Introduction: Postwar Compensation --Why Now?


1. Too Late?
2. Ideas in the Potsdam Declaration and Japanese Compensation
3. Distortion by the Cold War Structure
4. Factors Deterring Postwar Compensation
5. The Collapse of the Cold War Structure and Democratization in Asia
6. The Meaning of Postwar Compensation
7. Establishing Mutual Trust with Asian Neighbors


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1. Too Late?

The greatest mistake in the history of postwar Japan must be Japan's neglect of direct and effective apologies and compensation for its past invasion and atrocities of Asian countries.

The Japanese by tradition should hold forth uprightness and manifest acceptance of consequences as social virtues. Individually, they are less hesitant to offer apologies than are westerners. Why then, are they so inconclusive where national or social matters are concerned? For all the resulting damage to Asian relations and the loss of the confidence of the rest of the world over the years, they are still reluctant to apologize, a position clearly damaging to national interests.

In this sense, the voluntary apology expressed during a speech by then-Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa in 1993 garnered international admiration, for it demonstrated for the first time that Japan is capable of facing up to its moral responsibilities. The speech was welcomed in South Korea and other Asian countries, with certain expectations. However, those Asians who suffered from the war inflicted upon them by Japan were disappointed, as they thought it was hypocrisy to make an apology without the offer of compensation. Moreover, an outrageous statement made in the following year by then-Minister of Justice Shigeto Nagano that the Nanjing Massacre was a fabrication effectively negated Hosokawa's apology. Thus, more than ever, we must immediately extend apologies and compensation backed by the full support of the state and society.

People often ask me why now, after 49 years --almost half a century-- post-war compensation should be such an important issue. In Germany, the efforts to rectify the past crimes began in the 1950s, and has continued through to the present for Jewish victims, Swinty Roma and the disabled. Americans and Canadians of Japanese descent who were put into relocation camps during the Second World War were finally compensated by their governments 43 years later. Looking further back in history, it took a hundred years to achieve justice in Rome, England and France. Therefore, even if the process takes 50 years, in a historical context, it is never too late. This been said, in Japan, there are certain reasons which have delayed the redress of wrongs.

2. Ideas in the Potsdam Declaration and Japanese Constitution

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The Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Declaration expressed the aspiration of Allied Forces to build a world of democracy through the prevention of aggression towards and enslavement of other nations. The Cairo Declaration, announced on November 27, 1943 by Britain, China and the US, reads as follows

"All three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan...It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the First World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent."

Besides a reconfirmation of the claims made in Cairo, the Potsdam Declaration demanded that Japan liberate the Korean people from their quasi-slavery, as well as other Asians victimized in the aggression, and compensate for damages suffered. Article 11 of the Potsdam Declaration indicates "to collect a fair amount of material reparation" as the primary principle. The Instrument of Surrender, signed on September 2, 1945, was a formal treaty between the Allied Forces and Japan. Paragraph six of the document confirmed that Japan would carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration in "good faith." This became the basic guiding principle of Japan's postwar era and the Allied Forces' occupation policy for Japan.

Accepting this new principle, the postwar Constitution of Japan clearly acknowledged in its preamble that in order "to occupy an honored place in an international society," Japan must overcome "oppression and intolerance" and "tyranny and slavery," which Japan once inflicted upon its Asian neighbors. In this way, atonement for war crimes committed against Asian peoples became the starting point for postwar Japan. In other words, postwar compensation was the first and foremost task that Japan should have tackled in its rebuilding.

Diet Resolution of December 2, 1945

One Diet resolution gives an insight to the perception of the Japanese people immediately after the war. Four months after the defeat of Japan, Ichiro Hatoyama and other law makers submitted resolutions on "War Responsibility" and "War Responsibility of Diet Members." The latter reads:

"Having been defeated, our nation is facing the greatest threat in its history in every aspect of ideology, politics, economies and society. To establish a way of rebuilding Japan as a moral nation and of ensuring permanent peace, we must try to discover the causes of this defeat and determine those who were responsible, in order to implement measures to prevent a future recurrence of such mistakes."

Called on to prosecute those responsible in order to build a "Japan as a moral state," the legislators described "responsibility" as follows:

"We think war responsibility should be defined in the following two ways: responsibility for initiating the war, which is attributable to those who recklessly plotted to disturb international peace, and responsibility for criminal offenses involving of atrocities committed during the war in violation of international conventions. The general public, which followed state orders and legally performed those activities, should therefore be exempted from any responsibility."

It is important to note that responsibility as recognized here comprises (class A) war crimes of initiating war and (class B and C) war crimes of violating international laws regulating conduct during war. For this implies that they were clearly aware that observation of international law is the minimum requirement for building a moral nation. However, what the war crimes defined in international law lead to is not limited to criminal responsibility. Criminal responsibility ought to be accompanied by civil responsibility. War crimes, in logical inevitability, generate responsibility for compensation. The Diet resolution went further to assign "responsibility" not just to the "military bureaucracy" but to "part of political, business and ideological circles." Certainly, this must be the limit to those accountable for criminal responsibility. However, given the crimes were committed in the name of Japan, the state and society must take civil responsibility for victims, that is provide "compensation." The neglect of the war victims is a shortcoming of the Diet resolution. Yet, the resolution was significant in that it admitted Japan's violation of international law and in that it placed practicing "morals" through the fulfillment of responsibility as the first step for postwar Japan.

3 Distortion by the Cold War Structure

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A Shift in the US Occupation Policy

The Potsdam Declaration states that until irresponsible militarism has been eliminated throughout the world, the authority and influence of those who have deceived the Japanese people into embarking on world conquest will never be eliminated (Article 6), and that the Allied powers would occupy Japan to secure this objective (Article 7). In fact, this purpose was sincerely followed to some extent.

However, the Cold War constrained the US, from the early stages of occupation, to shift its policy to one of exploiting the existing establishment in Japan --including the Emperor, political leaders and bureaucrats-- rather than to seek demilitarization and restoration of a moral climate. The US set its priority as making Japan a pawn in the Cold War with the USSR. Exercising absolute ruling power over postwar Japan, the US intervened in the prosecution process of war criminals and released those political leaders and affiliated businessmen in Imperial Japan, such as Shinsuke Kishi and Yoshio Kodama. These individuals then openly exercised power as prime minister or behind the scenes as influential figures, sharing common interests with the US. Obviously, the US itself is also to be blamed for violating the Potsdam Declaration.

Moreover, the US made a deal with veterans of the Unit 731, an army unit that during the war engaged in medical experimentation on living humans to develop biological weapons, which exempted them from criminal prosecution in exchange for their information on the experiments. Concerning the crimes of sexually enslaving Asian women to serve Japanese soldiers, again the US, knowing of this since the war, chose to ignore the violations of human rights, preferring instead to exploit the "fruits" of war crimes committed by the Japanese military, succeeding them in the use of Korean comfort women on Truck Island for the American GIs who occupied it after the war. The US and other Allied nations were not particularly interested in prosecuting war crimes of the Japanese military, except for some cases, such as the abuse of Western prisoners of war. The only case in which the practice of sexual enslavement of women as military comfort women was condemned as war crime involved Dutch women in Indonesia. To the point, Asian victims were completely ignored. The US did not, except for a few cases, prosecute those war crimes of Japan committed against Asians, and paid no interest to their redress.

In addition, the principle of "fair collection of material reparations" stated in the Potsdam Declaration, gave way to the sustenance of Japan's "economic viability," as shown in Article 14-(a) of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.

Survival of the Ruling Class of Japan

The existing ruling elite, which despised and recklessly invaded Asia, survived through the postwar era almost intact, except for the military and a few top government officials who were eliminated. The Allied Force's occupation policy of indirect rule also helped to maintain the existing ruling system of old political forces. Behind their apparent observance of the new constitution and lip service to the practice of democracy, they put their efforts into justifying their past invasion of Asia even at the expense of historical veracity. It was unabashingly frank for former Prime Minister Shinske Kishi to confess in his autobiography that he made a pledge to change the new constitution at the time of his release from Sugamo, the prison for war criminals. It is only natural for Asian countries to feel threatened, as they did during the war, by a Japan like this. They may usually feign friendliness in the face of Japan's power and money, but are easily caught up in a flame of anti-Japanese sentiment at any occasion. As evidenced by the anti-Japan movements in Southeast Asia in response to Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka's visit in the 70s; the controversy over school textbooks in the 80s; and a series of careless statements, from that of Minister of Education Masayuki Fujio's in 1986, Director General of National Land Agency Seiryo Okuno's in 1988 to Minister of Justice Shigeto Nagano's in 1994, the endless repetition of ill-considered statements and justifications for past crimes has always triggered tension in Asia, for it reminds Asian countries of the possibility of the recurrence of Japan as an invader. As society has accepted such leadership, it is not surprising that there has never been even a sign of moves toward dealing with war responsibility and compensation to Asian neighbors. Still, it is the duty of politicians to put national values into practice with proper attention to history, while representing public consciousness in their decision making. In this respect, Japanese politicians, who have despised Asian relations and neglected postwar compensation for almost half a century, are heavily responsible.

4. Factors Deterring Postwar Compensation

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Differences in US Occupation Policies towards Japan and Germany

There were substantial differences in US postwar policies toward the defeated countries Japan and Germany. Why was this the case?

First, those victimized were different. The Westerners did not pay the same level of attention to colonized Asians as they did to the Jews, who held significant influence within western society.

Second, there were differences of character of the Supreme Commanders of the occupying Allied Forces. European Supreme Commander Eisenhower was a known as progressive, while Japan's commander MacArthur was a militarist.

Third, the timing of surrender was critical. Germany surrendered in May 1945, when morale among the Allied Forces was still high, with the supreme task of defeating fascism having been underway. This mood passed quickly, however, with the Cold War having begun by the time Japan surrendered in August. The difference was evident in the prosecution of war criminals, which was thoroughly pursued in the N renberg Trials and successive events in Germany, while left quite incomplete in the Tokyo Trials.

Forth, and most important, was the difference in autonomy. Many German neighbors, especially France and Britain, had a long history of democracy and modernization, and were not controlled by the US. They took serious measures to prevent a recurrence of Nazi crimes. In contrast, Japan's neighbors were largely at the mercy of US or USSR foreign policy, thus less able to prosecute Japan. Unfortunately, the victims of Japanese war crimes were the residents of these countries.

The Unheard Voices of Asian Victims

Being less modernized and democratized, Asia has maintained its traditional virtue of "Oriental Generosity." Chiang Kai-shek and China applied this idea to the diplomatic sphere, and attributed all wrongdoings to Japanese imperialism, absolving the Japanese people, regarding them as victims in the same way the Chinese were. This made Japanese feel morally indebted to the Chinese, but ironically, resulted in the discouragement of any serious attempt to deal with their war crimes or offer redress for the damages. Moreover, for a certain period after the war, most of Asia was subjugated under dictatorship (South Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan and other Southeast Asian countries), socialism (China, North Korea and the USSR), or colonialism (Hong Kong and Micronesia). Overwhelmed by US-Soviet hostilities, former Japanese victims were long divided into two camps, in confrontation with the other. Democracy and human rights had to give way to the requirements of the Cold War. Under such circumstances, it was almost impossible for victims of Japanese aggression to make their voices heard over the will of their own governments.

Victim Consciousness of the Japanese Left

Intellectuals and progressive forces have played quite an important role in shaping the course of postwar Japan. As in Germany, Japanese intellectuals were expected to critically reflect on the past, including their own, in order to rebuild a fundamentally different society through forthright criticism of the establishment that had made mistakes leading to war crimes. Similar roles were expected of other opposition forces, including political parties, labors unions and peace activists.

However, as they exclusively focused on the sufferings of the Japanese population during the war -- food shortages, air raid damage, casualties and deaths in fighting, and atomic bombings -- their supposed reflections were supplanted by a rampant sense of having been victimized. Few forces reflected on themselves in relation to their Asian neighbors.

Throughout the development of major diplomatic controversial issues in the postwar era, including conclusions of the Japan-US Security Pact and the Japan-ROK Basic Treaty, opposition from progressive forces was merely expressed in protest movements against a Cold War alliance between the US and Japanese conservatives, with little consideration paid to Asian war victims. Without facing up to the consequences of their own past war of aggression, however, they have no chance to successfully undertake a universal peace movement.

The Constitution of Japan, promulgated in 1946, proudly states in its preamble "We believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone, but that laws of political morality are universal" and that obedience to such laws is "incumbent." That notwithstanding, postwar Japan has been concerned exclusively with itself, totally ignoring other nations.

For instance, although the Japanese government took considerable pains to help the repatriation of 290,000 Japanese who were left behind in Sakhalin after the war, it did nothing for Koreans left behind who had been forced to collaborate with Japan's military policy. "The Karafuto League," a private organization of families of Japanese left in Sakhalin and repatriates, also gave no consideration to Koreans left there.

Such characteristics of postwar Japanese are strong even among the ostensibly progressive. For instance, regarding the issue of atomic bomb survivors, another major task of postwar management, the "Association of Japanese Atomic and Hydrogen Bomb Victims Organizations" ( Nihonhidankyo ), a national organization with 350,000 atomic bomb survivors in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, is the primarily symbolic organization for the postwar peace movement. The main objective of the organization for 30 years has been to enact the Nuclear Bomb Victim Aid Law ( Hibakushaengoho ) based on the principle of state compensation, which at least passed the Upper House as legislation of House members in 1989. However, the organization's claims, if enacted as law, will limit those eligible for aid only to Japanese residents, excluding 23,000 repatriated South Koreans and other A-bomb survivors abroad. Among the 100,000 Korean victims in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, who had been forced to immigrate from the colony to work in Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and other munitions factories, many have died and those surviving are living in misery in South Korea. Without taking these people into consideration, the nuclear bomb victims in Japan, the aggressor nation, have no justification for their exclusive consideration of themselves. Without demanding an equal, if not preferential, treatment for Korean victims as compatriots, the movement cannot achieve universality or moral persuasiveness. In this respect, a recent move within the organization to encourage greater exchange with victims in South Korea seems a positive sign.

The "Efficient" Japanese Bureaucracy

Within the Cold War framework and social atmosphere described above, Japan concluded various postwar management treaties with victimized countries in the '50s and '60s. During the process, the Japanese government concentrated on negotiating to slash the bills from its victims as much as possible. The formidable efficiency of the Japanese Foreign Office bureaucrats during the process won them the cynical appraisal, "legal bandits," from Chou En-lay. Moreover, the US, through treaties, put pressure on Asian countries to accept compromises. In February 1951, a group of US envoys, led by former Secretary of State John F. Dulles, paid a visit to the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand to persuade them to give up their claims for reparations, emphasizing the importance of Japan as a barrier against communist threats from the USSR and PRC. Reduced in this manner, the reparations and donations eventually paid in the name of economic aid by Japan were used to build up the local economies of the claimant countries as well as to assist Japan's economic ventures there. The money yielded double- or triple- fold benefits for Japan: solving international problems, revitalizing the Japanese economy and promoting its economic control of Asian countries. The Japanese government was well aware that the reparations it paid would never be passed on to any but a few of the individual victims. Japan has chosen to collaborate with local power holders who have suppressed their own people's cries for compensation. In essence, what Japan "resolved" was limited to its relations with troubled governments, not the people of Asia.

People Escaping the Past

We have seen the ways in which the government, progressives and intellectuals have dealt with the problem. How about people who experienced the war? After the war, seven million soldiers, militia and civilians returned home from overseas battlefields. How did they describe what they had done in China and other countries of Asia? Did they try to tell accurately of the conditions they had witnessed of more than two million Koreans and Chinese who had been brought to Japan? Did they not remain silent, just as the Japanese military and government had tried to burn all the documents? They may have bragged about their own experiences of killing Chinese and violently coercing Korean women as "comfort women" on occasions such as veterans' reunions, but very few made any serious attempt to tell the truth, as a historical lesson, to younger generations. They may have told of their hardships on foreign battlefields, yet seldom spoke of their stigmatizing experiences. They had spent years in various places in Asia and must have had some association with the local populations. Nevertheless, about that crucial period in their lives and the events surrounding it, they never spoke out, confining themselves to and living in their private worlds. If they continue to justify their past actions, averting their eyes from the fact that they are living on the corpses and ruins, sufferings and resentment of other Asians, they are nothing but hypocrites. We must seriously consider what happened and why, what we did at that point, and, including the postwar generations, tackle the issue of postwar compensation in order to be able to associate with our Asian neighbors without a sense of guilt.

5. The Collapse of the Cold War Structure and Democratization in Asia

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Since the mid-1980s, perestroika in the Soviet Union has brought about an advancement in democratization on a global scale, eventually facilitating postwar compensation. Deregulation of Jewish emigration from the USSR was accompanied by a similar expedition of the question of Koreans left in Sakhalin, with family reunions for these Koreans in Japan increasing since 1987. The Seoul Olympics in 1988 made it possible for Koreans in Sakhalin to visit South Korea. Establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and both the USSR and PRC, was symbolic of the collapse of the Cold War structure, which opened the way to allowing all the postwar compensation problems into the open, going beyond the issue of Koreans left in Sakhalin.

Meanwhile, in the regions damaged by Japanese aggression, democracy has gradually spread and the economy strengthened. Through this, war victims have become able to make their demands for redress of individual human rights violations, even when at odds with the will of their own government. For example, in South Korea, the vanguard of the compensation claims movements, settling the past with Japan emerged as an important social issue during the process of democratization that has been occurring since the administration of President Roh Tae-woo. 19 out of 22 court cases concerning claims for postwar compensation have been filed by South Koreans living in Russia, Japan or their homeland. Beside South Koreans, only Philippino, Hong Kong and Dutch victims have filed lawsuits. This also demonstrates how democratization is closely related to postwar compensation and redress for the violation of individual human rights.

6. The Meaning of Postwar Compensation

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Now that pressures from international politics have disappeared in line with the end of the Cold War, solving the postwar compensation issue has become a national task for Japan. The Japanese leaders, who have maintained political control under the aegis of US Asian policies, now find themselves with no choice but to face up to the obligations of history. No longer can they deceive their Asian neighbors.

The statement by Minister of Justice Shigeto Nagano in May 1994 that Japan did not invade Asia, that the Rape of Nanjing was a fabrication and that military comfort women were simply prostitutes, clearly demonstrated his insensitivity to the changing times. Apologies made by Japanese prime ministers, in keeping with the collapse of the Cold War structure, were an inevitable response to Japan's gradual realization of the grave importance of Asia.

Also, more importantly, Japan's democratization and true internationalization, which were halted by the Cold War, should be put on the agenda. We must now honor our obligation to practice the international ethical standards required by acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration and the Constitution of Japan. We must overcome the habit of exclusive self-absorption. Fortunately, although few, there are citizens who, jointly with Asian war victims, are concerning themselves with the postwar compensation issue; since the issue of military comfort women surfaced, citizen's groups concerned with this issue have spread throughout Japan. Because these citizen's groups have emerged independent of existing political parties and organizations, they have positioned themselves in relation to the fundamental questions of the postwar era, and are raising questions of war responsibility and compensation in their search for principles Japan should follow. War victims are now aging and soon there will be no first-hand testimony from victims available. Should we miss this last chance to compensate the victims directly, the unhealed wounds will be passed on to their families and fellow citizens, creating permanent national resentment, which will effectively deprive Japan of any possibility of reconciliation with other Asians. In this sense too, the question of postwar compensation should be brought up immediately.

7. Establishing Mutual Trust with Asian Neighbors

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Presently, the relations between Japan and Asia are becoming more extensive and profound with each passing year. The exchange is not limited to tourism and travel, but also includes the economy; Japan invests throughout Asia, from South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia to China, and these countries have become indispensable to Japanese industries. The region was once subjected to unbridled aggression by Japanese and this unsolved past still haunts investment and trade and labor relations, distorting judgment on both sides, which then prevents economic principles from operating.

Statements by top officials like Nagano, which reflect condescension toward Asia while trying to justify Japan's past, always trigger fierce anti-Japanese campaigns in Asia. These statements of justifying the war and denying past aggression suggest the return of an aggressive Japan. In fact, among the leadership, some forces are seeking a future for Japan built on the same historical perspectives and state concepts as in the past. In March 1994, former Army Staff Officer Ryuzo Sejima reportedly stated that the military dispatch to Shandong, China in 1927-28 was Japan's first PKO (Peace Keeping Operation) undertaking (Asahi Newspaper May 28, 1994).

Our aims in demanding postwar compensation lie primarily in the redress of those victims whose human rights were violated, yet also in transforming Japanese society so as to guarantee no recurrence of past mistakes. Unless Japan creates such a society, no true mutual trust can be built. In order to create such a society, postwar compensation should presently be discussed.


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