March 2005

Doug Hellinger
Development-Gap
Washington D.C.
USA

Dear Robin,

Steve just looked at what I wrote and said that I left out perhaps the main benefit of these initiatives, at least of SAPRI: that it demonstrated that organized civil society had the capacity to play an important role in economic policymaking based on its local knowledge, perspectives, and analysis, while representing its interests and priorities.

The Bank was intimately involved in SAPRI and probably had more than its "fingerprints" on the other two initiatives, to qualify another point.

DH

Dear Robin and Julie,

Many thanks for the opportunity to review the paper, which I did quickly and enjoyed earlier this week. But, crashing on fundraising and facing two back-to-back trips, starting with the one to Ghana tomorrow morning, means that I can give only a cursory response before I leave.

I think that the background and assessment are right on. It would be great if you could include the article I sent you in the bibliography, as it documents some of the backsliding that has been going on at the Bank. In Ghana, we are going to continue to push Martin and Chien Yen to help take the trade activist methodology into the IFI sphere, as we have believed for some time that there is real potential there, given the right circumstances (particularly in Latin America) for establishing a more effective accountability mechanism.

That takes us to the one disagreement I have the piece, a difference not on content or analysis but ones of emphasis and strategy. It's not that I disagree on the strategy of trying to get rid of the Bank and replace it with something better. The question is, how are we going to do that, especially in this environment? It's always helpful to throw ideas into the marketplace, like we all have over the past 20-30 years, but I think today it has to have some sticking power and the ability to have a real effect.
Ideas alone won't do it unless, say, it relates in some devious way to the Republicans' shrink-the-Bank efforts (which is always the way we should have gone, as you rightfully imply). I would emphasize instead the development of new approaches to real IFI accountability (maybe also unrealistic), but the two general strategies are not mutually exclusive and might be complementary.

Two final, related notes, if you don't mind, as I run out the door. This might seem self-serving, since we initiated SAPRI as the first of the major engagements with the Bank, but I think that it is important not to note the three initiatives as failures. They were successes in at least four important ways. First, they all yielded highly public findings extremely critical of Bank operations and each had the Bank's fingerprints all over it. Second, CSOs found a way in each case to level the playing field, despite Bank machinations, so that they were on equal footing with the Bank, something that most governments haven't been able to do. Third, at least in the case of SAPRI, tremendously successful CSO mobilization and participation took place in unique ways and, in at least some cases, more informed and mobilized populations are still active on various issues.
Four, the Bank took a battering for bailing out of its commitments to act on the findings and recommendations of the initiatives, giving lie to its interest in constructive engagement.

Related to that point, you might want to reference the outcomes of, and reports about, the three initiatives in the Research Dept. section as examples of what happens when the Bank actually opens the door to participatory investigations.

Gotta run. Hope this is okay.

Best, Doug