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2. A Responsibility to Resolve
4. Trials for Compensation Claims
From all corners of Asia, we hear an inexorable tide of voices calling for the compensation of those who suffered from Japan's past colonial rule and war of aggression. Why should this happen now, nearly half a century after the war? One thing that is obvious is that the Japanese have neglected their "postwar responsibility" to bring back the status quo, i.e., compensation, to these victims. The Economic White Paper of FY 1958 proudly announced that the postwar period was over. The postwar history of Japan, however, has been one in which society concentrated all its energy in a bid for economic power, remaining utterly silent about postwar responsibility to Asian neighbors.
During that period, repatriated Koreans who had suffered from the atomic bombings and other war-related damages, and supported by local civilian movements, continued their patient demands for compensation from the Japanese government. However, their voices went unheard. They were ignored by the mass media, and forgotten even by liberal intellectuals, leftists and the peace movements, groups whose very existence should have been inseparable from this issue.
In the 1990s however, South Korean President Roh Tae-woo's visit to Japan sparked extensive media attention of the issue of "unsettled postwar questions." The "International Forum on War Reparations for the Asia-Pacific Region" was held in August 1991, during which representatives of the victims organizations from ten countries posted and questions to Japan with regard to its postwar responsibilities. This international forum made it clear that Japan can no longer evade the problem of postwar compensation and that without resolving it, cannot truly establish a relation with the rest of Asia.
Part II of this book is devoted to a comprehensive and detailed examination of individual cases of various claims for compensation from the Asia-Pacific region. These claims will be grouped by several key issues, which together should present the whole picture.
The elements of postwar compensation essentially fall into either of the following two categories:
The first provides compensation for those who suffered from the Japanese invasion during the Pacific War. This includes cases of abused Allied POWs, even though they are not Asian. These cases are also related to the issue of war crimes, essentially of compensation for those who were brutally mistreated in violation of the Geneva Convention and of those Koreans forced to take responsibility for Japan's war crimes and then convicted as Class-B and -C war criminals.
The second provides compensation for those former colonial residents who were forcibly incorporated into the Japanese war system and thereby suffered.
We shall start by explaining the term "forced relocation," which is a key expression in the consideration of Korean issues.
Japan formally colonized the Korean Peninsula on August 22, 1910, with the conclusion of the Japan-Korea Treaty on Annexation of Korea.
Despite this annexation, Koreans were not allowed to travel freely to Japan. It was only after 1922 that they were allowed entry into Japan without restriction. Thereafter, Korean immigration to Japan increased. The forced relocation of Koreans to Japan was initiated with the passage of the National Mobilization Law in April 1938, and an accompanying ordinance on the issue of immigration of Korean laborers to Japan (effective September 1938), jointly signed by the vice-ministers of Home Affairs and Welfare.
The National Mobilization Law was implemented to regulate the human resources of the nation in order to maximize the overall performance of total national power in its pursuit of the war aims. Based on this law, the National Requisition Ordinance --specifically designed for fulfilling the need for labor and allocating the work force-- was introduced in July 1939. Further, in the final stages of the war, the National Labor Mobilization Ordinance of 1945 allowed the government to regulate all workers to serve wherever and however it saw fit. The entire population was mandated to work for the state to help carry out its war objectives. That is to say, the government officially imposed a legal obligation similar to conscription.
On the Korean Peninsula, the actual tracking down of individuals was called "forced relocation," was launched under the slogan, "In the unwavering spirit of imperial subjects, all 23 million compatriots on the Peninsula will cooperate with Japan as an integral part of the country" ( A 30-Year History of Administration , the Governor-General's Office of Korea).
In September 1939, the Japanese government started "controlled recruitment," a method by which Japanese business proprietors were given a quota by the Governor-General's Office of Korea for securing laborers within a designated area, assisted by the local police and myon (the lowest administrative unit) chiefs. With the start of the Pacific War, the controlling power of the state was further consolidated. "Official mediation" was introduced, with the Korean Labor Association (Chosen Romu Kyokai) -- just another face of the Governor-General's Office -- taking charge of securing laborers. This method was replaced in September 1944 with "requisition," a literal application of the National Requisition Act. Despite changes in the name and system, they all were in reality nothing but forced relocation operations administrated directly by the Governor-General's Office in Korea and the Imperial Government of Japan. Moreover, these systems allowed violent enforcement, with the military and the police indiscriminately abducting local populations with their trucks daily. The number of Koreans brought to Japan in this manner was estimated to have been from 1.5 to 2 million.
About 60,000 Koreans were forced to labor in coal mines and military factories in Karafuto (presently Sakhalin, a Russian territory) on the northern edge of Imperial Japan around 1944. Once relocated to Karafuto, they were not necessarily able to return home even after their nominal two-year contract had expired. For example, some were forced to postpone their return through the imposed submission of a printed pledge swearing, "We are Imperial subjects. At this critical moment for the survival of the Empire, we, the members of our party, in the full embodiment of national policy, swear to cooperate with your company in taking responsibility for an industry of national importance by extending our contract period" (In the name of coal miners working for Marushosasaki-gumi, the largest mining company in Karafuto of that period). Just before the defeat of Japan, about 20,000 Koreans in Karafuto were moved to mines in other places such as Hokkaido. Still, about 400,000 Japanese and 43,000 Koreans saw the end of the war in Sakhalin. Among them, 292,590 Japanese made their way home upon the conclusion of the US-USSR Agreement on Repatriation of those left in the USSR in December 1946. Later, 2,307 people -- including Japanese women married to Korean men -- their spouses and children, returned to Japan in groups following the signing of the Joint Declaration by the USSR and Japan on October 19, 1956.
From that point on, repatriation took place on an individual basis, with another 450 Japanese wives, their Korean husbands and children returning to Japan. As a result, most of the 400,000 Japanese left behind in Karafuto were repatriated. For Koreans, however, fewer than 1,000 made their way home and so the vast majority of the 43,000 Koreans were left abandoned. The majority of them were from Kyongsang Do, Chungchong Do and Cholla Do, where their parents, wives and children were waiting for them. They have been deprived of the fundamental elements of human existence -- family reunion and reintegration-- in both Sakhalin and South Korea. The prolonged suffering brought about by the disintegration of families is the essence of this issue. Japan created the problem and is therefore responsible for its resolution.
Naturally, for hardships enduring half-a-century, there have been several scenes and stages.
On August 9, 1945, USSR troops crossed over the border of the N" 50 degree parallel in Sakhalin, engaging in sporadic battles here and there, which resulted in many deaths by the 22nd. In the midst of the confusion, Japanese troops and military police stationed in Karafuto were making plans for a mass slaughter of Koreans. The plan was allegedly quashed secretly by then-Chief of the Karafuto Agency Ohtsu, but parts of it were carried out in the form, for example, of massacres at the Kamishizuka Police Station and Mizuho Village. In both cases about 20 Koreans were killed in attacks by the Japanese army, police and civilians. Also, there were numerous cases of individual killings of Koreans. The families of these victims in the Kamishizuka massacre have been fighting a legal battle for reparation in Tokyo District Court.
After the war, families of those Japanese who had been left on Russian soil desperately appealed for their early repatriation. Those in Russian territories were excluded from the massive movement of six million Japanese rushing back home from all parts of Asia after the collapse of the empire. Under Allied occupation, the Japanese government repeated its appeal for the return of those left behind in Sakhalin to the General Head Quarters of the Allied Forces.
All these efforts were, however, made only on behalf of Japanese nationals, while the 43,000 Koreans also being kept in Sakhalin were completely ignored. In the "30-Year History of Repatriation and Support" issued by the Ministry of Health and Welfare, which is in charge of repatriation, Koreans were mentioned, with the report stating that "based on the Cairo Declaration, they lost their Japanese citizenship." This implied even before the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty that they would not be treated as Japanese nationals, treatment which is inconsistent with that accorded by domestic law. Moreover, it was recently disclosed by a Russian source (Red Cross, USSR) that the Japanese government had officially requested the USSR exclude Koreans as potential repatriates on the basis of their loss of Japanese nationality. As a result, those Koreans were excluded from the US-USSR Repatriation Pact and thus the Japanese government shares the responsibility with the USSR and US for the "leaving behind" of these Koreans.
The next stage was repatriation from 1957 following the Japan-USSR Joint Declaration. As mentioned earlier, this time, those repatriated were Japanese women married to Koreans. Their eligibility for inclusion in the repatriation program of Japanese had been questioned as domestic laws began treating Japanese women with Korean husbands as non-Japanese upon the conclusion the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951. In fact, there was a case where the Japanese government applied foreign status to one such women after her return home in 1965. It seems the government either abandoned its consistency in the treatment of the woman's nationality on the humanitarian grounds, or interpreted "nationality" as a functional concept and considered her Japanese nationality not lost until she returned home. If so, then the government could have applied the same principle to Koreans left behind, whose legal status as Japanese citizens was the same as the woman. It was simple racism for the government to have applied such treatment only to those with Japanese blood.
Bureaucratic irresponsibility sometimes caused disruptions in the process of repatriation.
The Korean husband of the aforementioned Japanese woman, Son Song-you, who had obtained permission for the emigration of his entire family, including his father Son Jig-yu from the Soviet government, requested the Japanese government for entry permits as set force in the conditions established by the USSR. The Japanese government provided permission for his wife, as a repatriating Japanese, and her husband, as the accompanying spouse. However, the government rejected the father's request for entry in the following letter from its Embassy in Moscow, addressed to the wife:
We have received your telegram, requesting the entry of your father-in-law, Son Jig-yu, into Japan with you and your husband Son Song-yon. The embassy immediately sent a telegram of inquiry to the Foreign Ministry of Japan, and received a reply today. The Japanese government answered with regret that it cannot allow your father-in-law to enter Japan with you.
We are well aware of the circumstances that your father-in-law will have to remain alone in the USSR if you and your husband and children return to Japan. However, the Japanese government's position in accepting repatriation of those Japanese and their families left in the USSR at this time is that the policy will be applied only to Japanese nationals, their spouses and children. Therefore, we cannot allow the entry of your husband's parents and siblings, as they are not Japanese. (dated November 4, 1965).
Did the embassy personnel who wrote this lack even the slightest sensitivity to realize the cruelty in forcing the family to separate? The Japanese government at that time must have had a rather abnormal concept of humanity.
There was a more symbolic case, an incident known as the "Four Men in Nakhodoka." During the 1960s and the mid-70s, the government of the USSR was prepared to permit Koreans in its territory to leave if they were accepted by Japan. On the Japanese side, the position of the government was passive in that it would accept them only as transit foreigners. In 1982, then-Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka formally announced that 1) Japan would offer only port of transit to Koreans, who should eventually all be repatriated to South Korea, and 2) all expenses for repatriation should be borne by South Korea.
In June 1976, four elderly Koreans (Fang In-gab and others) who had obtained permission from the USSR for permanent leave and sold off their houses and other belongings, showed up, in high spirits after a large farewell party organized for them by friends and neighbors, at the Japanese Consulate for entry permits. However, the Japanese government had spent a long period of time on the process of receiving confirmation from the South Korean government of its acceptance of these Koreans. As a result, the time limit set by the USSR for exit had expired when the Japanese government finally issued its entry permits following the confirmation. The "Four Men in Nakhodoka" had no choice but to go back to Sakhalin in tears. Because of such compassionless administration by the Japanese government, the four men in Nakhodoka and many others died with grave resentment toward Japan.
Koreans left in Sakhalin were given false hope in the spring 1976 with the news that a good opportunity to realize their urgent wish --to emigrate as soon as possible-- had come. The local authorities had posted a notice that those wishing to emigrate should show up to the Immigration Office in Sakhalin to be processed.
They hurried to the office for the applications costing 30 rubles each. Within a week, from around 800 to over 1,000 Koreans were estimated to have completed the process. However, most of these applications were rejected because, it is believed, the Sakhalin authorities, shocked by an unexpectedly large number of applications, reversed its policy after the North Korean Consular stationed in Nakhodoka visited the Sakhalin government to strongly protest the decision. (from Fang In-gab's A Report from Sakhalin , published by Ochanomizushobo).
Offended by such a rapid shift in the government's policy, some started to protest. Some families held a procession, carrying placards while passing through the immigration office. The authorities displayed strong hand, arresting the protesters, including Do Man-sang -- who they believed to be the leader -- among the 40 people from five Korean families (one including a Japanese wife) in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Kholmsk, Poronaisk and Korsakov in November 1976. They were detained by the local police for a few days before being sent from the Ujino-Sakhalinsk Airport to Khasan, near the North Korean border, to be handed over to the North Korean authorities across the bridge on the other side of the border.
In any case, the impact of the deportation of 40 people to North Korea was such that Koreans in Sakhalin utterly lost any hope of returning home and were unable to even express their desire to do so openly. The local press and radio treated the issue as if those wishing to return were anti-USSR, and Korean communities were terrorized by the purge of their leading figures from their places of work. In Tokyo, Pak Na-hak, chairman of the Association of South Korean Residents in Japan Returning from Karafuto, received letters expressing the wish to permanently return from about 7,000 Koreans in Sakhalin in 1966, but any mention of such hopes totally disappeared from those letters sent after the incident.
A court case concerning claims by those left behind in Karafuto for repatriation (chief attorney Hiroshi Kashiwagi) was initiated in December 1975. The accused was the Japanese state and its accusers were the four elderly men in Sakhalin, including Om Su-gab.
Even in Japan, however, there was a campaign against the repatriation of these Koreans from a socialist country to an authoritarian South Korea. It was truly a winter period for the issue of Korean detainees in Sakhalin. For the following ten years, the movement for their return was carried on with extreme sensitivity. To avoid offending the USSR, expressions such as "detainee" and "left abandoned" were replaced by "remaining," and only those very human questions of family reunion and reintegration on a permanent basis were singled out and emphasized to downplay the political aspect of the issue. For many of those left in Sakhalin too, these ten years were the worst period of their lives. Currently, the greatest concern of those left in Sakhalin and their families in South Korea is the compensation for their prolonged suffering. For only with financial backing can they realize a permanent return and security for the remainder of their lives.
The issue of Koreans left in Sakhalin is currently spearheading various other movements for postwar compensation.
Koreans in Sakhalin filed suit in 1975 against the Japanese government, demanding their repatriation. At that time their goal was the reunion of families and reintegration through permanent repatriation, and their main activities were intended to push the governments of Japan and the USSR for its realization.
Following the mid-1980s, social conditions began rapidly changing in the USSR, South Korea and Japan: perestroika changed society in the USSR; the success of the Seoul Olympics strengthened international recognition of South Korean society; and Japan saw progress being made in court cases concerning war compensation, citizens movements and the activities of some MPs (an ongoing "Roundtable Conference of MPs Concerning the Issue of Koreans Left in Sakhalin," chaired by Bunbei Hara, was formed in 1987, which has had significant influence both inside and outside of Japan.) These changes in the three countries made it possible for Koreans in Sakhalin to meet with their families temporarily in Japan, to visit South Korea, or to move permanently to South Korea.
Since 1990, the governments of Japan and South Korea have funded chartered flights between Ujino-Sakhalinsk, Sakhalin and Seoul, South Korea to assist in the reunions of families. Each flight carries approximately 110 passengers who may stay home with their families for about a month.
However, a new problem has emerged --how to establish a means of support for those permanently repatriating. Not necessarily having financially comfortable families in South Korea, it is likely difficult to make a living in their home country if they must depend on an elderly wife, or if they are perhaps even widowed with no one alive to live with. Between 1988 and 1991, about 70 Koreans returned home from Sakhalin on a permanent basis. Some of them have been struggling and have begun wondering if their choice to return was a correct one. Moreover, some Koreans in Sakhalin have been unable to make their return permanent due to the poverty of their families in Korea, or in some cases the inability to even locate their whereabouts. These elements have prevented progress in their repatriation. Here, the issue of compensation becomes very important.
On August 29, 1990, a court case was filed by 21 Koreans --including those remaining in Sakhalin-- their families, and those who returned permanently, demanding the Japanese government provide postwar compensation (chief attorney Kenichi Takagi). The plaintiffs believe that as far as the Japanese government is responsible for forcibly relocating them to Sakhalin and then leaving them behind, there is at minimum an obligation on the part of the government to compensate them for their 50 years of hardship and to guarantee their livelihood after repatriation.
The Sakhalin trial marked the first case of a direct demand for postwar compensation. Following this case were many others arising from various situations, and an awareness of the problem has spread not only among South Koreans but Koreans in Japan and throughout Asia as well.
As far as the Sakhalin question is concerned, the Japanese government will not, and cannot, say "it has already been settled by the Japan-ROK Basic Treaty." For by no means, have any Korean nationals ever existed in Sakhalin.
This point was confirmed by then-Foreign Minister, Taro Nakayama, in his reply to a parliamentary question posed by SDP's Kozo Igarashi, chief secretary of the aforementioned Roundtable Conference of MPs on the Sakhalin issue, in March 1990. The Minister also confirmed the government position that postwar problems had not yet been settled concerning the Sakhalin issue and that some measures had to be taken. Accordingly, the Ministry of Post and Telecommunication at the same time confirmed its obligation to honor the old postal saving books in the possession of those remaining in Sakhalin.
The Japanese government has allocated a part of the budget for Sakhalin-related expenses, due in part to an active push by the MP's Roundtable Conference on the issue of Koreans left in Sakhalin. The budget was 4 million yen in 1988, 58 million yen in 1989, 100 million yen in 1990, 120 million yen in 1991, and 129 million yen with an additional 5.37 million yen in both 1992 and 1993. Most of this went to supporting travel expenses for the temporary visits allowed for family reunions. The additional 5.37 million yen in 1992 and 1993 (raised to more than 20 million yen in 1994) was apparently for surveying the conditions of permanent repatriates, but in reality was used for basic studies on setting up some form of resolution fund, an approach strongly pushed by the MP's Roundtable Conference. It is now likely that the issue of postwar compensation to Koreans in Sakhalin will be largely settled through the establishment of a fund or facilities for them as part of the national budget after 1995.
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