurate evidence. Every search using face recognition technology presents a unique risk of error depending on various factors from the specific FRT system used, the databases searched, the quality of the photograph, and the demographics of the individual. Study after study shows that facial recognition algorithms are not always reliable, and that error rates spike significantly when involving faces of people of color,  especially Black women, as well as trans and nonbinary people.

Moreover, these searches often determine the course of investigation, reinforcing errors and resulting in numerous wrongful arrests, most often of Black folks. Discovery is the last chance to correct harm from misidentification and to allow the defendant to understand the evidence against them.

Furthermore, the public, including independent experts, have the right to examine the technology used in criminal proceedings. Under the First Amendment and the more expansive New Jersey Constitution corollary, the public’s right to access criminal judicial proceedings includes filings in pretrial proceedings, like the information being sought here. That access provides the public meaningful oversight of the criminal justice system and increases confidence in judicial outcomes, which is especially significant considering the documented risks and shortcomings of FRT.

Hannah Zhao

APC at the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) 2025

APC
1 week 4 days ago
This edition of IGF is a vital opportunity to amplify our commitment to the World Summit on the Information Society, currently undergoing its 20-year review. This page is your go-to resource for this…
APCNews

【Bookガイド】6月の“推し本”紹介＝萩山 拓(ライター)

日本ジャーナリストクラブ（JCJ）
1 week 4 days ago
　ノンフィクション･ジャンルからチョイスした本の紹介です(刊行順･販価は税別)◆小倉紀蔵『日本群島文明史』ちくま新書 6/11刊 1400円　日本は、大陸文明的な実体系思考よりも、海に囲まれた群島文明的な非実体系思考が優勢である。そうした世界観から、日本文明が創り出されてきた。生命は偶発的なものという感覚や共同主観の構造、革新性をもたらす美意識などが展開され、そうした日本の歴史的動態を描きつつ、日本の群島文明を形成する東アジアの哲学を「通底哲学」として世界哲学の中に置き直す。..
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Protecting Minors Online Must Not Come at the Cost of Privacy and Free Expression

EFF update
1 week 4 days ago

The European Commission has taken an important step toward protecting minors online by releasing draft guidelines under Article 28 of the Digital Services Act (DSA). EFF recently submitted feedback to the Commission’s Targeted Consultation, emphasizing a critical point: Online safety for young people must not come at the expense of privacy, free expression, and equitable access to digital spaces.

We support the Commission’s commitment to proportionality, rights-based protections, and its efforts to include young voices in shaping these guidelines. But we remain deeply concerned by the growing reliance on invasive age assurance and verification technologies—tools that too often lead to surveillance, discrimination, and censorship.

Age verification systems typically depend on government-issued ID or biometric data, posing significant risks to privacy and shutting out millions of people without formal documentation. Age estimation methods fare no better: they’re inaccurate, especially for marginalized groups, and often rely on sensitive behavioral or biometric data. Meanwhile, vague mandates to protect against “unrealistic beauty standards” or “potentially risky content” threaten to overblock legitimate expression, disproportionately harming vulnerable users, including LGBTQ+ youth.

By placing a disproportionate emphasis on age assurance as a necessary tool to safeguard minors, the guidelines do not address the root causes of risks encountered by all users, including minors, and instead merely focus on treating their symptoms.

Safety matters—but so do privacy, access to information, and the fundamental rights of all users. We urge the Commission to avoid endorsing disproportionate, one-size-fits-all technical solutions. Instead, we recommend user-empowering approaches: Strong default privacy settings, transparency in recommender systems, and robust user control over the content they see and share.

The DSA presents an opportunity to protect minors while upholding digital rights. We hope the final guidelines reflect that balance.

Read more about digital identity and the future of age verification in Europe here.

Jillian C. York

PGP Key

Statewatch
1 week 4 days ago
Public key for secure [at] statewatch.org

Fingerprint: F768123BA2AA95C46F089EE223D35335ECB2871C

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