Contact /Last modified: May 5, 1997
1. Arguments on Postwar Compensation
2. Has Everything Been Resolved by the Japan-ROK Basic Treaty?
It was only recently (after 1990) that the expression "postwar compensation" appeared in the vernacular of Japanese society, indicating a virtual lack of any serious discussion on this issue so far. Rather, this lack of discussion may have been itself a certain statement, namely, an inclination --reflective of the collective wish held by the whole nation-- to do its best to forget the past, leaving it unseen, unheard and unspoken of.
Since the 1950s, the government of Japan repeatedly announced that the "postwar period" had ended. Successive prime ministers have never touched on the issue of postwar compensation when talking about the general reckoning with the postwar period. Also, in the meetings of the governmental committee dealing with unsettled problems relating to the war, their discussions were limited to issues concerning Japanese nationals, such as the problem of those who were ineligible for the national pension plan.
However, it is now obvious that without facing up to postwar management of Asia, Japan cannot establish substantial Asian relations or solid international standing, for the voices of Asian war victims are now reaching Japan through various channels. For the first time, Japanese have now started discussing war compensation, either viewing it as a major national challenge, or denying its necessity. Particularly, after the most symbolic issue --"military comfort women" forced to provide sexual services for Japanese soldiers in the battle front brothels-- surfaced, several arguments have been made against the idea of compensation. We will discuss some of them below.
Arguments against postwar compensation can be classified into several categories, but most of them share a common sentiment: a reluctance to reflect upon the past, which derives from views such as "it could not be helped because there was a war," "it was not entirely Japan's fault," and "to make compensation should be disrespectful to those died in the war." Certainly, such sentiment is understandable on an individual level, for the entire nation went through unforgettable hardships -- the threat of death with many losing their lives, food shortages, as well as other forms of extreme deprivation. However, can these be legitimate reasons to deny the need for war compensation to Asia? Let us discuss in more detail.
A typical argument is found in a comment by Katsumi Sato, editor-in-chief of the monthly " Contemporary Korea ," in the May 1992 issue of Shokun , a monthly magazine. There he states, "Surely, these former comfort women must have gone through indescribable hardships. It was not, however, only they who suffered. At that time, the entire nation, except for the sick, were assigned to virtually unpaid services under the General Mobilization Law......that is to say, more or less, everybody suffered from the severity and absurdity of war. This is the nature of war, and what an emergency requires, I suppose." (Military Comfort Women or Nuclear in the North?).
Does it make sense to argue that because one has experienced victimization, that person's own aggression toward other races and peoples can be offset?
For the Japanese, their suffering occurred in the course of executing a war, which they either directly or indirectly supported as members of the society. However, for those Asians who suffered beyond description from Japan's aggression, it was not something they invited. Their peaceful lives were suddenly disrupted by the Japanese soldiers, who with bayonets robbed, raped and murdered them. Although Japan waved the banner of war in the name of self-defense as well as Asian liberation and the creation of the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere, Asians believe it was simply an excuse, with the real motivation for starting the war being national self-interest. For them, it is preposterous to argue that they should tolerate their suffering during the war simply because Japanese also suffered. This point of view must seem like simple common sense, if we put ourselves in their position.
It seems, ultimately, a question of how one views history. It is important to examine not only the course of national history, but also, in an objective manner, the behavior of Japan and the role it played in the international relations at that time. To ascertain the events of history requires a disinterested view that can tell black as black and white as white with a minimum of subjectivity. Even if one has friends or relatives who died in war, one's grief for their deaths must be kept apart. Only by taking such a stance can one learn from history and speak of an ideal society. In a bilateral discussion between leading psychologist Shu Kishida and Kenichi Matsumoto ("A nation that apologizes and a nation that does not," in Shokun, April 1992 issue), Kishida observes, "By criticizing Japan's past, those people want to say'I had nothing to do with Japan's militarism; my crimes have been washed away and I am clean.' They accuse and blame bad Japanese only to prove they themselves are pure." However, I do not think the purpose of pointing out Japan's past crimes can be reduced to mere propagation of one's "purity," as Kishida says. The point of doing so is to make ourselves accountable. This is a common process of all similar discussions in other countries, such as overcoming the past in Germany or compensating mistreated Americans of Japanese descent in the US.
Another typical argument by the opponents of compensation is "The US has not apologized for its dropping of atomic bombs, nor have the British and French done so for their past colonialism." Regardless of whichever countries have or have not made apologies, however, their crimes are recorded in history. History is full of such crimes, most notably the massacre of native Americans by the Spanish. Certainly, some countries have admitted to their past crimes and have made apologies and compensation, while others have not. Nothwithstanding the statement made by former US President George Bush that the use of atomic bombs was a right action urgently required for an early conclusion to the war, those bombings, which indiscriminately killed and harmfully exposed a huge number of civilians to radiation, were an obvious breach of international conventions and were the very kind of war crimes that should be apologized for. Regarding the US nuclear weapons issue, I have long considered that if A-bomb victims in South Korea, who were not active participants of the war, filed suit against the US and raised questions, it would contribute significantly to the anti-nuclear movements.
Also, regarding colonial rule by the Dutch over Indonesia and the British
over India, I have heard that, despite these governments' refusal to issue
apologies, some of their citizens have been trying to raise questions about
colonialism. What is important here is that the issue should not be reduced
to the argument that one should not apologize because somebody else does
not. The only question is whether or not Japanese are guilty of systematically
persecuting others during the war.
Another reason often brought up to deny the necessity of postwar compensation is the existence of a series of postwar management treaties, including the Japan-ROK Basic Treaty of 1965. For the military comfort women issue, for example, many deny the need for compensation because the issue was, they argue, already resolved with the Japan-ROK Basic Treaty. This argument needs further examination.
The biggest flaw in the argument is that the Japanese government, when concluding the treaty in 1965, did not give any formal recognition to the injustice it inflicted on the Korean people under colonial rule. This shows that the Japanese government did not deal with the issue of compensation when it concluded the pact. From the beginning, such issues as Koreans left behind in Sakhalin, repatriated Korean A-bomb victims and especially military comfort women, have never been put on the agenda in any formal talks between the two governments.
A $500 million "payment," with or without return, made by the Japanese government to South Korea in 1965, was regarded entirely as "economic aid," not compensation, in the treaty. Actually, the Japanese government itself has disclosed that they have paid not a cent in compensation. For the reader's reference, the first clear apology by the Japanese government concerning its past colonialism was made only in March 1990, when then-Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama apologized in the Diet on the issue of Koreans left in Sakhalin. Following this, in May of the same year, then-Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu made an apology in his reception speech for visiting South Korean President Roh Tae-woo.
Those who argue that everything was resolved with the Japan-ROK Basic Treaty often cite a provision included in Article Two of the Japan-ROK Economic Cooperation and Claim Agreement attached to the treaty. As it reads that Japan and Korea had hereby confirmed a complete and ultimate settlement on the problems concerning property, rights and interests of both party states and their nationals (including corporations) and claims between their nationals, every problem must have been solved, they argue. This argument is also frequently employed by the Japanese government. The problem lies, however, in the interpretation of the text of the agreement.
To begin with, there are three separate kinds of rights that become a matter of concern when interstate liquidation is made:
Within these rights, basically it is only 1) rights of the state and 2) state's rights for diplomatic protection that can be subjected to interstate treaties or liquidation. This point was reconfirmed by an explanatory handbook " A Solution for Domestic Laws and the Japan-ROK Basic Treaty " (a separate volume of Tokinohorei) drawn up with the help of foreign office bureaucrats upon the conclusion of the Japan-ROK Basic Treaty. It reads,
Regarding the question whether the state becomes responsible for domestic compensation in relation to Article 29 of the Constitution (of Japan), the provision of Article 2-3 in the agreement should be interpreted that, in regard to properties of Japanese nationals existing in Korea, the Japanese state promised not to invoke its internationally recognized right of diplomatic protection, either against disposal by the South Korean government or for any claims made by Japanese nationals against South Korea.
That is to say, if Japanese citizens have had property in South Korea, the Japanese government has NOT given up their private property rights in South Korea on their behalf. Another example is found in one of the academic papers of that period by Professor Shigeo Sugiyama (Hosei University) which states, "The provision can be interpreted that both states agreed on giving up state-owned properties in the other's territory, but is difficult to interpret that property claims by private citizens based on domestic law are automatically revoked. It seems that both states only promised to surrender their right for diplomatic protection of its nationals' claims to private property against the other." (Horitsujiho September 1965).
As seen above, both the government and scholars view the "complete and ultimate settlement" by the Japan-ROK Basic Treaty as limited only to the aforementioned rights of 1) and 2), with no impact on the right of 3) "private claims." Nevertheless, some still insist that property claims by individuals have been liquidated completely through the agreement on claims and economic cooperation between Japan and South Korea. This is the least persuasive argument.
Still, the official interpretation of the agreement by the Government of Japan has not changed. For example, at an Upper House Cabinet Committee meeting on March 26, 1991, Treaty Bureau Chief in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Yushu Takashima, who was responsible for government interpretation of treaties, commented on the claims between Japan and the USSR:
The point we have repeatedly been emphasizing is that renunciation of claims in provision six of the Japan-USSR Joint Declaration means renouncing the state's own claims and right to diplomatic protection, which is considered to be inherent to a state. Therefore, we do not think that Japan has renounced as well the private rights of individual Japanese to make claims against the USSR or its citizens, as you pointed out. --In a reply to a question made by MP Masatoshi Ito about the issue of repatriated ex-solders left behind in Siberia.
Moreover, in regard to the interpretation of "complete settlement" by the Japan-ROK Basic Treaty, Shunji Yanai, Treaty Bureau Chief of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, commented at a meeting of the Upper House Budget Committee on August 20, 1991 as follows:
Through the Japan-South Korea Claims Agreement, claims between the two countries were ultimately and completely settled. What this means is that when we say all problems were solved including the claims of private citizens of both countries, it means the Japanese and South Korean states mutually abandoned their state right to diplomatic protection. Therefore, this does not mean that the right of individuals to make claims was abolished in terms of domestic laws. It simply means the government now cannot invoke its right to diplomatic protection of such claims between Japan and South Korea. --In answering a the question asked by MP Sumiko Shimizu
Now, it is repeating the obvious to state that what was "ultimately and completely settled" between the two governments was only the state's rights and diplomatic protection concerning individuals, and that private claims were not revoked by the treaty or agreement between the two countries. For the rights of the state and those of individuals are clearly separate issues, and without having been entrusted by individuals to do so, the state could not have abandoned their rights on their behalf. It is blatant self-deception to pick out only some words in the treaty, such as "completely solved" or "already settled between the states," pretending as if those issues concerning private rights too were also settled.
For another example of the arguments against compensation, there is that which points out how a part of the $500 million provided by the Japanese government to its Korean counterpart was actually handed down as compensation to individuals in South Korea. However, it should be remembered that the Japanese government gave the money to the South Korean government exclusively as economic aid, and nothing has been paid out as compensation, as mentioned before. Therefore, this is a matter of domestic policy in South Korea. Moreover, a dispersal of funds made around 1975 was to only about 8,000 survivors of those war dead who had been conscripted as soldiers or laborers, with each receiving 300,000 won (about 190,000 yen). This is by far insufficient.
Another argument is "If private claims are accepted, there will be tremendous confusion," and "In that case, Japanese who once immigrated to South Korea should also be entitled to make claims for property left in South Korea" (Katsumi Sato, op. cit.). However, private property within South Korea owned by Japanese was confiscated by the US military and later handed over to the South Korean government, an action for which the Japanese government has gave approval. Also, above all, it is inconceivable that Japanese could make claims for property obtained through the wrongful colonization of Korea. From the beginning, it is extremely unfair to even consider both the private property claims of Japanese emigrants and compensation for the atrocities against the Korean people on the same level.
In retrospect, it is amazing that no serious discussion has ever taken place in Japan in the half a century after the war on the question of redress for war damages inflicted on Asia. The expression "postwar compensation" itself came into full use only in the 1990s.
Since the filing of a claim in August 1990 for compensation of Koreans who were left behind in Sakhalin after being forcefully relocated there by the Japanese military, more than 20 lawsuits have been filed, effectively providing impetus for Japanese society to think about the war compensation issue. This was especially so after the summer of 1991, when a series of courageous testimonies given by Kim Hak-Soon harumoni and other former military comfort women caused a sensation not just in Japan but also in the international community, which is sensitive to issues concerning war and the human rights of women. Each testimony these women gave laid bare the reality of Japanese military conduct, impressively demonstrating the serious, unhealed sufferings that still remains among Asians more effectively than hundreds of academic arguments. It is the accumulation of such evidence, confronting society, that influences public opinion.
When the question of war compensation was raised, the general response was perplexity about why now such an issue should come out. Perhaps, they then noticed that, in other Asian countries, there are many people just like us, suffering from injury, or loss of parents or property. However, their misfortunes were caused by our country, Japan. Its aggression was openly unjust and unlawful. For these war victims, Japan must be held accountable and must compensate for the damage caused. This is the only natural conclusion to be reached for anyone who has honest emotion and judgment.
Within this context, the belief that Japan should provide compensation to Asian war victims has been accepted as public opinion.
What then, does the Japanese public think about war compensation?
On this matter, the first substantial opinion survey was conducted by the Japan Research Center, and published on December 24, 1992, under the title "A Survey on the Images of South Korea Held by Japanese." According to the survey, on the issue of apology and compensation to former military comfort women, while 10.7% say, "It was resolved by the Japan-ROK Basic Treaty," and 27.7% say, "Appropriate aid should be considered on the basis of humanity," the largest number, 35.6%, say, "Japan should admit to the facts, apologize and make compensation." The last group in particular contains the highest proportion of young people and those with a high level of education.
The Japanese government tried to solve this problem with "humanitarian aid" and with "alternative measures to compensation," as supported by the 27.7%. However, this approach to 'settlement through money" while avoiding any admission of responsibility was met by major opposition. However, on August 4, 1993, then-Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono admitted that the comfort women were forced into service and kept in brothels, clarifying the responsibility of the state for these illegal activities. He also hinted at the possibility of compensation based on accountability when he expressed, "I wonder how we shall express our apology..."
In this context, Asahi Newspaper featured an article entitled "War Compensation Questioned" in the November 14, 1993 morning issue, reporting the results of an opinion poll where 51% of the respondents said "yes" and 37% said "no" to the question of whether the government should provide compensation. Seen in the context of political party affiliation, Liberal Democratic Party and Democratic Socialist Party supporter responses were split equally between "yes" and "no," while the percentage of those answering "yes" was greater among supporters of the Komei, Renewal, Social Democratic and Japan New Party, increasing in this order. Among supporters of the Communist Parties, Sakigake, and Shaminren, the vast majority chose "yes." Also, on the issue of military comfort women, with the exception of men of over 60 years of age, who tended to answer "no" rather than "yes," a majority in all age groups supported compensation. This was particularly evident among the younger generations. 72% of those from 20 to 24 years of age said "yes," while only 21% of them said "no." Thus, it is members of the war generation, who have been pillars of postwar society, who are adverse to war compensation, a sentiment quite apart from that of the younger generations.
Needless to say, public opinion, which reflects the beliefs of society, sways the government and the Diet. Any government necessarily takes the position that its policies are based on public opinion.
For example, facing pressure to abolish the death penalty from both within and without, the Japanese government has been using the results of public opinion surveys as an excuse for maintaining the practice. For capital punishment, which is irreversible even if the judgment is found to be wrong, the general trend is toward abolishment in the international community. Against this current, the Japanese government continues to use domestic public opinion as a shield in defending its policy of using the death penalty. To this extent, public opinion is an important element in shaping policy making decisions of the Japanese government.
Therefore, there would be no difficulties should the government include postwar compensation, which is supported by the majority as shown above, in its policies. Moreover, as the younger generations overwhelmingly support such compensation, this policy would indeed reflect the direction the country is headed. Thus, it was a wise and necessary policy decision for the post-LDP government since Hosokawa, in its search for new fundamental policies, to acknowledge a war of aggression, acts of aggression and colonization of Korea in line with public opinion, and to make a gesture of tackling the issue of compensation. Having come this far, all the government needs is to take real measures. Once having admitted to its crime and made apologies, it is only logical for the government to carry out compensation to individual victims.
Nevertheless, the Japanese government has yet to decide in favor of direct compensation to individuals, reiterating the traditional view that the issue has already been resolved by interstate postwar settlement treaties such as the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Japan-ROK Basic Treaty. This, however, is missing the point.
There are victims of war crimes who are still suffering. The natural response to this is to believe that the aggressor is responsible for providing compensation to those victims. When such an idea becomes pervasive throughout domestic society as well as the international community, and strongly influences public opinion, war compensation will gain universal ideological acceptance, and will play a substantial role in the redress of human rights for war victims not only in Japan but throughout the world.
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