編集長の辛口時評 2006年9月 から分離





投稿者 木村愛二 日時 2006 年 9 月 26 日 21:24:08: CjMHiEP28ibKM



An endangered state
By Yair Sheleg

It is hard to believe, but only 60 years after the Holocaust the Jewish people is once again in danger of being destroyed - at least in its own state, where 40 percent of the world's Jews are concentrated. Evidence of the severity of the danger can be found not only in the explicit threats by Iran's president, which are backed up by an arms program that would provide the means to carry them out. It can also be found in recent articles in the European press that discuss the possibility of Israel's 'disappearance' as a reasonable 'working assumption.' Additional evidence regarding the threat level exists in the fact that not only is Israel the only country in the world that is threatened with destruction, it is also the only state whose right to exist is the focus of international polls, with many respondents answering negatively. That is an honor that even Iran, North Korea and apartheid-era South Africa were never granted.

The high degree of danger places before Israel a challenge no less serious than that facing the Jewish people in the 1930s. To face it, we must depart from the routines of hedonistic Western society. As a layman, I will not make recommendations in the area of security, but will instead relate to the general nature of public debate: first of all, there must be a focused agenda. The public, and in particular diplomatic and military officials, must put this threat at the top of their priorities, even at the expense of issues that during normal times would be the focus of attention.

Personal interests must be put aside in favor of concentrating all the forces of good in Israel, the Jewish people and its supporters worldwide. One practical conclusion might be to create an emergency government in Israel, or at least to invite the opposition to participate in decisions on the Iranian issue. Another possible conclusion is that 'making heads roll,' for example in the wake of this summer's war, is a means and not an end, and should be considered a waste of energy and avoided unless absolutely necessary. In the event that it is necessary to restore public trust, which currently appears to be the case, then it must be done without hesitation.

The same principle holds for the structure of the various committees of inquiry into the war: The goal is not to make heads roll but rather to learn lessons for the future. Thus it is preferable to create a two-stage process. In the first stage, the committee should not punish individuals, but rather make recommendations and draft an implementation schedule. In the second stage, the committee should check whether the recommendations have been carried out and only then fire those who were negligent in their implementation.

Complete openness of thought is required, from extreme hawkishness to extreme dovishness. The threat to the very existence of Israel demands that any means to preserve it should be adopted, without giving in to ideological assumptions. If hesitating to hurt Lebanese civilians in response to attacks on us could send Iran the message that we will hesitate to hurt civilians if Iran strikes us, then we must not be deterred. If making peace with Syria, even if it entails evacuating communities, could damage the new 'eastern front,' then we should do that. Here it is worthwhile to note another step that appears even more important than peace with Syria. One of the reasons Iran can threaten to destroy Israel with impunity is Israel's image as a Jewish 'weed' combined with the tendency to ignore Israel's 1 million Arabs, who would also be affected by a nuclear attack. Israel's Jews and Arabs thus have a shared existential interest in strengthening their partnership. It is also necessary to drive home to the Arab world the fact that a leader who is neither Arab nor Sunni is willing to destroy not only millions of Jews but also hundreds of thousands of Muslim Arabs.

Calmness is necessary: the threat level is high enough to warrant panic, but precisely because of the seriousness of the situation, various solutions should be examined with cool objectivity. For example, is it true that peace with Syria would dissolve its alliance with Iran, or would it only reinforce its militancy?

The need to shape policy relatively quickly must not lead to hurried decisions taken without regard for consequences. The very degree and urgency of the threat reduces the room for error as well as the need for precise solutions.



第2部 冷戦構造のはざまで



 イスラエルという国家は、[中略] 現地のアラブ諸国こぞっての反対をおしきって採択された国連決議によって建国されている。国家としての存立基盤が不確かなのだ。一九四七年にパレスチナ分割を決議したさいの票決は、賛成三三(アメリカとソ連をふくむ)、反対一三(全アラブ諸国をふくむ)、棄権一〇(それまでの委任統治国イギリスをふくむ)というきわどい結果だった。

 そのうえに決定的な問題点がある。それは「賛成三三」のなかにソ連がくわわっていたこと、つまりは「米ソ協調」だったということである。ソ連やアラブの王族の思惑については複雑な経過があるようだが、ともかく以後、国際的な社会主義運動の中でも、パレスチナ人は「世界の孤児」のあつかいをうけてきた。[中略] パレスチナ人は、「東西対決」の冷戦時代の間、どちらにも所属しない「はざまの存在」だった。